Introduction

Towards the end of the last millennium, I published a relatively brief volume on *Revelation and Reconciliation: a Window on Modernity*.[1] It was both a polemical and a constructive attempt to consider modernity from a specific and limited point of view. Although it did not deal with postmodernity, it did note that postmodernity could be regarded as late modernity.[2] Its polemic was directed against those who highlighted epistemological issues in the intellectual breakdown of Western Christianity. Conversely and constructively, I argued that underlying the surface contrast and collision between reason and revelation was the contrast and collision between what may loosely be called moral self-sufficiency and the Christian claim that God has acted in history for our reconciliation. According to Nietzsche, who featured quite prominently in my account, 'the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown. . . . I accordingly do not believe a "drive to knowledge" to be the father of philosophy.'[3] The argument in my volume did not amount

1. Stephen N. Williams, *Revelation and Reconciliation: a Window on Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
2. Colin Gunton, whose work came in for much consideration, drew no sharp lines between modernity and postmodernity in this respect in *The One, The Three and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 5, 12.
3. I quote from the translation of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil* (London: Penguin, 1990), section 6, used in my 1995 volume. From now on, this work is

to a direct endorsement of Nietzsche's claim; had that been its aim, it would have flopped badly, for I made no pretence to an engagement with philosophy. Further, my argument was no more indebted to Nietzsche's thought in general than it was overtly committed to this far-reaching categorical judgement of his in particular. Nevertheless, the argument that I ran clearly resonated with Nietzsche's judgement and constituted a proposal for the primacy of the moral over the epistemological in a way consonant with it.

The reason for turning the searchlight on the question of epistemology was that some theologians had appropriated and endorsed observations by Michael Polanyi that called for critical interrogation. What polemically drove the first edition were largely, though not solely, the contributions of two of them, Lesslie Newbigin and Colin Gunton, to discussions of the Enlightenment and modernity. They highlighted the significance of the epistemological shift effected by Descartes and Locke, which, they opined, disastrously overthrew the theologically and philosophically correct way of ordering the relations of reason and revelation. In the first chapter of the volume, I described Newbigin's and Gunton's arguments, voiced preliminary doubts about them and then briefly looked at Descartes from a different point of view. The second chapter dealt more rigorously with Locke. A third chapter enlisted Barth in the service of the argument that epistemological shifts in the eighteenth century, while most certainly significant, were nonetheless less basic than and were at the service of developing pretensions to autonomy in contrast to the Christian tradition. This chapter, like the previous one, also touched on deism. Nietzsche was the subject of the fourth and Don Cupitt of the fifth chapter before a final chapter concluded with brief reflections on a dogmatic, as opposed to an historical, approach to the theological question of reconciliation in history. Gunton's Bampton Lectures, *The One, the Three and the Many*, appeared just too late for me to integrate discussion of it satisfactorily into the main body of the book but, as it dealt with relevant matters, an 'Appendix' was devoted to it.

This second edition, which now sees the light of day, is very substantially revised to the point of being largely re-written; witness a one-word adjustment in the title to signal the difference. It sees the light of day because of the kind encouragement of theological friends to produce it, and special thanks in that regard go to Dr Andrew Moore in Oxford, Professor Bradley Green of Union University, Tennessee and

abbreviated as *BGE* and Adrian Del Carro's translation, *Beyond Good and Evil/ On the Genealogy of Morality* [*OGM*] (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014) is used.

Professor Daniel Treier of Wheaton College, Illinois. Its production has taken longer than it should have done because it initially seemed to me that there were only two ways of realistically going about it, each of which had a drawback. On the one hand, an edition that was only slightly altered would be unsatisfactory, failing to reckon with the passage of time since the first. On the other hand, a completely new volume would confound the purpose of re-launching the old. *Tertium non datur* (there is no third way) seemed to be writ large over the project by a scowling Muse. However, I have now defied her with all the boldness of a Classical hero and attempted a middle way. I trust that this resulting second edition is neither a lame compromise between the two rejected alternatives nor an unsightly dialectical attempt to transcend antitheses but, on the contrary, a felicitous re-writing.

What is going on now, in this second edition, is as follows. Lesslie Newbigin's work continues to command attention in missiological circles. Yet, without implying that there is no value today in what he said on the subject with which *Revelation and Reconciliation* originally dealt and deals now, I have re-oriented the discussion in this book so that he is ungraciously airbrushed out of its main body. By way of compensation, it well serves my purpose to recapitulate below, in this introduction, the substance of my original engagement with him. I have treated Colin Gunton with greater dignity. Rather than compel him either to carry the burden Newbiginlessly from the beginning of the book or virtually disappear Newbiginly in the course of it, the level of academic interest in his work since the first edition has warranted my expanding and strengthening what was originally the 'Appendix', re-writing it so as to form a chapter in the main body of the book. I have also kept him in the frame before that by way of occasional allusion. [4] In arguing my thesis, then, in this second edition, I have formally distanced it somewhat from some of the contributions that goaded me into it in the first place, but the concerns and substance of my argument remain exactly what they were in the first edition.

In this revised edition, the material arising from a consideration of Descartes has been expanded in the first chapter at the expense of our two theologians, though the chapter is not just about Descartes. The second chapter, on Locke, and the third, on Barth, are slightly altered

4. Michael Polanyi, whose critique of Locke steered Newbigin and Gunton's analyses and who correspondingly occupied an important place in the early chapters of the first edition, has attained the via media in relation to these two. I enlarge his profile in this edition, but he does not attain the Guntonian heights of a dedicated chapter.

here and there, but they remain substantially the same. The first half of this volume, then, has been revised and somewhat expanded overall, but most of it is not substantially re-written. It is otherwise with the second half. The (fourth) chapter on Nietzsche has been entirely re-written. [5] The chapter on Don Cupitt, which originally followed it, has simply been dropped and Colin Gunton is now substituted for Cupitt in the fifth chapter. The final chapter has been largely re-written, while retaining a key argument from the original. None of this will matter much to anyone except the author, but remnants of a once noble, if rather shallow, professional conscience oblige me to square accounts with the (doubtless equally noble) reader.

The Nature of the Enquiry

Explaining how Lesslie Newbigin and Colin Gunton set me on the trail followed in the first edition is not an exercise in wandering down memory lane.[6] It explains the concerns that lay and lie behind this work. A generation ago, there was a significant movement in the United Kingdom to proclaim the gospel as 'public truth'. No one was more prominent in it than Lesslie Newbigin, perhaps the most influential missiologist of that generation in the English-speaking world. In his Osterhaven Lectures, published under the title *Truth to Tell: The Gospel as Public Truth*, Newbigin declared the need 'to affirm the gospel not only as an invitation to a private and personal decision but as public truth which ought to be acknowledged as true for the whole life of society'.[7] He urgently advocated a cultural renewal comparable to what Augustine strove to accomplish in and in relation to a decaying Classical world. What Augustine did was to establish publicly the main elements of a Christian world-view by unashamedly starting with dogma, specifically Christian dogma. Following Augustine's act of intellectual creation came intellectual transgression, featuring Descartes, who led the way in persuading us to start our intellectual constructions with doubt rather than with dogma. 'I hope', said Newbigin, that it is 'not overdramatizing'

5. I had the opportunity of pursuing Nietzsche in greater depth in the interval between the first and the present editions. See Stephen N. Williams, *The Shadow of the Antichrist: Nietzsche's Critique of Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic Press, 2006). In this work, I cite quite extensively secondary literature on Nietzsche along with the primary literature, whereas in this volume, relatively little secondary literature is cited.
6. I repeat here some of the material found on pages 1-12 of the first edition.
7. *Truth to Tell: The Gospel as Public Truth* (London: SPCK, 1991) 2.

to 'say that the new Cartesian starting-point, which has been so foundational for all that has followed, was a small-scale repetition of the Fall'.[8] From then on, the critical method expanded, eventually to implode under the pressure of its own logic, leaving the stark and sinister Nietzschean will as the source of understanding. Responding to this state of affairs, Newbigin offered a rationale for a new Augustinianism, making belief again the starting-point of knowledge. His modern mentor in this project was Michael Polanyi.

In identifying Polanyi as the most prominent of his aides or guides in the task of epistemological renewal, Newbigin was recycling an argument developed with some passion and force in at least three previous works.[9] Jointly considered, these works constituted a proposal for intellectual reconstruction built on a critique of the legacy of the Enlightenment. The passion for the restoration of meaning and hope exhibited in these works was suited to the high social, religious and cultural significance of their author's aims. Newbigin did not doubt that the Enlightenment brought great gains, which must be preserved. However, he opined that their salutary preservation required a Christian frame of life and thought. The Enlightenment framework turned out to be catastrophic. On account of its problematic epistemology, it led culturally to the loss of both meaning and hope. Doubt was given epistemic primacy over belief. This found its most prominent expression in the scientific world-view. Speaking of faith – which, in this context, meant the same as 'belief' – in its relationship to doubt, Newbigin said: 'The reversal of roles between these two words was at the heart of the experience which ushered in the modern scientific world-view. . . . At the centre of the movement which created our modern culture was a shift in the balance between faith and doubt.'[10]

If Descartes was responsible for the fall, it was John Locke who merited the stick at the particular point where these words were written. As far as Newbigin was concerned, Polanyi neatly and precisely

8. In light of Newbigin's vocabulary, we note that belief 'that the task of Cartesian philosophy is to make good what we lost with the Fall' was present early; see, e.g., Nicholas Joseph Poisson in 1671, quoted in Stephen Gaukroger, *The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210 – 1685* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006) 337. Had Newbigin made reference to Francis Bacon, he would have been referring to a project explicitly dedicated to that task.
9. *The Other Side of 1984* (London: World Council of Churches, 1983); *Foolishness to the Greeks* (London: SPCK, 1986); *The Gospel in a Pluralist Society* (London: SPCK, 1989).
10. *The Other Side*, 20.

identified the problem bequeathed by Locke. This was the elevation of demonstrative reason over faith, and it constituted the hallmark of the critical mind at its modern cultural advent. In the round, Newbigin was pitting Augustine and Polanyi against Descartes and Locke in the enterprise of restoring faith as the ground of knowing. What made Polanyi's contribution particularly weighty was that it issued from a philosopher of science. Science is 'the intellectual core', the 'mental and spiritual heart' of our culture. Its abandonment of teleology is the key to the way it understands nature, and its generalized philosophy contains the epistemological poison that entered the bloodstream of Western thought. While Polanyi did not espouse Augustine's Christian faith in particular, he made room for and gave support to a contemporary repristination of Augustine's basic epistemological approach, viz., the grounding of knowledge in faith and the presentation of truth on a foundation of dogma.

Newbigin's main theological ally in advancing this line of thought shared the limelight with him in my original enquiry. That was Colin Gunton, who engaged in rather more detail than did Newbigin with the aforesaid epistemological issues. In an essay exploring the 'epistemology of the concrete', Gunton claimed that 'the Gospel's unique contribution to epistemology is best illustrated by means of an instance of creative and imaginative rationality, which is still essentially grounded in the concrete and the particular'.[11] It is vital that we promote this in light of the 'baneful legacy which Enlightenment epistemology has bequeathed to our culture'.[12] The personalistic theology that Gunton sketched in order to counter that legacy was associated with Polanyi's brand of *fides quaerens intellectum*. Like Newbigin, Gunton was here sustaining a line that he had taken for some years. Epistemology is not just *an* issue. Newbigin wrote the foreword to Gunton's *Enlightenment and Alienation*, a volume that set out a thesis parallel to his own, albeit developed differently.[13] Gunton argued here that the Enlightenment produced a variety of alienations whose first mark 'is the tearing apart of belief and knowledge'.[14] Tackling this theme in three parts, Gunton duly dealt

11. See 'Knowledge and Culture: towards an epistemology of the concrete' in Hugh Montefiore, ed., *The Gospel and Contemporary Culture* (London: Mowbray, 1992) 84-102, quotation from p. 94.
12. 'Knowledge and Culture', 85.
13. *Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay towards a Trinitarian Theology* (Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1985). In this work, Gunton picked out for commendation *The Other Side of 1984* from amongst Newbigin's works, ix.
14. *Enlightenment and Alienation*, 5.

with epistemology first.[15] Descartes lies at the bottom of our problems. He succeeded in dividing the world dualistically into a world of senses and a world of intellect, an operation that results in the alienation of mind from the world. By forging a lamentably skewed philosophy of perception, Descartes promoted intellectual error, eventually generating a conceptual incapacity for epistemological realism. The religious outcome of this was that claims essential to any sound theological epistemology were outlawed. In this context, Immanuel Kant was able to spin out a philosophical anthropology and a moral philosophy that featured an autonomous moral subject, separated in freedom from the external world of causal order and convinced that any external authority, supremely God, was an interference with autonomy and, thus, with moral agency. Gunton perceived that the sad end of all this is that we are alienated from our world, our true selves and our God.

'The sad end' – but if epistemology was the beginning, what exactly was the end? Moving in a general direction similar to that of Newbigin on nihilism, but limning the contours of his account a bit differently, Gunton remarked on the atheistic telos of the trends he was concerned to expose. With Newbigin, he followed Polanyi in his indictment of Locke and with Eberhard Jüngel he indicted Descartes. Descartes is a significant source of atheism. Jüngel judged Western atheism to be eminently a reaction to a God whose predominant attribute is power. Descartes' methodological doubt had two relevant consequences in this respect. Firstly, in the process of his deductions, by the time Descartes had worked his way out of the *cogito* through to the demonstration of divine existence, God turned out to be necessary for human identity. If God is necessary, we are dependent, and it is the notion of such dependence, such a relation to power, that largely fuelled atheistic revolution. Secondly, Descartes' conclusion could be up-ended. God was so positioned in the intellectual scheme of things that, in effect, he was dependent on us humans, for he emerged at the end of human logical operations. Conceivably, then, he is the product of my thought. Ontological power turns out to be perched precariously on a highly suspect appearance of logical necessity. Enter Fichte, Feuerbach and finally Nietzsche, who will topple the deity by razing the foundations on which deity was mounted.[16]

15. While Gunton appears to accord priority to the epistemological question, describing 'the tearing apart of belief and knowledge' as the 'first *mark* of alienation' (my italics) is not the same as saying that it is the first *cause* of alienation.

16. See especially chapter 10 of the work to which Gunton is indebted here,

Like Newbigin, Gunton offered a rich and positive contribution to the theological resolution of these problems, his own being of a studiously Trinitarian nature. Saluting their fruitfulness and force, I did not in the original edition interest myself in the substantive and worthy doctrinal proposals of either author, nor in that of Jüngel for that matter. My interest lay in their report on the past. Two questions troubled me on that score. The first applied to Gunton's work and was then, and remains now, of lesser importance, though not unimportant. If Gunton agreed with Newbigin's positive account of Augustine, as far as it went, he showed little sign of it; it was to the negative and not to the positive features of Augustine's intellectual effort that he persistently drew attention. My interest was not then, and is not now, in adjudicating Gunton's critique of Augustine's substantive theology, but in his reading of the influence of Augustine on intellectual history. Overtly, it was entirely different from Newbigin's, yet they both agreed with Polanyi's appeal to Augustine. Moreover, my interest in his reading of the influence of Augustine on intellectual history included an interest in the general principles of Gunton's reading of intellectual history.

The second question, by far the chief, that exercised me in connection with our two authors provides us with an entrée into the present volume. In *The Other Side of 1984* and *Foolishness to the Greeks*, Newbigin made much of the rise of modern science and scientific method. The success of scientific explanation led to a wider, if not imperialistic, ideal of explanation in the form of generalisation from science and this disabled people from accepting forms of explanation other than the narrowly scientific. Scientific knowledge became a paradigm for knowledge. Then, in *The Gospel in a Pluralist Society*, we encounter an interesting admission. In *The Other Side of 1984*, Newbigin had fleetingly referred to the influence of the Renaissance on the eventual outcome for theology of the seventeenth-century scientific method. Now, in *The Gospel in a Pluralist Society*, he observed that Reventlow's detailed study of *The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World* had led him to see that broad currents of humanistic spirituality and rationality flowed even deeper than the stream of scientific movement under the surface of modern culture.

'Spirituality' is the more interesting and telling word in this pair. Well might Newbigin use it alongside 'rationality' in his account of Reventlow's work. Reventlow documented the way in which the notion of Christianity as a scheme of moral action dominated the beginnings and development

Eberhard Jüngel's *God as the Mystery of the World* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1983).

of biblical criticism up until the eighteenth century, and he did it so as to give clear prominence to the place of broadly moral considerations in the formation of modernity. On Reventlow's account, a humanistic religious outlook, of which Stoicism is a significant component, undergirds the form of post-Reformation rationalism that bears fruit in the deistic turn against traditional Christianity and its claims to revelation.[17] What made Newbigin's acknowledgement of Reventlow's influence interesting and telling is that it led him to no perceptible modification of his historical thesis on the role of epistemology in either this or in the succeeding volume, *Truth to Tell*. Why not? Reventlow places epistemological and scientific questions in a wider context. This should surely have affected or challenged Newbigin's diagnosis of modernity. Apparently it did not.

A little probing unearthed more questions. When, under the influence of Basil Willey, Newbigin claimed that the Enlightenment was characterized by a shift towards celebrating the general sufficiency of the scientific mode of explanation, he picked out the familiar fact that Newton taught the Enlightenment to start with and work from what is observable. Do this, however, and you just end up with a bloated version of the observable with which you started. So Newbigin thought:

> The totality of all observable phenomena is 'Nature'. 'Nature' in effect replaces the concept of God, which is no longer necessary. The characteristic position of the eighteenth century, known as 'Deism', did indeed retain the concept of God as a sort of Prime Mover standing behind the processes of nature. But even in that century there were plenty of critics who defined a deist as 'a person who is not weak enough to be a Christian and not strong enough to be an atheist'. The nineteenth century drew the obvious conclusion: there was no place for 'God'.[18]

These words indicate a hiatus in explanation. Leaving aside the questions of whether the characteristic position of the eighteenth century should be identified with deism and then deism identified with this notion of God, something was obviously missing from Newbigin's

17. E.g., Reventlow uses the phrase 'moralistic-spiritualistic religious humanism' to describe this outlook, H. G. Reventlow, *The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World* (London: SCM, 1984) 72. See his discussion of Herbert of Cherbury in part 2, chapter 2.
18. I had made much of these words in a brief article on 'Theologians in Pursuit of the Enlightenment', *Theology* LXXXIX, September, 1986, which included discussion of the work of Andrew Louth.

summary account. If the concept of God in the eighteenth century merely fulfilled a role that, logically, 'Nature' was equipped to fulfill, then we might indeed understand the logic of the atheistic outcome as described here by Newbigin. That is, God retreats with the advance of Nature. However, there was significantly more to nineteenth-century atheism than one would gather from this account. Take Kant. On Newbigin's account, replacing God with Nature recasts the whole understanding of law, reason and conscience, a fact to which Kant's philosophy is something of a monument. Yet, as far as Kant was concerned, whatever happens to God when you are talking science, cosmological and even teleological arguments, you require at least some kind of God in some kind of way when you talk morality through to its end. Morality blocks atheism. Granted, the survival of God on Kant's moral understanding may be adjudged extremely tenuous and the surviving God theistically thin. Nonetheless, Kant's insistence on God's regulative presence in this domain of moral discourse testifies to the way in which the concept of God had provided the foundation for morality in Western Christianity hitherto. God had been intellectually required to account for human moral agency as well as for the physical cosmos. This is where questions arose about Newbigin's account. In light of Kant, what was Newbigin proposing? Was he implying that the trajectory in the breakdown of revelation that eventually led to the denial of God *began* by acquitting God of responsibility for creation and *proceeded* from there to his suspension from office as moral judge? If this was the historical claim about the course of intellectual history, could it possibly be right? Newbigin was scarcely making such a detailed historical claim, but how could he arrive at his conclusions about atheism by limiting his attention to science?

It was not only his reference to Reventlow that generated my questions about Newbigin's account. In *The Other Side of 1984*, Newbigin drew on Charles Norris Cochrane's celebrated study of *Christianity and Classical Culture* for his interpretation of Augustine's philosophy of cultural renewal, and in *Truth to Tell* he confessed how much this work had influenced him.[19] It is as important to ask why Newbigin, influenced by Cochrane's work, followed the epistemological trajectory that he did as it is to ask why, influenced by Reventlow's work, he did not follow the moral trajectory that Reventlow did. While Cochrane certainly made much of Augustine's reconstruction of epistemology, he also made clear that Augustine located the error of Classical culture morally in the realm of self-will even more fundamentally than in the intellectual realm of

19. *Truth to Tell*, 15.

epistemological method.[20] 'The conditions of wisdom are, at bottom, not so much intellectual as moral.'[21] Here, Cochrane shored up the familiar account of Augustine on the centrality of the human will and of pride in human thought and deed.

We know that, prior to the Enlightenment, such figures as Luther, Calvin and Pascal took this general line. After the Enlightenment, Kierkegaard observed in rather Augustinian vein:

> People try to persuade us that the objections against Christianity spring from doubt. The objections against Christianity spring from insubordination, the dislike of obedience, rebellion against all authority. As a result people have hitherto been beating the air in their struggle against objections, because they have fought intellectually with doubt instead of fighting morally with rebellion. [22]

How did Kierkegaard's analysis stand in relation to Newbigin's account, drawing deeply, as Newbigin did, on Augustine and proximately on Reventlow? The question could not be avoided of whether Newbigin had failed to integrate into his account a perspective or perspectives that would potentially have modified that account very significantly indeed.

So much for the literature that inspired the enquiry in the original edition of *Revelation and Reconciliation*. I have alluded to it both in order to explain what sparked my engagement with Descartes and Locke and as a prelude to what follows in the present volume. I shall now let Newbigin rest in peace and Gunton be content with an occasional appearance until he comes into his own the fifth chapter.

20. C.N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: a study of thought and action from Augustus to Augustine* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944). Although it is the discussion that closes the chapter on 'Nostra Philosophia' (446 – 455) that particularly brings this out, it is heralded in an earlier expository comment that, from the standpoint of the human subject conceived 'as a centre of radiant energy . . . the different so-called faculties may all be considered as functions of the will' (389).
21. *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 451.
22. Quoted in Howard and Edna Hong's translation of Kierkegaard's *Works of Love* (New York, NY etc; Harper & Row, 1962) 11. More poignantly: 'Everything essentially Christian must have in its presentation a resemblance to the way a physician speaks at the sickbed; even if only medical experts understand it, it must never be forgotten that the situation is the bedside of a sick person', Kierkegaard, *Sickness Unto Death: a psychological exposition for upbuilding and awakening*, tr. H.V and E.V. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) 5.

In the first edition, I underlined the fact that the volume was not designed as a work of deep or comprehensive scholarship. Whether or not the scholarship was beyond my capacity, it was certainly beyond my ambition. So it is with this new edition. While I invariably enjoy and usually profit from comprehensive analyses of Western intellectual history relevant to my theme, I am not interested here either in offering anything comprehensive myself or even in citing the important works that do.[23] À propos of this second edition, I underline, now in bold, this scholarly limitation by adding to the original a confession about the present edition: I have no more tried to incorporate all the relevant scholarship of the intervening period between the editions than I did all the scholarship of the late twentieth century in the first edition. It goes without saying that this can no more be an excuse now than a corresponding excuse would have been then for making sloppy and indefensible judgements. In preparation for this present edition, I have consulted more recent scholarship to see whether something said in the earlier edition needed to be shored up, supplemented, modified, corrected or abandoned. However, like that princely and exemplary student who regarded every mark above the 40% required to pass the module as a sign of a corresponding number of hours wasted in the library, I have done the minimum in order to secure a pass. Whether or not I have succeeded is, of course, up to the examiners of this volume.[24]

23. However, three works that I have found instructive should be mentioned. One is Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), which is particularly interesting in light of the use I make in chapter 1, below, of Taylor's *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). A second is Bradley S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: how a religious revolution secularized society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). The third, to which I am much indebted beyond what I have learned from it of intellectual history, is Iain McGilchrist, *The Master and his Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World* (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2012). There is a fourth and different kind of work that deserves mention. While written on a different subject from the one with which this book is concerned, and not a work on intellectual history, Shoshana Zuboff's devastatingly well-documented and chillingly sobering *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for the Future at the New Frontier of Power* [one of two alternative sub-titles] (London: Profile, 2019) confirmed my growing sense since the first edition of *Revelation and Reconciliation* that the absence of Max Weber from it was as regrettable as the absence of Hegel, which I acknowledged at the time (xiii). With regard to Hegel, this judgement was confirmed by my reading of a work that influenced Colin Gunton, namely, Edward Craig, *The Mind of God and the Works of Man* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). Zuboff's analysis of the 'second modernity' is sobering.
24. For a persuasive and properly scholarly account of a germane subject that shows how relatively slender is my own treatment, see Peter Harrison, *The*

In what follows I have quoted extensively from both primary and secondary sources. I confess that it is not my preferred way of writing nor, sometimes, of reading, but I have judged it helpful to the reader of this volume to quote freely and, indeed, I have found it useful to myself. I trust that the reader who shares my literary taste will indulge me in what I high-mindedly perceive to be the public interest and the greater good. In any case, absolutely no shadow of value-judgement attends my literary preference. Questions about epistemology and scientific culture inevitably float around in the background to this work, though they are not substantially treated in the course of it. On matters surrounding these questions, I am instructed by many people but want to pick out the work of the late Mary Midgley. Why gratuitously mention her name? Well, firstly, because she exemplifies that style of literary communication that, for myself, I find most congenial. And why gratuitously mention that fact? Because, secondly, it gives me an excuse to smuggle in reference to her support for the proposition that 'change of moral temper, and not any scientific discovery, seems . . . the root cause of the modern estrangement from traditional religion'.[25] Although a relatively brief study such as follows cannot hope even to get close to demonstrating that point, I hope that it contributes to grounding its plausibility.

Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

25. *Science as Salvation: A modern myth and its meaning* (London; New York: Routledge, 1992) 118. Cf. 125.