F

FABLE, *FABLIAU*. The hypothesis that the fable gave birth to the *fabliau* is not very convincing. The *fabliau* is fable only if we give this word the broad sense of "fiction". With no obvious genetic relationship, the two genres have a very different structure. The fable is deliberately allegorical: what it says of animals makes sense only when applied to humans. The *fabliau* is without depth, it settles directly into the "human, too human".

The 150-odd surviving French *fabliaux* are comic tales written mostly in the 13th century. Most have less than 300 verses. Their plot is borrowed from narrative tradition, written or oral, popular or learned: thus the same story independently inspired the *fabliau* of the *Vilain Mire* (the peasant doctor) and Molière's *Le Médecin malgré lui*. The setting of the *fabliaux* is that of everyday life; their pleasure is that which we get from seeing aggressive tendencies satisfied by violence or cunning and obscene tendencies by defecation or sex. The only point is to enjoy the lubricity of spouses, the false candour of girls, the ingeniousness of students, the outrages inflicted on avaricious and debauched priests, the malice of peasants. The narrators have an unequalled talent. The best handle the techniques of the literary art of their time cleverly. Some have a strong personality (Gautier Le Leu, author of the *Prêtre taint*) and are known for more ambitious works: Jehan *Bodel of Arras (*Le Vilain de Bailleul*, *c*.1200), Rutebeuf (*Le Pet au vilain, c*.1260), Jean de Condé of Hainaut (*La Nonnette, c*.1330). The *fabliau* had its contemporary equivalent in the German *Versschwank*; it disappeared with Jean de Condé, but lived again in Italian collections of novels (including *Boccaccio's Decameron*) and their imitations, English (*Chaucer, *Canterbury Tales*) or French (anonymous *Cent nouvelles nouvelles*, Marguerite de Navarre's *Heptaméron*).

The medieval Latin collections of fables and their French verse adaptations (Marie de France, *c*.1175) are reworkings of collections from late Antiquity. The *Avionnets* go back to the adaptation of the Greek Babrius by Flavius Aviannus; the *Isopets* to a prose compilation deriving from Phaedrus and attributed to a supposed Emperor Romulus! In accepting stories from folklore and, through the intermediary of Arabs, *Jews and Spaniards, stories of oriental origin, the Middle Ages enriched an already complex tradition. The fable was a respected genre. Fables have an ample place in collections of *exempla* for the use of preachers (*Parabolae* of Eudes of Cheriton, *c*.1225; *contes moralisés* of the *Franciscan Nicole Bozon, *c*.1335): their moral lesson came auspiciously to strengthen the authority of the *sermons.

P. Menard, *Les Fabliaux, contes à rire du Moyen Âge*, Paris, 1983. – D. Boutet, *Les Fabliaux*, Paris, 1985. – P. Carnes, *Fable Scholarship: an Annotated Bibliography*, New York, 1985. – G. Dicke, K. Grubmüller, *Die Fabeln des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit: ein Katalog*, Munich, 1987. – J. Hines, *The Fabliau in English*, London, 1993.

Pierre-Yves Badel

FABRICA. The *fabrica* can be defined as an institution intended to provide for the construction and maintenance of sacred buildings, in particular *cathedrals, *collegiate and especially parish churches; it also took charge of *liturgical objects, *vestments and *liturgical books. The term *fabrica* went back to Christian late Antiquity at a time when church revenues were divided into four parts, one of them being reserved for the "work" of the *fabrica* (*opus fabrice*). Later, at the time of *feudalism, the *patrimony of churches would be divided up before being turned into a *benefice, *i.e.* into revenues collected by the *cleric who performed divine service. In the new situation created by the *Gregorian reform, no provision was made for buildings. They were doubtless the province of the patron or the incumbent. But the construction of cathedrals and churches made it indispensable to create an organisation that would both collect and manage the funds.

Such foundations were particularly necessary in cathedral and *chapter churches because of the decline of common life and the creation of *prebends: part of the temporality was reserved for the *opus fabrice*, and one or more *canons, called workers (*operarii*) or treasurers (*thesaurii*), were charged with maintaining the buildings. The impulse given by the cathedrals was rapidly followed by parish churches; but during the 13th c. the *fabrica* often came under the control of the parishioners. This was the time when communities of parishioners and inhabitants, entitled to representation according to the norms defined by *canonists, were organised. For the needs of buildings and liturgical objects, the parishioners designated delegates sometimes called "procurators", sometimes "providers", "receivers", "rectors", "masters", "treasurers" or "workers". The term *matricularius* (*churchwarden), also used, came from the name given during the early Middle Ages to a servant of a church. The members of the *fabrica* were generally elected for a duration fixed by the assembly of parishioners. Yet, for the *fabrica* as for the *parish, we cannot advance universal rules: statutes varied from one region to another.

From the early 13th c., the autonomy of the *fabrica* was recognised by the Roman pontiffs, and this institution constituted a benefice distinct from that of the church and the other benefices that the church could count on. It drew resources, sometimes abundantly, from its own endowments, from *tithes, gifts and *legacies of the faithful. And in case of financial difficulty, impositions were laid on the parishioners.

The history and evolution of *fabricae* in the last centuries of the Middle Ages is not always easy to follow. Records of accounts show the power and wealth of the institution that had become an important part of parish life. However, it sometimes escaped the control of the parish community and fell under the tutelage of the local bourgeoisie or the municipal authorities, the two often being identical. So the *fabrica* could lose its autonomy and its representative character: moreover, in certain regions, the *fabrica* was replaced by the village community which took over the maintenance of the church. The *fabrica* can thus be considered one of the manifestations of the vitality of communal organisations in the late Middle Ages.

P. Adam, *La vie paroissiale en France au XIVᵉ siècle*, Paris, 1964, 80-86. – J. Gaudemet, *Le gouvernement de l'Église à l'époque classique: le gouvernement local*, 1979, 279-281 ("HDIEO", 8, 2). – B. Delmaire, *Le diocèse d'Arras de 1093 au milieu du XIVᵉ siècle*, Arras, 1994 (2 vol.).

Joseph Avril

FACULTY. A faculty is a power of the *soul, a *potentia* ("potency") or *virtus* ("virtue" in the old sense of "manly strength", the Greek *dunamis*), its capacity to produce operations by itself. Its sources are the biblical theme of the soul as the image of *God (Augustine: triad of "memory-intellect-will") and *Aristotelian psychology read through *Avicenna. The third of the Augustinian triad and the revealed doctrine of the divine *Trinity raised the question of the unity proper to the essence of the soul and of God. Augustine added a qualification: these three powers "are not three lives but one life, not three minds but one mind, hence not three essences but one essence" (*De Trinitate*, X, 11; *BAug*, 16, 154). *Alcuin offered a modalist explanation: they were just different names (*De animae ratione*, 11: *PL*, 101, 644 B). The 13th c. saw two antagonistic solutions: strict identity (*William of Auvergne, *Bonaventure with nuances, the traditionalists); or real distinction, following *Dionysius and *William of Auxerre, *Thomas Aquinas. The debate between the latter and the Augustinianizers arose in *c.*1270.

Affirming their real distinction, Thomas started from operative potency: on one hand, what belongs to the essence of the human subject, the higher powers of *intellect and *will ("memory" designates the intellect in its retention of irreversibly acquired intelligibles), identical to the essence of the soul in *man; on the other, the causal influx that proceeds from the object of operation (intellective, volitional) which dynamizes the intellect and the will and activates their proper receptivity. *God alone acts by his essence since he does not have to find outside himself either his intelligibles or his *good or his end to will. Hence a restatement of the notion of the trinitarian image, which is a trio not of faculties, but of cognitive and charitable operations in involution and bearing on the essence of the soul referred to its known or willed objects. Augustine's formula "one essence" designated the essence of the soul as the object of reflexive operation, hence, with a view to emphasizing the dynamic meaning of both the trinitarian image and the procession of divine Persons in eternal *circuminsession, a break with *Peter Lombard who relegated the Augustinian triad to three organ-faculties (*vires*). Later writers would ignore this restatement and confine themselves to subtleties called "formal reasons". Descartes would return to the bare modalism of Alcuin.

Fidèle d'Eysden, "La distinction de la substance et de ses puissances d'opération d'après saint Bonaventure", *EtFr*, 4, 1954, 5-23, 147-171. – John of La Rochelle, *Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae*, P. Michaud-Quantin (ed.), Paris, 1964.

A. Schneider, *Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen nach den Quellen dargestellt*, *BGPhMA*, 4, 5-6, 1903/1906. – E.-H. Wéber, *Dialogue et dissensions entre saint Bonaventure et saint Thomas d'Aquin à Paris (1252-1273)*, Paris, 1974. – E.-H. Wéber, *La Personne humaine au XIIIᵉ siècle*, Paris, 1991.

Édouard-Henri Wéber

FACULTY (UNIVERSITY). Towards the middle of the 13th c., the word "faculty" (*facultas*) took on the meaning it still has today, viz. the administrative subdivision of a *university organising the teaching of a discipline. At *Paris, there were from the start four faculties, the faculty of arts, which gave a preparatory teaching, and the three higher faculties, those of *theology, law and *medicine. The number of faculties was not fixed: some universities, especially those recently founded, had only two or three. The function of the faculties was to regulate teaching, examinations, collation of *degrees and recruitment of *masters.

O. Weijers, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIᵉ siècle*, Rome, 1987.

Olga Weijers

FAIRIES. The fairy is a creation of the medieval West, born out of the fusion of two fantastic figures. Towards the year 1000, Bishop *Burchard of Worms, in his *Penitential, simultaneously pummeled two *superstitions: one attached to the Parcae, goddesses of destiny; the other to the "women of the forest" (*sylvaticae*) who sometimes gave themselves to mortals. "You have done what certain women are accustomed to do at certain periods of the year: in your house, you prepare a table and set out food and drink that you have prepared, together with three knives, to allow those three sisters whom an ancient and ceaselessly perpetuated foolishness has named the Parcae to refresh themselves, if they come." The Parcae, also called *Fata* and *Fatae*, gave the fairies their name and a good part of their attributes. Their cult, inherited from Greco-Roman mythology and associated with that of the Celtic tutelary triads, remained lively for a long time. Thus was drawn in the collective imagination the figure of the fairy godmother, mistress of men's destinies, but also linked to the cult of fertility and abundance. It is she whom Burchard evokes, with the tradition of the fairies' meal. But the bishop of Worms was aware of other fantastic women who, according to a universal theme of folklore, made a gift of their love to fortunate mortals: "You have believed what some are accustomed to believe, that there exist rustic feminine creatures who are called women of the forest, of whom it is claimed that they are creatures of flesh, that they show themselves to their lovers when they wish and take (it is said) their pleasure with them and, when they wish, hide themselves and vanish". Well before the 12th c., in all likelihood, the two figures had been joined together in folklore. In the 12th c., with the birth of a new culture, secular and aristocratic, and a new vernacular literature, marvellous tales (in particular Celtic tales) were sucked into literature, where we see two types of fantastic women arise: the fairy godmother and the supernatural lover, also called the fairy. Our fairies were born out of this interpenetration of written and oral culture. From the early Middle Ages, theologians included *fata* and *sylvaticae* among the growing troop of *demons. Then, around the 13th c., the fairy became, by rationalization, a mere mortal who practised white or black *magic and was confused with the *witch or enchantress. The mythical figure tended towards the literary type. The end of this evolution was the birth of the fairy story as a literary genre in the late 17th century.

Burchard of Worms, "Decretorum libri viginti", *PL*, 140, 1853, 538-1066. – A. Maury, *Croyances et légendes du Moyen Âge*, Paris, 1896 (re-ed. 1974). – L. Harf-Lancner, *Les Fées au Moyen Âge, Morgane et Mélusine ou la naissance des fées*, Paris, 1984. – F. Dubost, *Aspects fantastiques de la littérature médiévale*, Paris, 1991. – P. Gallais, *La Fée à la fontaine et à l'arbre*, Amsterdam, 1992.

Laurence Harf-Lancner

FAIRS. The fair (Lat. *nundinae*) was a meeting of buyers and sellers, at more widely-spaced intervals than the *market. It was at first linked to the rhythms of rural life, to habits of purchase at winter's end, summer's end and the *feasts of certain saints. With the economic progress of the 11th, 12th and 13th cc., certain fairs acquired a function in long-distance *commerce. The right to authorize the creation of fairs and markets was a royal right, eventually usurped by princes. The possession of a fair was considered a factor in economic activity and repopulation, hence the great number of demands in *France after the *Hundred Years' War.

The fair was a Peace institution and, as such, could benefit from privileges: protection, "safe-conduct", accorded to

*merchants at fairs and and on *roads by territorial princes and *kings; often, partial or total exemptions from fairground taxes, tolls or duties. A time of exceptional jurisdiction, the fair was provided with a specific court (fair-guards in *Champagne, fair-master at Chalon-sur-Saône), judging according to an exceptional procedure that aimed to give the maximum safeguard to the rights of creditors. Each fair was a time organised into successive regulated periods (entry, display, sale, *hare*, payment, exchange, taking of letters).

Chronologically, several generations of fairs can be distinguished. Those of *Flanders: Messines and Thourout at the end of the 11th c., *Ypres and Lille in 1127 and *Bruges founded in 1200, constituted an annual cycle serving the sale of local cloth, but Bruges developed a financial market of the first importance. The five fairs of *England specialized in the sale of indigenous wools. Those of *Champagne and Brie were the meeting-place, doubtless from the early 12th c., of sellers of cloth and linen from the north, and southern merchants buying cloth and linen and selling *spices, *silks, horses, jewelry, perfumes, dyes, *gold. Constituting an annual cycle, with organisations of merchants (Provençal, Italian. . .), they also developed considerable activity in the sphere of credit.

The fairs of Champagne declined in the late 13th c. and lost the cloth market after 1320. Their functions were taken over by other fairs, those of the Parisian cycle including the Lendit, those of the duke of *Burgundy at Chalon-sur-Saône (founded *c*.1239 and *c*.1280), those of *Languedoc, *Frankfurt am Main and *Brabant (*Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom), while the fairs of Flanders continued their activity. The apogee of the fairs of Chalon was between 1320 and 1360; after 1410, the civil war hit the French centres . After 1417, the trade of the Chalon fairs was captured by those of Geneva (mentioned from 1262). The apogee of the Geneva fairs was between 1415 and 1450: four meetings, a considerable market for the Milanese, Florentines, French, Burgundians, Swiss and south Germans, links with the Iberian economy.

In the 15th c., France was largely excluded from the international circuits, but the fair economy remained flourishing. The main centres of fairs were Antwerp (two) and Bergen-op-Zoom (two), based in part on the activity of the English and southern and western Germans. To them were added the fair of *Deventer and those of *Leipzig in *Saxony, at the meeting-point of Eastern and Western commerce. The fairs of *Lyon, much favoured by the kings of France from the 1440s, captured part of the financial func-tions of Geneva after 1462; their apogee was after 1489 and in the early 16th century. They were the site of an active trade in merchandise (silk, silk goods, cloth, *furs, linen, *metals, drapery, spices) and the seat of considerable financial activities (great Florentine houses of *Medici, *Pazzi, Capponi). The displacement of fairs reflected changes in economic geography. The fairs were shop-windows, centres of financial and monetary regulation and places of big business, and the fair economy complemented the urban economy.

H. Laurent, *La Draperie des Pays-Bas en France et dans les pays méditerranéens (XIIᵉ-XIVᵉ siècles)*, Paris, 1935. – E. Chapin, *Les Villes de foires de Champagne, des origines au début du XIVᵉ siècle*, Paris, 1937. – "La Foire", *RSJB*, 5, 1953. – J. F. Bergier, *Genève et l'économie européenne de la Renaissance*, Paris, 1963. – R. Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIᵉ siècle. Lyon et ses marchands*, Paris-The Hague, 1971. – H. Dubois, *Les Foires de Chalon et le commerce dans la vallée de la Saône à la fin du Moyen Âge (v.1280 – v.1430)*, Paris, 1976. – *Frankfurt im Messenetz Europas, Erträge der Forschung*, H. Pohl (ed.), Frankfurt, 1990, ("*Brücke zwischen den Völkern. Zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Messe*", 1). – *A commercializing economy: England 1086 to c.1300*, R. H. Britnell (ed.), B. M. S. Campbell (ed.), Manchester, 1995. – M. Rothmann, *Die Frankfurter Messen im Mittelalter*, Stuttgart, 1998.

Henri Dubois

FAITH. The theme of faith is one of those that bring out with greatest clarity the problematic underlying the whole Middle Ages. It is a veritable sounding-box, in which the most varied problems find an echo in the medieval mentality.

In the Carolingian period, we encounter two different attitudes to faith: one sought to base itself on St Augustine, the other on Pseudo-*Dionysius. The former was represented particularly by the work of *Paschasius Radbertus (790-859) entitled *De fide, spe et caritate* (*PL*, 120, 1387-1490). This was a work more pedagogical than original, in which the author sought to adapt Augustine's thought to the mentality of the time. It was one of the works that transmitted Augustine's thoughts on faith to the whole Middle Ages. To confront the subject of faith, he takes as his starting-point the definition of the epistle to the Hebrews (11, 1): "*Fides est substantia rerum sperandarum, argumentum non apparientium* (Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen)". By *substantia*, he understands the eternal, and thus the very reality of *God. In analysing *argumentum non apparientium*, he opposes "what we see" to the "invisible", *i.e.* the relation between faith and vision. Faith disappears where there is "vision", and that is why faith will always be provisional, proper to this life. The analysis of *argumentum* introduces it into the subject of the relationship between faith and *reason; he finds no opposition between the two, but a simple complementarity. Faith, moreover, puts *man in relationship with God, binds (*religat*) him to God, and, as such, is identified with religion: "*unde et religio nominatur* (whence it is called religion)". But faith is, above all, God's *grace and gift: "*sed donum Dei est fides* (but faith is a gift of God)". The second orientation of the *theology of faith was that based on Pseudo-Dionysius. He stressed more the reflective than the pastoral aspect. Its most important representative was *John Scotus Eriugena (810-870). Admittedly Eriugena never wrote any treatise on faith, but in his works he speaks of it ceaselessly. He approaches this subject of faith mainly in the light of knowing: man is essentially *knowledge, and faith comes precisely to satisfy this radical desire of man. In this perspective, it encounters reason, and the relationship between faith and reason would be the theme developed throughout his work. But faith and reason are not opposed since both have their foundation in God, who is One; they are two sources of knowledge, certainly independent, but between them exists a very close relationship. Faith is the principle and source of knowledge, but at the same time it is the principle of *salvation: "*Salus autem nostra ex fide inconcoat* (for our salvation comes from faith)". Faith heals reason of its ignorance. Certainly God created man as a rational being, but *sin has wounded reason. And God comes to the aid of human reason, precisely by faith: faith heals reason. But without reason there is no faith. God permits faith, but we must not stop there. Faith is truly the principle of life, a principle that tends to develop into an ever more perfect knowledge. And faith grows, develops by the intermediary of reason. Reason develops faith, prolongs the effort of faith. With Eriugena there arises in all its strength and intensity one of the key themes of the whole Middle Ages: the relationship between faith and reason.

The same theme of faith as knowledge is developed at length

and in depth by St *Anselm (1033-1109). Better still, his way of confronting this subject of faith determined to a great extent all further medieval thought. St Anselm thought about faith and gave his successors something to think about. That said, his reflections on faith are not reduced solely and exclusively to the relationship between faith and knowledge; he also studied, and in depth, the relationship between faith and *love. The foundation of his theology of faith is found in the nature of man, wounded by original sin. Before man's sin, there was no need for faith in order to know God or to live in knowledge of God. After sin, faith would be the moral condition for knowing God: it is faith that purifies the eyes of the spirit to see God. And it is in this perspective that St Anselm situates, in the first place, the relationship between faith and reason. Reason judges the value of faith: to accept faith requires a certain understanding of its content. Admittedly, to accept faith requires, beyond this understanding, the grace of God, and this because faith is not just a work of reason; it is, above all, the work of God. But faith, for him who believes, is a force that leads him to understand what he has accepted by *freedom and grace. It is a *virtue, a dynamic force that leads to "vision" and, as such, it induces reason to understand the content that it offers it. *Intellectus fidei* (understanding of faith) starts from faith and journeys towards "vision". Furthermore, faith is a transforming force, *operosa fides*, which changes or modifies all man's behaviour and, in particular, reason. Faith without works, but especially without works of reason, is a dead faith. For St Anselm, faith requires to be thought about, to be reasoned about.

In the course of the 12th c., reflection on faith changed its perspective. Certainly, the earlier themes continued to be studied, but from now on the main emphasis would be on the pastoral dimension of faith. On one hand, the problem was posed of faith among Christians who lacked all training, the "simple". These must base their faith on that of the theologians, but their faith is often reduced to a simple repetition of formulae totally incomprehensible to them. On the other hand, "infidels" are sometimes encountered, and with them arises the theme of *conversion. In both cases, the problem posed is that of the communication of faith. To proclaim the faith is in no way to transmit it by incomprehensible formulae. Man is a reasonable being and, as such, he must accept faith reasonably. Communication of faith requires, in the first place, an effort to make it comprehensible. The theme of communication of faith is the central theme of all 12th-c. theology.

Peter *Abelard (1079-1142) reflected on faith while keeping in mind the "simple", but also *Jews and infidels. Believers must be helped to make their faith explicit, just as it is necessary to bring the Christian faith to Jews and infidels. But, in both cases, this calls us to develop the rational dimension of faith, since only reason can make faith comprehensible. Abelard's problem is certainly that of the relation between faith and reason, but not in a theoretical or abstract form: it is posed in terms of communicability of faith. A faith that cannot be communicated on account of its obscurity or its incomprehensibility is not a true faith. He who lives in and by faith must know how to communicate it, and its communication needs to have *virtus praedicationis*; if we lack this *virtus* inherent in faith, communication is reduced to a simple repetition of empty formulae. The communication of faith must awaken conviction, and conviction is rooted in reason. Rational knowledge is a *divina inspiratio* similar to that of the Old Testament and that of the Jews; but this rational knowledge will never arrive at the *mystery of the Incarnation, a specifically Christian mystery.

To accept the mystery of the Incarnation, we need the help of grace. *Ratio* certainly prepares us for faith, but faith is not *ratio* but *existimatio*. No more is faith *visio* or experience; it prepares us for *visio* and, as such, faith is a provisional thing.

St *Bernard (1090-1153) approached the subject of faith in a very different context from that of Abelard. His was primarily a monastic context, one of *prayer and *contemplation. It is not in the light of reason that faith acquires all its meaning, but in the light of *love. At the moment of reflection on faith, the important thing is not so much the study of its rational character as that of *pietas*, and *pietas* sets aside understanding to enter fully into love.

*William of Saint-Thierry (1085-1148) opened up a new perspective on the study of faith: the psychological perspective, or its subjective dimension. He analysed in detail and in depth the psychological process of adherence to faith. In this process, we find firstly a voluntary adherence to what is believed; by analysing this adherence, we go on to study a theme of considerable importance for the theology of faith: the co-operation between *will and grace. But faith attains its perfection only when it is communicated. And the communication of faith requires that it be thought about: and to think about it is, in the first place, to enter into communication with *tradictio*, with the Church community. Faith can only truly be thought about within and from the Church. William of Saint-Thierry distrusts individual reason, its autonomy; faced with the *nominalism of his time, he stresses the communal, ecclesial *tradictio*. The function of *ratio* will be precisely to follow *auctoritas*. The perfection of faith is found in mystical experience or in the simplicity of heart that gives itself up totally to the grace of God. Hence it is necessary to approach the content of faith through love: love illumines faith. That is why faith has no need of arguments; arguments or rational proofs are even a danger to faith, because we then accept the contents of faith by reason of rational certainty and not by the authority of divine *Revelation.

The school of *Chartres, and more precisely *Gilbert of Poitiers (1080-1154), took a different attitude to the theme of faith. The school of Chartres was a school open to scientific knowledge. As we know, *Aristotle's scientific works began to be translated from the 12th c., and in them was found a new way of approaching the study of *nature. A confrontation very soon arose between this new conception of scientific knowledge and that of faith as knowledge. For Aristotle, *knowledge had its origin in the senses, while theology situated it in faith; *science was knowledge of visible things, faith that of invisible realities. And faith, in this perspective, was presented as superior to opinion, but inferior to science. It is certain that faith and opinion are not based on necessary things, but probable ones. However there is in faith a *firm* assent; it is *perceptio veritatis rerum cum assentione sine causarum cognitione* (perception of and assent to the truth of things without knowledge of causes). It is by this that faith is distinguished from opinion. But faith is different from science. It is admittedly a knowledge, but a knowledge different from scientific knowledge: faith is perception and assent. This perception proper to faith requires a labour, an intellectual effort, since Revelation offers a whole collection of truths that reason must explore. But these contents of faith have a coherence in themselves, they are *substantia* (substances). Faith is, at the same time, *perceptio invisibilium* (perception of invisible things) and, as such, a certain vision of realities to come. This *perceptio fidei* (perception of faith), moreover, is not a theoretical, abstract knowledge; faith is an affective apprehension of divine mysteries.

The school of Chartres posed many other problems to do with faith: the relationship between the faith of the "simple" and that of theologians, the difference between human faith and divine faith, the relationship between faith and community, the dialogue of faith with Jews and infidels. In this school we encounter all the problems that the 12th c. posed about faith.

In the 13th c., the problematic of faith was fundamentally joined to that of *theology as a science. The *translation of the *Logica nova*, like that of Aristotle's scientific works, radically transformed the scientific mentality of the time. Henceforth, the problem was whether theology was really a science, on a level with Aristotelian science, and whether the *articles of faith occupy a place in theology similar to that of first principles in Aristotelian science. Until then, *intellectus fidei* (understanding of faith) had been considered as a development of the content of faith; from now on, it would be considered as the foundation of theology, and of theology as science. This is why, throughout the 13th c., little was said of faith as experience of God; it was discussed primarily in the light of scientific knowledge. The articles of faith were considered as the foundation of *argumentatio*, as scientific principles. And the perspective of faith as illumination was emphasized in line with this: faith is a divine light that discovers to us the *prima Veritas*.

*Alexander of Hales (1186-1245), for example, compares the certainty of faith with scientific certainty: the certainty of science is a speculative certainty, that of faith is an affective certainty. This affective certainty of faith is expressed in the definition of the epistle to the Hebrews (11,1): *substantia rerum sperandarum* (the substance of things hoped for); speculative certainty, on the contrary, is expressed in the second part of this definition: *argumentum non apparientium* (the evidence of things unseen). And his problem is precisely that of linking or uniting these two parts of the definition or these two certainties. Faith is not a purely theoretical or scientific knowledge; it exists in direct relation to life: for this reason, the conception of faith must be, above all, an affective knowledge. This is the orientation followed by St *Bonaventure (1220-1274). The central theme of his thought is that of the relationship between scientific knowledge and faith, and he analyses this relationship in the light of illumination. Reason and faith have one and the same origin, one and the same foundation: illumination. Admittedly reason, on account of sin, is weakened and sick as to knowledge of the truth; it is faith that comes to its help. That is why *philosophy, fruit of reason, is a pre-Christian state, preparatory to faith. It does not oppose it. Moreover, it is faith that gives strength and security to philosophy itself. The certainty of faith is not that of *scientia* as *visio Dei in patria* (vision of God in *heaven), any more than it is the *certitudo speculationis* (speculative certainty) proper to human science; its certainty is a *certitudo affectionis* (affective certainty), or a *veritas secundum pietatem* (truth according to piety). Faith is admittedly a knowledge, but a knowledge that is not purely speculative, but affective. Then again, faith unites us with *Christ and, as such, it is that light that allows us to understand Holy Scripture, since everything in Holy Scripture speaks to us of Christ. Faith, moreover, permits us to understand *nature itself in depth, since nature is a book that speaks to us of God. Finally, faith is the light that permits us to contemplate the very reality of God, who introduces us to his *contemplation.

The attitude of St *Albert the Great (1206-1280) was quite close to that of St Bonaventure. In his theology of faith, he develops practically the same themes: faith directs reason to God and directs it by charity: *fides operans per dilectionem* (faith acting through love). *Veritas intellectiva* (intellective truth) is proper to science, while what is proper to faith is *veritas affectiva* (affective truth). And between the two truths there is a true relationship, though the foundation of science and that of faith are totally different. In fact science, like philosophy, is *manuductio fidei* (allurement to faith), but not faith; faith is of another order, that of *assensus fidei* (assent to faith), which is the fruit of grace.

The attitude of St *Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) to this theme of faith was different. Thomas did not build his theology of faith starting from *abstraction, but from life and, more concretely, from the different problems posed for him by infidels and *heretics. Faced with infidels, the first problem is that of reason's capacity to accept the Word of God. He is sure that faith is necessary for *salvation. But there are, and have been, many pagan and infidel philosophers who, by the effort of their reason, have come to the knowledge of God, and of God as man's final end. Their rational effort has for St Thomas a certain saving efficacity, but he never confuses faith with reason; both have different foundations. Then again, the certainty of faith is not the certainty of reason. The certainty of faith proceeds from *veritas divina*. Faith unites us to God, *prima Veritas*, but this union is not purely intellectual, it is existential, vital. In faith, *freedom, moved by *grace, always has a hand: the *intellect consents through the *will, which is moved by the grace of God. We believe *non per rationem humanam sed propter auctoritatem divinam* (not by human *reason but because of divine authority). In analysing the definition of the epistle to the Hebrews (11, 1), Thomas attributes to the word *substantia* the sense of *inchoatio gloriae* (beginning of glory) and, by that fact, he establishes a clear relationship between faith and glory. Faith is certainly light, but infused light. Thanks to it we can contemplate the truths of faith and these are presented to our mind as evident. *Argumentum*, on the contrary, is that by which the *intellect is united to truth: by faith, the intellect is united in full security to the truth of Revelation. Then again, faith belongs primarily to the speculative order; its object is *verum* (the true). That is why St Thomas does not pay much attention to the affective dimension of faith. Against heretics, Thomas vigorously emphasizes the logical unity of faith. Faith is a whole and, as such, is systematic, logical; it is indivisible, just as *prima Veritas* is indivisible. All the articles of faith are so joined to each other that to reject one of them leads to rejecting all the others. The heretic is an infidel who does not know himself. To clarify this union, or this logical coherence between the different articles of faith, is the proper task of *theology.

John *Duns Scotus (1265-1308) gave reflection on faith a new orientation: for him, the human contribution to the act of faith came into the foreground. In fact he left faith as gift or *fides infusa* (infused faith) slightly on one side, to give his attention to *fides acquisita* (acquired faith). In reality, it is man who believes, though his act of faith necessitates the action of God or of grace. Faith is admittedly assent to God's Revelation, but to make this assent real we must be certain of its credibility. And it is reason that prepares the assent of faith. Scotus strongly emphasizes the credibility of reason, but without ever forgetting *fides infusa*. This is a light from God which, from outside our mind, leads the intellect to accept Revelation. In it, it is not the will that moves the intellect, but God's truth. *Fides acquisita*, on the contrary, resides in the will and is what leads the intellect to give its assent. *Fides acquisita* is the human or anthropological dimension of faith. But Scotus makes sure that no-one can accuse him of Pelagianism: what leads the intellect

to give its assent is not *fides infusa*, but the object of faith, *i.e.* the truth of God. He also has important reflections on the faith of the "simple" and that of the theologians, on faith and the knowledge of God, as well as on faith as foundation of the *social order.

William of *Ockham (1285-1347) developed and perfected Scotus's theological reflection on faith. He, too, established a clear distinction between *fides infusa* and *fides acquisita*, always seeking the relationship between them. This distinction allowed him to explain the case of the *pagan who lives in a Christian setting and who knows and admits the truths of the Christian faith, or that of the Christian who lives and acts like a pagan, as well as the relationship between the believers of the Old Testament and the faith of the members of the Church. *Fides acquisita* requires and demands an intellectual education in the faith; but faith is not just assent to revealed truths; it must be translated into works; without works faith is dead.

*Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) based his theology on a totally different anthropology from that of previous theologians. The intellect is radically oriented towards *God: it finds its perfection in God. And it is faith that introduces the intellect into an intimate union with God. In faith, the intellect finds its perfection: faith is peace and the serenity of reason. Certainly God is a hidden God, and faith never claims to reveal or manifest the mysteries of God in full clarity. And yet in a certain way *maxima fides* approaches *visio*.

The medieval theology of faith is extremely rich. It is envisaged under its manifold aspects: faith and charity, faith and science, faith and contemplation of God, faith and society, etc. But medieval reflection on faith is not a cold, abstract reflection: it always responds to living, concrete problems. The solution to these problems depends on the concrete situation in which the different theologians lived. That is why their theology of faith is in large part a pastoral theology, though still based on extremely profound theological reflections rooted in the Church's *tradition.

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FAMILIA. "In the Middle Ages, the *familia* of a church designated all the secular persons attached to its service, whether within the monastery or in its dependencies or rural *estates" (Berlière).

The word does not appear in the Rule of St *Benedict, though it mentions the servants (*servitores*) who care for the sick. The evolution of monastic life entailed a change in the organisation of the community, though Carolingian texts, like the *synod of Aachen (817), suppose all material activities to be exercised by the monks. Well before the institution of lay-brothers in the 12th c., we find in attendance on the monks various categories of persons who, under various names, contributed to the material life of the monastery and formed its *familia*.

The earliest were *matricularii*, initially poor people inscribed in the *matricula*, who performed modest tasks, doorkeeping, bellringing; they were replaced by servants from the 10th century. In the 9th c. appeared *clerici* or *canonici*, not *clerics assigned to the service of parish churches, but to domestic tasks, genuine servants under the orders of the *abbot. *Servientes* and *famuli* were free or unfree men, essentially craftsmen ensuring the daily functioning and upkeep of the house (tailors, bakers, cooks, *masons, farrier, etc.), personnel maintained by the monastery, but sometimes salaried (from the 13th c. at Silos), and who could appear as witnesses in *charters. The great numbers of guests received by some monasteries made this domestic staff necessary.

From the 9th c., prebendaries (*prebendarii*), lodged in the monastery or in its dependencies, received their material subsistence or a life pension from the abbot, in return for *donations *in *precaria*, the *prebend (*praebenda, provenda*) being originally the daily portion of provisions given to those to whom the monastery guaranteed subsistence. *Ministeriales* were, from the 10th c., veritable officials, mayors, tax-collectors, officers of justice, as well as tradespeople, who occupied a higher rank within the *familia* and sometimes managed to transform these posts into hereditary *fiefs or honorific lay offices, with the inconveniences this represented for sound management of the community's budget.

Oblati, *donati*, *redditi* were also part of the *familia*. *Oblates were persons (who could be married), who offered themselves to a monastery to serve it, and put themselves under the jurisdiction of the *abbot, renouncing all property, the monastery then providing for their upkeep. The term *donatus*, which goes back to the Frankish period, covers practically the same thing, as does *redditus*, which appeared in the 13th century.

Finally, from the 12th c., *conversi* or lay brothers formed an important element of the *familia*. They must be distinguished from *monachi conversi*, monks who entered late without having received a real training. At *Hirsau we see the appearance of lay *conversi* charged with helping the monks, who directed them spiritually, laymen observing religious practice outside the *cloister, not bound by *vows, but just by a promise of *obedience. The *Cistercians, the *Carthusians, the Order of *Grandmont, the *Camaldolese, admired such laymen leading a quasi-religious life, and discharged onto them all the material tasks and the working of the land, though they did not totally replace waged servants.

U. Berlière, *La* familia *dans les monastères bénédictins du Moyen Âge*, Brussels, 1931. – J. Dubois, "L'Institution des convers au XIIᵉ siècle, forme de vie monastique propre aux laïcs", *I laici nella "Societas christiana" dei secoli XI e XII*, Milan, 1965, 193-261. – *Les Mouvances laïques des ordres religieux*, CERCOR, "Travaux et recherches", 8, Saint-Étienne, 1996.

Jean-Loup Lemaître

FAMILY. The term "family" has undergone a circuitous semantic evolution. Here we will define it as a group of persons united by recognised links of consanguinity and *marriage, *i.e.* a "*kinship group"; in this sense, our "family" corresponds quite well to the words used in the Middle Ages: *cognatio* and *parentela*, or relationship and lineage. The way in which the members of a network of this nature are distributed in space has to do with residence. The relationship between family organisation and manner of residence is neither automatic nor constant: in one and the same society, the composition of residential units, domestic groups, varies according to *social class – the *ménage* of an aristocrat is not that of an artisan or *peasant; and the nucleus formed by those linked by kinship is itself subject to various transformations in time, caused by births, marriages and deaths.

Confusion between order of kinship and order of residence has nourished a fruitless debate on broad family, narrow family, extended family, notions based on considering only the number of relatives dwelling under the same roof. In reality, in medieval society, as in our own, the networks of relatives that constituted families went far beyond residential units, whatever their size: "the family appears the tightest knot of solidarity, and the community inhabited does not make much change in things. Links are of flesh and blood rather than of stone and hearth" (C. Gauvard).

In its maximal theoretical extension, fixed by *canon law, an individual's family comprised all his blood-relatives (paternal and maternal), as well as all his connections by marriage (relatives of his wife or those married to his blood-relatives) within limits that increased from the 5th c. to reach the seventh canonical degree in the 11th and 12th cc., decreasing to the fourth canonical degree at the *Lateran council. This maximal extension had two main functions, whose actual practice is not always easy to measure: to define the set of those who, being already relatives, could not marry each other under pain of *incest; and to delimit the circle of those who, being relatives, were capable of inheriting from each other.

For the family was the primary and ordinary setting of the transmission of *property, status, or even a name or symbol of belonging. But, for everyone, the family also and primarily consisted of this network of effective mutual acquaintance, formed of the close and less close, within which preferential relationships were formed in daily life and on extraordinary occasions. Family solidarity was not an empty word in medieval society; it has long been perceived through the intermediary of regulations on vengeance or the waging of private wars among the aristocracy; we have an inkling of its role in the cohesion of dominant groups; it was at work, in various milieux, as much when crime was afoot as in the tutelage of minors or in the activities of production and *commerce. Yet it is indispensable to emphasize, as well, the development of nuclei of organisation and solidarity that were moulded on another form of kinship, spiritual kinship; we may cite baptismal kinship, *confraternities and parish communities.

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Anita Guerreau

FAMINE

The West. Famine has always lain in wait for man, from the *Bible to the contemporary world, but it was present all through the Middle Ages to the point of being a veritable "structure of everyday life" (Braudel). Men's imagery reveals the place of hunger: *miracles of feeding were numerous, and lands of Cockayne with feasting and revelry filled literature and images.

The first cause of famine was insufficiency of production: very poor yields would scarcely feed a rural population that had to hand over the surplus demanded by its masters and to feed the town-dwellers. Reserves were ill-protected and tiding-over was often a problem; and the smallest hazard had dramatic consequences. A climatic event (drought, storms. . .) led to a bad harvest, a dearth, an increase in the price of grain from which the poorest suffered. Then people ate spoiled foods, grass, earth; anthropophagy and necrophagy appeared; *epidemics ensued. Such was the pattern of "mortalities" well described by *Rodulfus Glaber around 1032. The Roman world had limited the damage by its political infrastructure and transport system: the *princeps* could send here the grain produced there. Medieval political fragmentation removed this palliative.

Famine was not socially neutral. The demand for grain being incompressible, the market was very sensitive: the least variation in supply entailed a wide variation in prices, and eating one's fill was then for those who could pay. The others begged or paid with what they had. It is probable that during the early Middle Ages a fair number of freeholders paid with their liberty for nourishment in a time of famine.

Though some writers presented famine as "one of the results of original sin" (*Honorius Augustodunensis, 12th c.), people did not sit there with their arms crossed: they cleared land. Augmenting the cultivated area allowed an increase in the overall quantity produced.

During the early Middle Ages, hunger seems to have been very severe. This is attested both by texts and by *archaeology, which uncovers the rickety skeletons of young people dead of undernourishment and malnutrition. Thanks to land *clearances and to some extent by a revival of collective administration, famine diminished in intensity in the 12th and 13th centuries. This does not mean an abundance of *food: right into the 13th c. there was severe famine in *Poland, Austria, *Aquitaine, *Paris, etc.

But the limit of colonizable land had been reached; no more could be produced; land was even allowed to revert to waste. With the great famine that raged in northern Europe in 1315-1317, the result of an unlucky succession of two years of bad harvests, famine and its faithful companion disease returned to centre-stage to cause the catastrophic mortality of the late Middle Ages.

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Georges Comet

Byzantium. The *Byzantine Empire, having a subsistence agricultural economy, necessarily suffered frequent famines, related primarily to climatic disturbances. These could be over-long and over-rigorous winters, like that of 927-928, which was the origin of the "great famine"; droughts, like that which raged numerous times from the late 5th c. to the 7th c.; excessive rains, invasions of locusts (in 516-517 around *Jerusalem). But an occasional

climatic disturbance did not generally cause real famine. For this to be the case, the loss of the main harvest had to be aggravated by the loss of the secondary harvests and bad conditions had to be prolonged for at least two years, entailing the exhaustion of all the reserves. So it was only in the second year that famine settled in, as at Edessa which suffered grasshoppers in the spring of 599, then a drought in the spring of 600. Crises of production could also have human origins. Thus in 1307, when the Catalans crossed Macedonia, they pillaged the region in order to provide themselves with reserves for the winter, forced the *peasants to flee and provoked a famine.

The crises of production that developed in the countryside were transformed, in the towns that the countryside was supposed to provision, into market crises. Insufficiency of supplies led to a surge in the price of cereals. We can even see market crises, hence urban famines, without there having been any crisis of production, but simply because provisioning was deficient, as in *Constantinople disorganised by the plague in 542. The consequences of severe famines were manifold: demographic losses naturally, but also disruption of the rural population and exodus to the towns; however, famines were often confined to a single region.

Faced with this recurrent catastrophe, remedies were few. At Constantinople, the multiplicity of supply regions allowed the effects of a localized crisis of production to be attenuated. Moreover, *Constantine had established distributions of bread there on the Roman model: regular distributions limited to a small number of beneficiaries drawn by lot, and exceptional distributions from which everyone could benefit; this practice ceased with the loss of Egypt, save for the proprietors of landed property. The emperors also attempted more than once to set up a grain monopoly. Distributions of rations in time of shortage were also a very frequent theme of hagiographical literature; it was also one of the roles taken by those who had the task of almsgiving, *i.e.* essentially the monasteries.

The main famines that affected the Byzantine Empire were those of 383-385 at *Antioch, 443 at *Constantinople, 499-502 at Edessa, 516-521 in *Palestine, the 540s, 580s and 600-603 in *Syria, 927-928 and 1032 in *Cappadocia, 1037 in Thrace and Macedonia. Later, the Byzantine famines are less well known, but we can still point to that of 1306 due to the "scorched earth" policy followed by Andronicus II against the Catalans.

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Anne-Françoise Loué

FANON. A fanon (from an Old French term meaning a piece of material), used in the singular, designates the ornamented *amice, worn by the *pope, which at a late date took the form of a sort of silk liturgical collarette or *mozetta*, ornamented with stripes.

In the plural, *fanons* designate lappets, the two silk bands, often trimmed with fringes, that hang behind the *mitre of *bishops or *abbots. They are a memory of the circular galloon, a sort of cloth diadem, which surrounded the lower border of the early mitre and hung down behind the head.

P. Salmon, *Étude sur les insignes du pontife dans le rit romain*, Rome, 1955.

Guy-Marie Oury

F&R&BÎ AL- (*c.*870-950). Abĺ Nasr (in Latin, Avennasar) Muhammad ibn Tarkh.n al-F.r.bÿ (in Latin, Alfarabius); Turkish philosopher and scholar who wrote in Arabic (born at Wasÿ, near F.r.b, died at *Damascus). After the groundwork of al-*KindÿÌ, he was the true founder of the *falsafa*, a name given by the Arabs to that one of their schools of thought that claimed kinship with the Greek heritage. So he was called the "second master", *Aristotle being the first. Though a Muslim, he owed his formation to Christian authors, and several of his disciples were Christians: his thought was marked by the 6th-c. Alexandrians' interpretation of Greek *philosophy. Only a small part of his important output was translated into Latin: the *De intellectu et intellecto*, the inventory of *sciences, the *Fontes quaestionum*, the book on Plato's philosophy and works on *ethics and *politics such as the *Recall to the Way of Happiness* or the *Compendium legum Platonis*. A larger part was translated into Hebrew. His influence also made itself felt through *Ibn B.ja and especially *Averroes, who both made great use of his commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon*. He defined the essentials of the *metaphysical world which became that of 13th-c. *scholasticism.

Étienne Gilson considered F.r.bÿ's metaphysical adaptation of the logical distinction made by Aristotle between essence and existence "a capital date in the history of philosophy". From a dialectical analysis of the notion of essence, he concluded that the notion of existence was not included in it, that subsequently essence did not include actual existence and hence that existence was an accident of essence. There is a first *cause both of the existence of the world and its movement and of its logical structure and hence of the *knowledge we have of it. This *ontological and gnoseological architecture is given by the distinction of the functions of the *intellect, which extends the levels of human activity (potential, actual and acquired intellects) by the assertion of a transcendent Agent Intellect always in *act. It is this that has produced by "emanation" (*fayd*) the *forms that inform matter, and gives knowledge of these to human intellects. But it is not *God, who is the inaccessible One, the indefinable and self-necessary being (monotheism is hence a corollary of the divine essence), from which it itself emanates by a series of intermediaries. The end of *man is to seek to unite himself with the Agent Intellect. The prophet is endowed from the outset with this *grace, which allows him to express by imagination what the philosopher attains by *abstraction.

F.r.bÿ's thought is essentially logical and systematizing. It depends on the maintenance of *Platonism (quasi-transcendent character of essences) within Aristotelianism. Being closely linked to monotheism and affirming the necessity of prophets, it was able to circulate freely between *Islam, Christianity and Judaism within the Arab world. But it later suffered from comparison with the great intellectual construction of *Avicenna, who owed a great deal to it.

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É. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant", *AHDL*, 4, 1930, 27-28 and 115-126. – I. Madkour, *La Place d'al-F.r.bÿ dans l'école philosophique musulmane*, Paris, 1934. – J. Jolivet, "L'intellect selon al-F.r.bÿ quelques remarques", *BEO*, 19, 1977, 251-260. – M. Galston, *Politics and Excellence: the Political Philosophy of Alfarabi*, Princeton (NJ), 1990.

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