2

Jesus Christ the Elect

Through and Beyond Barth

Aaron shall cast lots on the two goats, one lot for the LORD and the other lot for Azazel. Aaron shall present the goat on which the lot fell for the LORD, and offer it as a sin offering; but the goat on which the lot fell for Azazel shall be presented alive before the LORD to make atonement over it, that it may be sent away into the wilderness to Azazel.

(Lev 16:8–9)

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER WILL PICK UP BARTH'S CHALLENGE TO HIS READER (FOUND in the small print of §35.2) to surpass his argument and give a better interpretation of these cultic texts.[1] Despite partly agreeing with Barth's methodology and exegesis, I cannot reach the same conclusion. Instead, I shall argue that Jesus should *only* be seen as the elect and not the rejected. This chapter will investigate whether or not Barth does justice to the biblical texts by giving an alternative exegesis. Here I shall outline the concept of *Existenzstellvertretung*—a notion that I see as vital in understanding the Old Testament concept of atonement—and show that it is partly contained in Barth's thinking, though not fully developed or explicitly mentioned. The last step will be to focus on Barth's typological interpretation and outline some of the implications that my new alternative exegesis together with the concept of *Existenzstellvertretung* might have for Barth's doctrine of election.

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1. See *CD* II/2, 366.

1. An Exegetical Challenge to Barth's Doctrine of Election

The aim of this section is to give an alternative exegesis of the texts and answer the questions addressed in chapter 1 before 'implanting' this exegesis back into Barth's own interpretative approach. The method I want to follow is Barth's own. First, I shall conduct an outer examination of the texts, but with a more exegetical approach (paying more attention to the texts). Secondly, I shall take a closer and more detailed look at the texts, particularly highlighting the media through and ways in which the individual comes into contact with the animals and vice versa. Thus, besides exegesis of the text and interpretation of the rituals the analysis will also include an examination of the ritualistic use of blood and the *sĕmîkâ*, the ritual of laying on hand(s).

Furthermore, though this section gives an alternative exegesis to the cultic texts of Lev 14 and 16, chapter 1 of this book, where Barth's understanding of the atonement was highlighted, will continue as the background to the discussion and will be occasionally drawn into the argument, especially when it comes to the concept of sin and sin bearing or, more generally, of sin removal. Here Barth's understanding in relation to election will be scrutinized.

However, before taking up this challenge, Bächli asks two questions in relation to Barth's exegesis of Lev 14 and 16, to which I would like to add two more followed by an attempt to answer them. The first of Bächli's questions relates to Barth's exegesis and the second to his conclusion linking his exegesis to his doctrine of election.[2] (1) Does Barth do justice to the texts in Leviticus? Has he portrayed the rituals accurately and interpreted them correctly? (2) Has Barth discovered a new exegesis, a new dimension to the hitherto accepted exegesis? (3) What is the role and function of blood as well as that of the human being in the ritual events? (4) In what way can we say that Jesus is a type of all four animals in Lev 14 and 16? This raises the question of the removal of sin in the atonement. Thus, we need to ask more precisely: can (and does) Jesus simultaneously fulfil the role of both goats of Lev 16, the sin-laden Azazel-goat as well as the sinless sin offering, two goats which are entirely separate, serving different functions and experiencing different fates (the Azazel-goat released into the desert bearing away the sins, the sin offering slain in a salvation-bringing and purifying death)? This is the underlying question of this book, whether Jesus is the elect as well as the rejected.

2. See Bächli, *Das Alte Testament in der Kirchlichen Dogmatik*, 173.

The questions addressed and the aspects of Barth's exegesis that are highlighted and given an alternative exegesis will vary in length. I will look at two significant questions: (1) exegetical questions—apparent 'errors' in the immediate context of these ritual portraits, and (2) questions of omissions in Barth's approach (asked in light of his own thought and approach). What aspects does he exclude and why, and what significance might these excluded aspects carry in the bigger picture of Barth's typological-exegetical approach?

1.1. *The Cultic Atonement in Leviticus: An Exegesis*

The book of Leviticus, and in particular chapter 16, summarizes the theology of the atonement cult. The following study neither asks whether or not the complex ritual of *Yom Kippur* ever actually happened in the way described in Leviticus, nor does it examine its redaction history. It will simply analyze the cultic atonement texts as described in Leviticus and compare them to Barth's reading. After an outline of the concept of *Existenzstellvertretung* as a paradigm used to describe the cultic atonement, my first step will be to look at the verb *kipper* (to atone), before considering the sin offering, the *ḥaṭṭā't*. What will follow is an analysis of the role of the blood and the purpose of the rite of laying the hand upon the animal's head, followed by an examination of the implications of the *Yom Kippur* and finishing with an exploration of the concept of sin bearing.

(a) The Concept of *Existenzstellvertretung*[3]

Existenzstellvertretung is understood to be an atoning death, a vicarious offering of one's life as an equivalent substitution for the forfeited life of another. *Existenzstellvertretung* should be seen as a concept making sense of the theology of cultic atonement and events in the Old Testament, in particular in Leviticus. To contend that atonement is *Existenzstellvertretung* is to argue that the ungodly are redeemed from their sinful nature by participating in the death of the sacrifice through which they come into contact with the transcendent and holy God. The slaying of the sacrificial animal

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3. For the concept of *Existenzstellvertretung* see Gese, "Die Sühne," 85–106; Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*; Stuhlmacher, "Existenzstellvertretung für die Vielen," 27–42; Hofius, "Sühne und Versöhnung," 33–49; Hofius, "Sühne IV," 342–477; Janowski and Stuhlmacher, *The Suffering Servant*; Graf, *Unterwegs zu einer Biblischen Theologie*, 174–77. For engagement within the English-speaking world see Bailey, "Concepts of Stellvertretung in the Interpretation of Isaiah 53," 223–59; Bell, "Sacrifice and Christology in Paul," and Bell, *Deliver Us from Evil*, 190–92.

should not be seen as a punishment of the animal, nor should the priestly offering of the blood be seen as a human work to appease an angry deity. Instead the sin offering and the sprinkling of the blood should be seen as a salvific act (restoring the covenantal fellowship previously breached by sin) enabled by God himself.[4]

(b) The Hebrew word *Kipper*—כִּפֶּר

Scholars have arrived at two possible derivations for the *pi'el* verb כִּפֶּר (*kipper*—to atone) from other Semitic languages: the Akkadian *kuppuru* 'to uproot,' 'wipe away,' and 'cleanse or purify' (cultically) or the Arabian *kaffara* 'to cover, hide.' However, Janowski[5] and Levine[6] point to a historical relationship between the Akkadian *kuppuru* and the Hebrew *kipper*, at least in Old Testament cultic contexts. Additionally, it should be observed that in its *pi'el* form *kipper* means 'to atone' and in the Old Testament the focus is on the result achieved rather than the process by which the result is reached.[7] In an interpersonal context the verb כִּפֶּר presupposes an act of legal-social, religious, or moral breach, due to which the existence of a person or community is forfeited.[8] The *kipper* texts describe situations in which a person's guilt thrusts him between the spheres of life and death, his situation being irreparable from the human side. Atonement, requested by a person and accomplished by God, "makes possible a restitution that affects one's very own being [. . .] in which a substitution is made or atonement accomplished symbolically."[9] The redemption price for the individual life is paid by a *kōper*, כֹּפֶר, a ransom, which should be understood as "a substitution for one's existence" פִּדְיוֹן נַפְשׁוֹ (see Exod 21:30).[10] The ransom 'takes the place,' תַּחַת, of a forfeited life, and rescues the individual from the sphere of death. Thus, *kōper* is understood as *Existenzstellvertretung*,[11] and the atonement act, "a saving of life, for which the person strives and which God accomplishes,"[12] enabling the continuation of life for the person.

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4. See Janowski, "Atonement," 152f.

5. Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 15–102 passim.

6. Levine, *In the Presence of the Lord*, 56–63 and 121–27.

7. See Maass, "כפר," 626.

8. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 115.

9. Gese, "The Atonement," 95.

10. Ibid., 95.

11. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 174.

12. Gese, "The Atonement," 96.

So far, we may note two ways in which this exegesis differs from that of Barth. The first point, which in Barth's exegesis plays a relatively minor role but is nevertheless worth mentioning, is that Barth sees expiation as a 'covering' up of sin, whereas we did not follow the Arabian *kaffara* but the Akkadian *kuppuru*, to 'wipe away' and 'cleanse and purify.' The other more important aspect is the meaning of the verb *kipper*, to atone. Barth writes from a particular presupposition—his emphasis is on the *necessity* of the process of atonement in the light of humanity's sinful *status* rather than the resulting covenantal fellowship. Barth's primary focus is therefore not the new status of reconciliation—rather he simply understands reconciliation as 'necessary and available.' He focuses not on the result of the event (restoration of covenantal fellowship) but instead on the current state of Israel's sinfulness, where the reconciliation comes from and the way leading up to it.[13] In contrast, we have seen that the focus of the verb *kipper* is on the *result* rather than the process by which the result is achieved; what is important is the sinner's final reconciliation and his or her new status. In chapter 4 we will hear that for Barth, the removal or rather the "battle against sin"[14] is the main purpose of the atonement. He writes: "The very heart of the atonement is the overcoming of sin."[15] We will return to this important aspect later, having looked at the rituals.

(c) The *Ḥaṭṭā't* —חַטָּאת

The goat sacrificed in the ritual of Lev 16 is called the חַטָּאת (*ḥaṭṭā't*). The *ḥaṭṭā't* can be regarded as the primary expiatory offering in the Levitical system of offerings.[16] In the Leviticus texts the "priest is always the subject of the action denoted by *kipper*"[17] and God's response is indicated by the recurring phrase "the priest effects atonement [*wĕkipper*] for him" along with the phrase "so he will be forgiven [by God]," which is the basis of the *ḥaṭṭā't* ritual.[18] Thus the priest is the Mediator; he acts not only on his own behalf, but more importantly on behalf of others, removing the tension between the sinner (both individuals and community) and the deity through a sacrifice,

13. See Barth, who writes "[w]hat is important is not so much the nation's new status of reconciliation to God," in *CD* II/2, 358f.

14. *CD* IV/1, 254.

15. *CD* IV/1, 253.

16. See Averbeck, "Sacrifices and Offerings," 720.

17. See Lang, "כפר," 294.

18. See Lev 4:26, 31, 35; 5:6, 10, 13, 18, 26; 14:18, 20; 15:15; 19:22 and Rendtorff, *Studien zur Geschichte des Opfers im alten Israel*, 230.

a *kōper* (Exod 21:30; Lev 16:18; Lev 17:11) provided by the guilty party.[19] The emphasis is not on God's anger (and the notion of an angry God who must be appeased is not expressed)[20] but instead on the tension that previously existed between humans or between a human being and God due to sin, which has now been neutralized.[21] Thus the "verb *kipper* never refers to a 'propitiation' of God."[22] This "classic Priestly *kipper* ritual"[23] included the purification, atoning, laying of hands on the sacrificial animals and application of blood on the horns of the altar, the so-called blood rite (Lev 4:25, 30, 34).[24]

The steps of the *ḥaṭṭā't* (which also occurs on *Yom Kippur*, examined below) were the following: the animal was forth (הִקְרִיב and הֵבִיא), the hand was laid upon the head of the sacrificial animal (סָמַךְ יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁ), the animal was slaughtered (שָׁחַט), the priest announced the declaration formula (חַטָּאת הוּא) that it be a sin offering,[25] the blood was manipulated (שָׁפַךְ) and finally the last parts of the animal were removed (הִקְטִיר and שָׂרַף). However, the focal point of the *ḥaṭṭā't* was the blood **manipulation** (and the laying of hands upon the head of the animal, which will be explained later).[26] The sinner who provided the sacrifice also laid a hand upon the animal, identifying with it and symbolizing the offering of his or her own life.[27] Then the blood of the animal was applied to the altar by the priest. For the minor blood-rite, the blood was only applied on the horns of the altar of burnt offering—the rest was poured out at the base of the altar (Lev 4:25ff). On special occasions, such as *Yom Kippur*, the blood was carried into the Holy of Holies.

Koch, in agreement with Milgrom,[28] observes that the translation of *ḥaṭṭā't* as 'sin offering' appears to be a serious blunder, "dating to a time when every non-Christian ritual act was conceived of in the sense of the

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19. See Lang, "כפר," 293.

20. Besides special cases such as Num 16:46; 25:11, 13.

21. See Lang, "כפר," 292.

22. Ibid., 294.

23. Ibid., 294f.

24. See Janowski, "Atonement," 153.

25. See Rendtorff, *Studien zur Geschichte des Opfers im alten Israel*, 256.

26. Space limitations prevent my providing a detailed analysis of the minor blood-rite and the differences of the *ḥaṭṭā't* for a leader and a common person, or a priest and the congregation.

27. See Lang, "כפר," 295.

28. Milgrom translates the *ḥaṭṭā't* as "purification offering," in Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16*, 232.

Latin *do ut des* as a sacrifice of the deity."[29] YHWH does not receive the sacrifice, but rather it is he who makes it possible—"he is not the object but the subject of an act that is performed in his name by the priest."[30] Also, the term 'sin offering' might lead to the conclusion that it was just intended for moral sin when in fact it was also intended for physical impurities (Lev 5:2–3) which on many occasions had nothing to do with moral failure. 'Purification offering' might be a better translation as this simply signifies that it was required before an *unclean* person could be brought back into the community as a ritually *clean* person (Lev 12:6–8; 14:18–20).[31] The understanding of *ḥaṭṭāʾt* is made more problematic because in the LXX it can mean both 'sin' and 'sin offering' (see Lev 4:3). This can cause confusion in New Testament contexts such as Rom 8:3 or 2 Cor 5:21.

At this stage the overall notion of our exegesis agrees with Barth, who also emphasizes that God is the sole author of the atonement. Furthermore, for Barth, the aspect of purification is also very important. He sees the death as God's saving act, which is necessary for the sinner since it is through death that he is cleansed from sinful existence and led into life.[32] Death, which Barth sees as "full of grace and salvation,"[33] is God's remedy, his *Heilmittel*, against sin and a forfeited life, effecting God's love and mercy towards sinful humanity. It is his means for salvation and not, therefore, a punishment but a loving act towards the sinner that allows the continuation of life, indeed, a new and better life.

Yet, whilst Barth briefly mentions the role of blood in Lev 14 (in the context of the second bird being dipped into the blood as a sign of purification), he does not provide the rationale behind Lev 16 (the blood-sprinkling on the Ark of the Covenant and tabernacle). Nor does he give an explanation of the function and use of blood in these rituals, other than stating that it has a purifying and sanctifying function. But the 'why,' the reason behind it, remains unexplained. So our next step is to look at the cultic role of blood in the rituals.

(d) The Role of the Blood—דָּם

We have seen that blood, דָּם, played a significant role in the offerings and was applied by the priest on the horns of the altar at the blood-rite, sprinkled on

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29. Koch, "חטאת," 316.

30. Ibid., 316.

31. See Milgrom, *Studies in Cultic Theology and Terminology*, 67–69.

32. See *CD* II/2, 362.

33. See *CD* II/2, 362.

the leper, and always handled with great care. Besides the gesture of laying the hand upon the head of the animal, the execution of a blood-rite was a constitutive element of the *ḥaṭṭā't*-ritual. The two forms of the blood manipulation were the minor (Lev 4:25, 30, 34) and the major (Lev 4:5–7, 16, 18) blood-rites; besides them there was the blood-rite at the *yôm kippūrîm*, to be examined later. In the *ḥaṭṭā't*-tradition the blood was used to atone for humanity—for Israel, her representatives, and the common person.[34] Leviticus 17:11 provides an explanation of why blood was significant for the atonement: "For the life of a creature is in the blood, and I have given it to you to make atonement for yourselves on the altar; it is the blood that makes atonement for one's life." Both in Exod 30:11–16, where a 'ransom' was used to make atonement, and Lev 17:11, where the blood of the slaughtered animal is used to make atonement, we find the identical expression: "to make atonement for our lives" (lit. soul) לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם. Comparing the two texts, we see that the blood of the animal, the locus of life/soul, becomes the ransom for the person who offers the blood, which again is paralleled with the ransom money in Exod 30:11–16. Through the use of the preposition *bᵉ* the blood becomes the instrument of atonement.[35] The blood was a symbol of the surrender of the worshipper's own life to the sanctuary and thus to YHWH himself.[36]

Leviticus 17:10–14 describes the prohibition of the consumption of blood and why it was handled with so much care—namely because contained in the blood is the life of the animal. The reason for draining the blood from the animal (and covering it with earth—Lev 17:13) before eating the meat was to ensure that it was only the meat that was eaten and not the blood. Blood contained the *nepeš*, נֶפֶשׁ (see Deut 12:23), which was the substance of life and reserved for God alone (Gen 9:3–5). If in a cultic ritual the blood was released—and only in a ritual slaughter was human interference with life allowed—that individual life, *nepeš*, was freed.[37] Blood was sacred and given by God for the purpose of atonement alone (Lev 17:11, 14).[38] It was not that blood acted by means of inherent expiatory power, "but because Yahweh had designated it as a means of atonement" (see Lev 17:11)[39] and thus the blood manipulation, regulated by YHWH, depended on his

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34. See Knöppler, *Sühne im Neuen Testament*, 16.

35. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 244ff. and Averbeck, "כפר," 688.

36. See Lang, "כפר," 295.

37. See Gese, "The Atonement," 107.

38. See Trebilco, "דם," 965.

39. Gerleman, "דם," 338.

sovereign will.[40] This is a key point—blood was the agent of atonement, not from its substantial nature but from its appointment by God as the carrier of life.[41] Thus the life-containing blood (see Gen 9:6; Deut 12:23) was the basis of the cultic atonement and should be seen as a gift from God. So if a person offered up a sacrificial animal, he or she did so on the presupposition that God had created the possibility for the blood to atone. Therefore, the sacrifice in the Old Testament was not a human payment in order to appease God; rather the priestly atonement took place only because God had made it possible. This concept of atonement therefore annuls the common sacrifice logic of *do ut des*.[42]

In conclusion it might be said that the blood in Lev 17:11 finds its rationale in the belief that YHWH himself gave it to Israel to make atonement possible. YHWH inaugurated the possibility that the blood could be used as an atoning instrument for the cult, because it was the "bearer of life."[43]

As previously indicated, Barth states that blood has a purifying function but does not give an explanation for the 'why.' For him it is by God's grace and love that the sinner is allowed to surrender his blood, his impure life.[44] Yet, we saw the rationale behind the blood in our analysis. In the same way that the offering is not an offering *to* God but an agent given *from* God to Israel to make atonement (Lev 10:17), so also God has ordained the blood for Israel to be used to make atonement (Lev 17:11). Barth is partly right in writing that the blood symbolizes the total surrender of life to God, and yet this is not all—it has to be seen in relation to the ransom motif. It is not simply that the sinner's impure life is eliminated and poured out; rather, that the blood of the animal represents the *kōper*, the ransom-substitution, thus pointing beyond and transcending the sinner, towards the need of something/somebody else, a blameless and sinless sacrifice, without which the sinner would be lost. Barth talks about the hidden subject in the rituals but does not explicitly make the link to the blood. He states that the "renewal can take place no less radically—that man should die, that his blood should be shed to the last drop. His pure new life can be born only through such a total surrender of his previous impure life."[45] But what Barth neglects to see is the *meaning* of blood as the *kōper* in relation to the hidden subject; he sees in the rituals the hidden subject, who dies as a substitute for the sinner,

40. See Kedar-Kopfstein "דם," 248.
41. See Knöppler, *Sühne im Neuen Testament*, 18.
42. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 247.
43. See ibid., 246.
44. See *CD* II/2, 359.
45. *CD* II/2, 360.

but does not sufficiently emphasise that it dies 'in-place' in order to give its blood (which contains the *nepeš*) as a *kōper*. This offering of blood is not simply an act of deity-appeasement through the paying of a price, but an act of reconciliation between the transcendent God and Israel and a restoration of the covenantal fellowship. This will be examined in the section on the *kappōret*-rite below.

(e) The *Sĕmîkâ*—סְמִיכָה

Having undertaken a detailed study of the verb *kipper* and considered the offering of the *ḥaṭṭāʾt* and the role of the blood in the cult, what remains is an examination of the rite of 'laying the hand upon' the animal, סְמִיכָה, the *sĕmîkâ*-rite. This is something that Barth completely overlooks in his study. After this we can move on to *Yom Kippur* itself, at which all the rites converge.

The ritual of laying of hands becomes pivotal here. Whereas it is explicitly mentioned that during the *sĕmîkâ* the High Priest confessed all the iniquities over the goat for Azazel, this is not the case with the *sĕmîkâ* of the sacrificial *ḥaṭṭāʾt*. Here no confession or transferal of transgression is mentioned. What then is the meaning of the *sĕmîkâ* in the *ḥaṭṭāʾt*? The *sĕmîkâ* should be seen in the same context as the appointment of a successor (Num 27:18.23; Deut 34:9) or the consecration of the Levites (Num 8:10)—an 'authorization' or 'ordination,' a dedication to YHWH. It should not be regarded as a transferal of sin material, but rather as "an identification between the offerer and animal,"[46] "a continuation of the subject in a delegated succession" [*Subjektübertragung*].[47] A simple transferal of sin by the consecutive killing of the sin-laden animal would only amount to an exclusive *Stellvertretung* (a substitution happening 'outside' or without the sinner's existence involved). However, the significance of the atonement is the identification of the one bringing the sacrifice by his laying his hand upon the head of the animal. The person bringing the animal "affirmed that it was he who was offering the animal and that he was offering himself" through the sacrifice as a gift or dedication to God.[48] It is not a passing on of *materia peccans* to the animal, as in the Azazel-rite, but through the gesture of the *sĕmîkâ*, an identification of the *homo peccator* with the dying animal occurs and the person 'participates' in the animal's death[49] in a

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46. Wright, "The Gesture of Hand Placement," 434.

47. Gese, "The Atonement," 105.

48. Wright, "The Gesture of Hand Placement," 434.

49. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 220f.

symbolically-real manner.[50] This presupposes an identification, through the *sĕmîkâ*, of the offerer's *nepeš* with the *nepeš* of the animal.

Thus the gesture expresses a "*Subjektübertragung, aber keine Objektabladung*"[51]—a symbolic offering up [*zeichenhaft*][52] of the person's life through the shedding of the animal's blood. The animal's death becomes the sinner's own death [*real*], taken over by the sacrificial animal in substitution.[53] Finally, through the blood-rite the *nepeš* is dedicated and incorporated into the holy.[54] Thus, the cultic atonement is a surrender, a "total substitutionary commitment of a life"[55] in which the sacrifice of the animal's life is a "substitution that *includes* the one bringing the sacrifice."[56] The sacrifice of the animal and the blood ritual should be seen as a holy rite in which the animal is not punished for the guilty, but brought into the sanctuary "where it comes into contact with what is holy."[57] It is not merely a death and a removal of sin that accomplishes the atonement but an inclusive *Stellvertretung* and the commitment of life to what is holy—this "ritual brings Israel into contact with God."[58] We can conclude that it is the inclusive *Existenzstellvertretung* occurring through the *sĕmîkâ* that has the atoning function in the blood-rites.[59] It is the covenantal fellowship, and its restoration, that stands at the centre of these rituals.

Barth does not mention the *sĕmîkâ* in his analysis of the sin offering. He sees "the Israelite who as an individual or as the whole nation is the particular object of the purification in question [is] both here and according to the whole sacrificial legislation no more than a *spectator*, as it were, of the actions which represent this purification."[60] However, as Bächli notes, the individual or the collective group were not simply spectators in the ritual events but were actually part of and involved in the rituals, since they were dependent upon them in their everyday life.[61]

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50. See Hofius, "Sühne und Versöhnung," 36–37.

51. Gese, "Die Sühne," 97.

52. See Gese, "The Atonement," 107.

53. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 359.

54. See Gese, "The Atonement," 108.

55. Ibid., 106.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 218.

60. *CD* II/2, 358.

61. See Bächli, *Das Alte Testament in der Kirchlichen Dogmatik*, 173.

Through the offering of a sacrifice, which first had to be brought to the priest by the individual and which then included the specific ritual of the *sĕmîkâ* with the consecutive slaying of the animal, every Israelite was brought not only into close contact with cultic rituals, but also to an understanding of the seriousness of sin. The people were therefore not simply passive bystanders. Furthermore, we saw that the sacrifice of the animal was not only a sign [*Zeichen*] for Israel, demonstrating to her the treatment that she deserves and otherwise would be destined for because of her sinfulness (i.e., death or banishment from the presence of God).[62] Rather, the Old Testament sacrifice holds a meaning that is more than a mere "sign and testimony" [*Zeichen- und Zeugnischarakter*][63]; it has real inherent value. The bird that was previously in captivity stands for the life of the leper who was cast out of the community, and the ritual of releasing the bird in freedom stands for the leper's life brought back into the communal fellowship.[64] As Hofius concludes, by identifying with the animal through the *sĕmîkâ*, the sinner's death happens "*zeichenhaft-real*"[65] in the substitutionary death of the sacrificed animal, where "*mit seiner Sünder-Existenz Schluß gemacht wird*,"[66] and "*die Heraufführung eines, neuen, weil in seinem Sein neu gewordenen Menschen*"[67] occurs. Through the offering of the נֶפֶשׁ of the person "*wird eine zeichenhaft-reale Lebenhingabe des Opfernden an das Heiligtum Gottes vollzogen*."[68]

(f) The Ritual on The Day of Atonement
—*Yom Kippur*—יוֹם הַכִּפֻּרִים

At the centre of Leviticus, and thus at the centre of the Pentateuch, is *Yom Kippur*—יוֹם הַכִּפֻּרִים. It was a day of holiness for both the tabernacle and the nation, and observance of it laid the foundation for YHWH to forgive the people their sins in order that he could continue to bless them and have a covenantal relationship with Israel.[69]

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62. See *CD* II/2, 358.

63. *CD* II/2, 357.

64. Staubli, "Die Symbolik des Vogelrituals," passim.

65. Hofius, "Sühne und Versöhnung," 43, and Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 247.

66. Hofius, "Sühne und Versöhnung," 42.

67. Ibid., 43.

68. Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 241.

69. See Hartley, "Day of Atonement," 55.

According to the biblical description,[70] on the tenth of Tishrei (i.e., in September or October) two goats were presented to the High Priest who would draw lots for them, symbolizing a transfer of ownership.[71] One animal would be assigned for the Lord, "for YHWH" (לַיהוָה), to be slain and offered as a חַטָּאת (ḥaṭṭā't), a sin offering. Some of the blood was carried into the Holy of Holies (הַקֹּדֶשׁ) and sprinkled seven times on the *kappōret*, כַּפֹּרֶת (Lev 16:14f). The other animal, "for Azazel" (לַעֲזָאזֵל), was to be sent away alive into the wilderness as an elimination rite. The priest laid his hands on the head of a ram, confessed the Israelites' sins, and sent the animal away into the desert.

(G) The *Kappōret*-rite—כַּפֹּרֶת

We saw that in the minor blood-rite the blood was applied only on the horns of the burnt offering altar, but that in the major blood-rite the blood was brought further inside the sanctuary, right up to the edge of the Holy of Holies, sprinkled against the veil and applied on the incense altar. However, the most central event of *Yom Kippur* was the *kappōret*-rite (Lev 16:14f.). In this blood-rite, the blood was sprinkled on the כַּפֹּרֶת or ἱλαστήριον, the mercy seat over the cover of the ark where the divine שְׁכִינה [*Shekinah*] rested (Lev 16:14f.).

On *Yom Kippur*, the presence of YHWH above the *kappōret* declared to the congregation YHWH's willingness to atone for their sins,[72] as the High Priest entered the Holy of Holies to make atonement for the whole nation. He had to cover the *kappōret*, the place where YHWH was present (Exod 25:22), with a cloud of incense before sprinkling blood on it, in order not to die by the divine *doxa* of YHWH (Lev 16:13). According to Lev 16, the High Priest, the representative of Israel, applied the *Yom Kippur* blood on the *kappōret* twice: the blood of the bull for the priest's transgressions (Lev 16:14) and the blood of the goat for the transgressions of the people (Lev 16:15).[73]

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70. The biblical description of *Yom Kippur* is rather brief and a more detailed explanation is found in the Rabbinic literature—see the rabbinic tractates *Yoma*, the day, in the Mishnah.

71. See Gane, *Cult and Character*, 250.

72. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 266.

73. Furthermore, the blood of the *ḥaṭṭā't* animals, some of which is applied on the *kappōret*, was also used to make atonement for the burnt offering altar (Lev 16:18–19).

The climax of the atonement process was reached at the priest's sprinkling of the blood of both sin offerings seven times on the *kappōret*.[74] The animal's blood stood for the life of the Israelites and in being sprinkled on the *kappōret*, their lives were offered to God.[75] Through the blood-rite the נֶפֶשׁ (*nepeš*) was dedicated and incorporated into the holy.[76] There on the *kappōret* the guilty nation, otherwise doomed to death, met the transcendent God and in this atonement act, YHWH bestowed his salvific presence onto Israel.

(h) The Azazel-rite and Sin Removal

The Azazel-rite should be seen as separate from the offering rites of *Yom Kippur*. In Lev 16:7 the lot-rite of the two goats for the people is a transfer of ownership, one for a sin offering for YHWH and the other one for Azazel, sent away into the desert[77] as a rite of elimination.[78] Gane argues that the goat for Azazel was not a sacrifice, explaining that it was not the lack of slaughter which excluded the Azazel-rite from the category of sacrifice (see grain offering Lev 5:11–13) but rather the fact that neither the animal, nor any part of it, was given over to YHWH as a gift.[79] Rather the goat for Azazel should be seen as an elimination, as Janowski highlights, with its origin in the ancient Mediterranean region.[80] The rite "represents a struggle against chaos, against transgression and disorder, which threaten the harmony and safety of man, and [. . .] expels them to the desolation to which they pertain."[81] Milgrom highlights that demonic impurities were often exorcised through banishment to their place of origin.[82] This was the role and function of the Azazel-goat which—by bearing the iniquities of the people, evil spirits,[83] and the demonic impurities transferred onto him—became "a symbol of evil."[84] One might even go so far as to say that the rite did not simply send away a goat *to* Azazel, but rather identified the goat with all

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74. See Maass, "כפר," 630.

75. See Hübner, "Sühne und Versöhnung," 289.

76. See Gese, "The Atonement," 108.

77. See Gane, *Cult and Character*, 250.

78. See Maass, "כפר," 629.

79. See Gane, *Cult and Character*, 251f.

80. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 211f.

81. Zatelli, "The Origin of the Biblical Scapegoat Ritual," 263.

82. See Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16*, 1042 and 1072.

83. Tawil, "Azazel The Prince of the Steepe," 59.

84. De Roo, "The Goat for Azazel," 238.

the iniquities *as* Azazel itself, and we know from rabbinic sources that in practice, the goat was pushed over a cliff in order that it would not return to the camp of the people.[85]

The cleansing rite of the leper with two birds in Lev 14 is generally seen as an elimination rite in the same sense as the Azazel-rite, the live bird taking away the *ṣāra'at* impurity.[86] However, we might question whether the live bird, which is dipped into the sanctifying blood, does in fact 'bear' the disease of the leper or whether the ritual is actually a symbolic exchange. In this case the release of the bird into its natural habitat[87] and into freedom would be seen to correspond to the 'new life' of the leper and his being brought back into the community from the sphere of death.[88]

(1) The Two Goats

Thus we must distinguish between the elimination-rite (for the spatial re-moval of the substance of evil, the *materia peccans*) and the substitution rite of the *ḥaṭṭā't*, an inclusive *Existenzstellvertretung*. In the *sĕmîkâ*-rite at the *ḥaṭṭā't* the person lays "his hand" (see Lev 4:4, or 4:15 as a collective group) on the animal's head, whilst in the Azazel-rite the priest (Aaron) lays "both his hands" on the animal's head and confesses over it "all the iniquities of the

85. See Mishna *Yoma* and *Targum Pseudo-Jonathan*, Grabbe, "The Scapegoat Tra-dition," 158f., and Helm, "Azazel in Early Jewish Tradition," 225f.

86. See Wright, *The Disposal of Impurity*, 75–80. See also Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16*, 833.

87. Milgrom points out that "the bird had to be wild, else there would remain the ever-present fear that the live bird dispatched to the open country would return to the settlement. [. . .] A *ḥaṭṭā't* bird, or for that matter any sacrificial animal, perforce had to be domesticated," in Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16*, 833. The fact that the birds were wild animals serves to strengthen our argument of exchange. The same way that the wild bird is released into freedom from its captivity, so too is the leper, brought out of the sphere of death and back into the community.

88. See Staubli, "Die Symbolik des Vogelrituals," passim. He writes in his abstract that "the bird ritual for the purification of the leper is usually interpreted as an elimina-tion rite in analogy to the scapegoat rite at Yom Kippur. However, all constitutive ele-ments of an elimination rite are missing: an evil is not mentioned, nor a demonic place for the evil nor a beast, sympathetic with the demon. On the contrary birds in the Bible and elsewhere in the Ancient Near East symbolise in many ways human vitality, just as the other ingredients of the ritual do. So the article argues, that the ritual symbolises the return of the healed leper from social death to life, as the first act of a threefold ritual for the reintegration of a person into human society." See also Jenson, who calls the live bird rite an "unusual" elimination rite, in Jenson, *Graded Holiness*, 170. Jenson also highlights the social reintegration of the leper back into the camp.

people of Israel, and all their transgressions, all their sins, putting them on the head of the goat" (Lev 16:21).

Daly highlights another important difference between the Azazel and the *ḥaṭṭā't*: whilst the "scapegoat was considered unclean after the imposition of hands on it, the flesh of the hattat [was considered] most holy."[89] The Azazel became ritually unclean after the transference of Israel's impurities on its head while the priests in Leviticus were allowed to eat the flesh of the *ḥaṭṭā't* because it was holy (see Lev 10:17).[90] Moreover, neither is it a purification rite like the *ḥaṭṭā't*, with the aim of coming into close and healing contact with God.

The tabernacle/temple was the meeting place of heaven and earth and the *kappōret* in the Holy of Holies was the throne of the Lord, which was simultaneously heaven and earth. The Holy of Holies, where the blood of the *ḥaṭṭā't* was sprinkled and atonement was effected, stands in contrast to the desert, the place of the Azazel-goat. On the Day of Atonement, when God came down into the tabernacle in his *doxa*, the Holy of Holies can be regarded as a "microcosm of creation,"[91] standing in polar opposite to the desert, the "home of chaos"[92] and habitat of demons into which the 'scapegoat' was sent. If the rituals of the temple are understood in this way, as creation rituals, then the Azazel-rite removes impurities and sin (understood as chaos) "not just outside the camp, but outside creation itself into the chaotic area of the wilderness."[93] Therefore the *kappōret*-rite and the Azazel-rite should be seen not as occurring successively, but together performing one mirror-inverted act.[94] Whilst the purpose of the *kappōret*-rite was to meet God, that of the Azazel-rite was to go into the desert, as far away from the sanctuary as possible. Thus the movements of the two rites are extreme opposites—the *kappōret*-rite faces towards the Holy of Holies and the Azazel-rite faces far away into the wilderness. This ritual should be seen in a similar light to Barth's understanding of God's *Yes* and *No* spoken in creation, which we will hear about in chapter 3.

The *Yom Kippur* ritual became the annually-repeated image of the Sinaitic covenant[95] between YHWH and Israel (see Exod 24:15f.), through

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89. Daly, *Christian Sacrifice*, 104.

90. Though this did not occur on *Yom Kippur*, when it was burned outside the camp (Lev 16:27).

91. Rudman, "A Note on the Azazel-goat Ritual," 398.

92. See ibid., 399.

93. Ibid., 400.

94. See Jenson, *Graded Holiness*, 203.

95. See Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 349.

which the guilty nation was brought into contact with YHWH. For Israel as the receiver of YHWH's willingness to reconcile, the only appropriate response was to perform the blood-rites, through the High Priest as Israel's representative. Therefore, the sacrifice of the animal and the blood ritual should be seen as a holy rite, in which the animal is not punished for the one who is guilty of sin, but a rite of sanctification in which (1)[96] the sanctuary was cleansed with blood[97] so that God could dwell amongst Israel, and (2) a rite through which Israel was brought into the sanctuary where it came into contact with holiness.

Hence the ritual performed stood for the "commitment of life to what is holy,"[98] and the sacrifice brought Israel back into contact with her holy God and restored the covenantal relationship. Nehemia Polen points out that the essential purpose of the offerings and sacrifices was to "cultivate and maintain the relationship between God and Israel, to assure the continuity of the Divine Presence"[99] with Israel "so that God might abide with (לְשָׁכְנִי) Israel."[100] He explains that we have to understand the cultic atonement from a theocentric perspective, a perspective of God's wanting to have fellowship with Israel.[101]

In the inclusive *Existenzstellvertretung,* the Israelites participated in the death of the substitutionary sacrifice of the animal; through the priest's sprinkling the animal's blood (which stood for the life of the Israelites) on the *kappōret*, their lives were offered to God.[102] Thus new life was possible. This atonement was not simply a negative act removing sin, but a sanctifying act—"*ein Zu-Gott-Kommen durch das Todesgericht hindurch.*"[103]

(j) The Concept of Sin bearing—נָשָׂא עָוֹן

We have yet to consider how sin is actually dealt with in the atonement and what is really meant by 'bearing iniquities.' It is this that we will scrutinize in this final step.

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96. Milgrom explains this urgency to purge the sanctuary: "the God of Israel will not abide in a polluted sanctuary," in Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16*, 258.

97. The *ḥaṭṭā't* blood was the purging element—see Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16*, 254.

98. See Gese, "The Atonement," 106.

99. Polen, "Leviticus and Hebrews . . . and Leviticus," 216.

100. Ibid., 216.

101. See ibid., 216.

102. See Hübner, "Sühne und Versöhnung," 289.

103. Gese, "Die Sühne," 104.

The root נָשָׂא (*nāśāʿ*) in Lev 16, which describes the sin bearing aspect of the Azazel-goat, literally means 'to lift, raise high, pardon, take away, bear, carry'—referring to a physical movement.[104] In the "Old Testament this notion has been expanded to include the principle of forgiveness, and forgiveness is itself associated with the idea of lifting away or taking away guilt, sin, and punishment" and therefore "forgiveness is frequently understood as 'to bear, carry away, settle etc.'"[105] Moreover, the expression נָשָׂא עָוֹן (*nāśāʿ ʾāwôn*) in the sense of 'to forgive' is synonymous with the verb *kipper*, 'to atone,'[106] and when it is God who bears the guilt of others by removing the iniquity "the reference is to divine forgiveness."[107]

Furthermore, Baruch Schwartz argues for two *uses* of the term *nāśāʿ* with only *one* meaning.[108] He argues that when the sinner himself 'bears' his sin, he suffers its consequences—this is to say that "the sinner deserves punishment."[109] However, when God "'bears' the sinner's burden, it no longer rests on the shoulder of the wrongdoer; the latter is relieved of his load and of its consequences."[110] However, Schwartz goes on to say that the sinner has nevertheless not 'transferred' his burden to somebody else, meaning that the bearer is not "'weighed down by the sin of the sinner,' but rather the burden does 'no longer weigh upon anyone. It has disappeared.'"[111] The question remains—how? He answers this by saying that in both cases the primary meaning of *nāśāʿ* is to 'bear,' yet whilst in the first case it means to bear in the sense of 'to be laden with,' in the second, "when the sinner is relieved of his burden, it means not 'to carry' but 'carry off, take away, remove.'"[112] So when it is God who is said to 'bear sin,' what he actually does is to 'remove *sins*,' namely by forgiving them. Sin thus disappears.

Furthermore, Polen points out that the animal is "not dying in place of, for the sins of, the human [. . .] if there is any suffering, it plays no role in the ritual per se."[113] Thus the taking of the animal's life for sacrifice is not

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104. See Freedman, "נשא," 24. See also Stolz, "נשא," 770.

105. See Freedman, "נשא," 25. Stolz explains that "the nuance 'to carry away' can be understood against the meaning 'to bear,'" in "נשא," 770.

106. See Freedman, "נשא," 27f. See also Stolz, "נשא," 772.

107. See Freedman, "נשא," 34.

108. See Schwartz, "The Bearing of Sin in the Prieslty Literature," 9. I am indebted to Mark Scarlata for directing me towards this article.

109. Ibid., 9.

110. Ibid., 9.

111. Ibid., 10.

112. Ibid., 10.

113. Polen, "Leviticus and Hebrews . . . and Leviticus," 218f.

murder but a "making sacred."[114] The blood—the fluid of life itself—was the sign of the bond between Israel and God, and should be seen as a "gift of the self, applied to the divine table,"[115] the altar which represents God. The blood intimates for the Israelites "contact with God Himself whose Presence hovers over the ark-cover."[116] Therefore the *ḥaṭṭā't* sacrifice effects a "renewal of right relationship"[117] between God and the person bringing the offering, enacting and maintaining the relationship between God and Israel, Creator and creature, heaven and earth.

Implications and Criticism

We saw that the cultic atonement was an event that must be understood as an inclusive *Existenzstellvertretung*. It was not so much a division of the sinner from his sin—a transferal of sin onto a vicarious or substitutionary object and an annihilation of sin with the animal's death—but rather an inclusive identification. When the person making the offering laid his hand upon the animal in the *sĕmîkâ*, the person's *nepeš* was identified with that of the animal, the person participated in the *stellvertretenden* death of the animal and the person's life was symbolically offered up. It was an inclusive act signifying a life surrendered to God, and through the blood-rite at the *kappōret*, the place of God's presence (Exod 25:17), the sinner again came into contact with God. Atonement therefore must be seen as a coming-to-God through the death, out of which a new creation is born.[118] We explained that the sacrificial *ḥaṭṭā't* did not bear sin—in fact it was just the goat for Azazel that carried away the iniquities of the people. Instead, the *ḥaṭṭā't* performed a rite that brought the people back into contact with their holy and transcendent God through the blood-rite performed by the High Priest on the *kappōret*.

We have already identified similarities between the concept of *Existenzstellvertretung* and Barth's thought, especially in his exegesis of Lev 14. Barth affirms more than once that the second bird partakes in the salvation accomplished by the death of the first bird by being dipped into its blood, a sign that the human being is freed from her limited existence and transferred to freedom as a new human being.[119] Barth also states that Lev 16

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114. Ibid., 219.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid., 222.

117. Kiuchi, *The Purification Offering in the Priestly Literature*, 15.

118. See Hofius, "Sühne IV," 343.

119. See *CD* II/2, 360f.

attends to the same purification when it highlights the fate of the first animal. We saw that for Barth the similarity in the rituals of Lev 14 and 16 is found in the death of the first animals. Yet whereas the first animals highlight the redemptive endurance of death (ordained and accomplished by God)[120] and the redemptive suffering and death (the presupposition of purification and renewed life),[121] the second animals highlight completely opposite aspects from one another. The focus in Lev 14 is the new life accomplished by this redemptive death and in Lev 16 it is the life in sin before the redemptive death:

> Death is the saving judgment of God, which is necessary in the operation of His grace towards man and therefore exhibits His love for him, and through which he is cleansed and led into life. Death is the sacrifice willed and ordained and accepted by God in His goodness to man. The life of which these two passages speak has two possible meanings in contrast to the unequivocal meaning of death. It may be the wretched life of man that does not deserve this death and does not partake of the salvation secured by it. But it may also be the new liberated life of the man who has merited this death, and by means of it passed through to his salvation.[122]

Yet, there are also fundamental differences between Barth's thinking and the concept of *Existenzstellvertretung*. First, because in Lev 16 Barth looks backwards from the cultic death and in Lev 14 he looks forward, he comes to the conclusion that the rituals of Lev 14 and 16 look in opposite directions. But our exegesis shows that in fact both rituals are forward-looking, with their focus on the result achieved, towards meeting YHWH in the act of atonement and reconciliation.

Secondly, Barth sees all four animals as relating to each other as types of Christ. However, we saw that the Azazel-goat was seen as separate to the rites of the cultic atonement and the *ḥaṭṭā't* sacrifice. In contrast, in the bird ritual in Lev 14, the two parts of the ritual are connected through the blood.[123] The shedding of the blood of the first bird into which the second bird is dipped unites both parts of the ritual. In Lev 16 it was Israel that was united to the *ḥaṭṭā't* sacrifice through her representative the High Priest, in his performing the *sĕmîkâ* on behalf of all of Israel. So whereas the goat for Azazel

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120. See *CD* II/2, 359.

121. See *CD* II/2, 359.

122. *CD* II/2, 362.

123. See Staubli, "Die Symbolik des Vogelrituals," 232.

does not come into contact with blood or anything holy, the second bird is dipped into the blood, the same blood that is also applied to the person.

Thirdly, Barth sees the purification as founded in total surrender, by the outpouring of the impure life of the first goat.[124] However, we have seen in our analysis of the role of the blood that the cultic use of blood must be seen in a different way, not as *impure* but as a *kōper*, a ransom, holding a vital role. It is not simply that the blood is surrendered to God and eliminated but rather that it (and through it life itself) is offered up to God, that it is the means through which Israel meets her transcendent God. Israel transcends her own state of sinfulness and offers her soul afresh to YHWH, who meets her in his transcendent *Shekinah*. This happens through the *sĕmîkâ*-rite at the *ḥaṭṭā't*, where the blood (containing the *nepeš*) was offered. Thus the sinner participates in the death of the animal. By and through the blood being sprinkled at the *kappōret*-rite on *Yom Kippur*, the sinner is also brought into contact with YHWH. Furthermore, it is not a surrendering of *impure* blood but in fact it is the blood of the *sinless* animal that is poured out as a *kōper* for the benefit of the sinner. Thus, the shedding of the blood should be seen as an act of *Existenzstellvertretung* in which one offers their life vicariously for another. Barth sees this in Lev 14 when he says that "the one has necessarily to die in order that the other may live"[125] yet never explains why (and this notion of the use of blood as a *kōper* is entirely absent in Barth's commentary on Lev 16).

Fourthly, Barth's view is that the individual is only a passive bystander observing the cultic act, which is a sign for what should actually happen to the person. However, we saw that in this act of *Existenzstellvertretung* the person's death happens *zeichenhaft-real*, by participating in the animal's death. Thus, the person is far from being a spectator—instead he is actively involved in the ritual and changed from within.

After concluding our examination in this section, we can state as an interim evaluation that we can answer questions 1[126] and 3[127] and have highlighted various aspects of questions 2[128] and 4.[129] So in the next section of

124. See *CD* II/2, 359.

125. *CD* II/2, 361.

126. Does Barth do justice to the texts in Leviticus? Has he portrayed the rituals accurately and interpreted them correctly?

127. What is the role and function of blood as well as that of the human being in the ritual events?

128. Has Barth discovered a new exegesis, a new dimension to the hitherto known exegesis?

129. In what way can we say that Jesus is a type of all four animals in Lev 14 and 16?

this chapter we want to tackle these remaining issues and highlight possible implications of our own exegesis for Barth's doctrine of election.

2. Barth's Typological Interpretation Revisited

We saw that Barth sees all four animals as a type of Christ. In the final step of Barth's exegesis he looks at the Church Fathers' typological approach to exegesis and compares his understanding of Leviticus to that of Calvin. He comes to the conclusion that he is in line with the Church Fathers' older Christian investigation of the Bible and states that Jesus Christ is both the blameless and sinless lamb as well as the second goat, the rejected one, who suffers. Therefore, he concludes, Jesus Christ must be seen as simultaneously God's elect, according to his divine nature, and God's rejected, according to his human nature.[130]

It is this typological approach of the older Christian investigation of the Bible to which we now turn, before we give in our final section an alternative typological interpretation. At the forefront is question 4: how can Jesus simultaneously fulfil the role of both goats of Lev 16, the sin-laden 'Azazel' as well as the sinless sin offering, two goats which are entirely separate, serving different functions and experiencing different fates (the Azazel is released into the desert, the sin offering is killed)?

2.1. A Typological Exegesis

Even though Barth sees himself in line with the Church Fathers in his typological exegesis, it is actually only Calvin whom he mentions. In fact, long before Calvin, many Church Fathers read the Old Testament passage of Lev 16 typologically, finding its true meaning and fulfilment in Christ. Justin in his *Dialogue with Trypho* refers to both animals as prophecies for the two appearances of Christ.[131] Tertullian in *Against Marcion* seeks to prove that Jesus is the Messiah of the Old Testament and gives an interpretation of the two goats as both prefiguring Christ.[132] The scapegoat represents the passion of Christ, the human nature which is passible, and the paschal lamb symbolizes the Eucharist, the divine nature which is impassible. Hippolytus sees the 'sacrificial goat' and 'the goat leading the flock' both as types of Christ. In mentioning only a few patristic examples, we have seen that Jesus Christ was regarded as fulfilling both types of goats in the Old Testament.

130. See *CD* II/2, 365.
131. See Stökl Ben Ezra, *The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity*, 155f.
132. Ibid., 156–58.

The early Church "saw Christological imagery throughout the Old Testament."[133] Whereas in Christian theology there was clear consensus from the beginning that the sacrificial *ḥaṭṭā't* of *Yom Kippur* was a type for the final once-and-for-all sacrifice of Christ on the cross for the sins of the world,[134] the Azazel-goat proved to be more difficult to allocate typologically. This might be because the Christian canon does not explicitly refer to Jesus as scapegoat,[135] whereas it does make reference to Jesus as a sacrifice in the letter to the Hebrews (Heb 9:26; 10:10).[136] This therefore became "*the* hermeneutical key for the sacrificial understanding of Christ's death"[137] of the early Church. Furthermore, Jewish interpreters saw the goat for Azazel carrying away the iniquities of Israel, "bringing them back to their author, the demon Azazel."[138] Thus the "Jewish authors of the New Testament refrained from using the scapegoat as a type of Christ because it was identified or connected with a demon. Early Christian authors, however, did develop a range of various typologies of the scapegoat as part of the Christianisation of the Old Testament."[139]

Jesus was regarded as a vehicle bearing away evil, somewhat similar to the Greek Φαρμακός (*pharmakos*) ritual,[140] as a spacial distancing of *miasma*, evil substance.[141] According to Stökl, the "rise of the scapegoat-typology

133. Grabbe, "The Scapegoat Tradition," 161.

134. Stökl, "The Christian Exegesis of the Scapegoat between Jews and Pagans," 212 and 223.

135. See ibid., 208. However, the Epistle of Barnabas, in which the first explicit scapegoat typology appeared, had major significance and was one of the reasons why the scapegoat was often interpreted in a christological typology by the early Church.

136. Paul also refers to Jesus as the Passover lamb (1 Cor 5:7). Frances Young writes: "Only two of the Jewish feasts are of special importance as background to Christian thought, the Day of Atonement ritual and the Passover," in Young, *The Use of Sacrifical Ideas in Greek Christian Writers*, 43.

137. Stökl, "The Biblical Yom Kippur," 497.

138. De Roo, "The Goat for Azazel," 239. See also Grabbe, "The Scapegoat Tradition," 156.

139. Stökl, "The Christian Exegesis of the Scapegoat between Jews and Pagans," 226f. Grabbe writes: "It should not really be surprising that the goat of Azazel was associated with Christ since the Greek translation—which constituted the Bible of the early Christian writers—does not render 'Azazel' in a way to suggest the figure of Satan," in Grabbe, "The Scapegoat Tradition," 162.

140. See Westbrook and Lewis, "The Scapegoat in Leviticus," 419. Stökl, "The Christian Exegesis of the Scapegoat between Jews and Pagans," 224.

141. See Janowski and Wilhelm, "Der Bock, der die Sünden hinausträgt," 129–132 and Janowski, *Sühne als Heilsgeschehen*, 209–15. See also Bremmer, "Scapegoat Rituals in Ancient Greece," passim.

was probably fostered by the fact that its rationale was easily understandable to non-Jewish converts [. . .] [and] because of its comparability to their own cultural institution of *pharmakos* rituals."[142] For some of the early Christian (often non-Jewish) authors therefore, both the sacrificial goat and scapegoat simultaneously became symbols for or types of Christ (here we particularly think of the *Epistle of Barnabas*[143]).

The scapegoat motif had "tremendous impact on the development of the early narratives and interpretation of Jesus' death."[144] From the perspective of 'Penal Substitution,' Jesus Christ is often understood as something of a cosmic scapegoat who bears the sin of the entire world on the cross, a type of the Old Testament Azazel-goat. One such New Testament passage influenced by scapegoat typology is John 1:29, the "Lamb of God." Furthermore the notion of 'bearing' enters New Testament thought from citations of Isa 53 in the Septuagint, and from the translation of נָשָׂא with ἀναφέρω—Christ bore our sins (Heb 9:28, 1 Pet 2:24).[145] Thus both of these Old Testament concepts of sin bearing—that of the Azazel-goat in Lev 16 and the Suffering Servant in Isa 53—are paradigmatic in interpreting the way Jesus deals with sin on the cross, namely by 'bearing' it.

Yet whereas Jesus is explicitly mentioned as the paschal lamb (1 Cor 5:7) or as a sin offering (*ḥaṭṭā't*) in texts such as Hebrews or 2 Cor 5:21, he is *never* referred to anywhere in the New Testament as the Azazel-goat. The letter to the Hebrews clearly shows Jesus to be both High Priest and self-sacrifice, offering his own blood through the eternal Spirit, representing the one-way movement of the sacrificial *ḥaṭṭā't* into the Holy of Holies. But there is no mention of Jesus also acting as a type for the Azazel-goat, by going away into the wilderness, the place of chaos and destruction, with the iniquities of the people.

Again, 'does Jesus fulfil the role of the Azazel-goat, and if so, how?' Are we provided with any further explanation as to how Jesus 'bore' our infirmities, diseases and sin? A brief look into the Gospels seems to open up an entirely new view of Jesus' act of 'bearing.' In the Gospel of Mark the first signs of Jesus' messianic ministry are the casting out of a demon, healing Peter's mother-in-law, cleansing the leper, and forgiving the sins of the paralytic (as well as healing him). These are all signs of his messianic authority. Chapter

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142. Stökl, "The Christian Exegesis of the Scapegoat between Jews and Pagans," 225.

143. See chapter 7 in Barnabas, "The Epistle Of Barnabas," 141f.

144. Stökl Ben Ezra, *The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity*, 147. See also the Epistle of Barnabas.

145. See Janowski and Stuhlmacher, *The Suffering Servant*, 184.

8 of Matthew's Gospel also narrates the story of Peter's mother-in-law and only here do we find a full citation of Isa 53:4, after Jesus drove out many evil spirits with a word and healed all the sick. It says in verse 17 that "this was to fulfil what was spoken through the prophet Isaiah: 'He took up our infirmities and carried our diseases.'"

In quoting Isa 53 "Matthew does associate the prophet and his book with Jesus as the bringer of salvation,"[146] the Servant or Messiah of whom it was said "that he would take and bear the sickness of the people."[147] Yet Matthew does not follow the LXX—he translates the text independently, highlighting and emphasizing the physical aspect of the sicknesses that Jesus healed.[148] Whereas the LXX translated *nāśā'* with φέρω, which might be seen to imply that Jesus became sick, Matthew chooses to use λαμβάνω.[149] In this way he "eliminates the possibility that Jesus himself was sick"[150] and instead states that he removed sicknesses. So according to Matthew, Jesus bears our iniquities and diseases *by removing them*, namely by driving out the evil spirits from the possessed, healing the sick, cleansing the leper, and forgiving the sins of the sinners.[151]

3. An Alternative Typology

It was Origen who first maintained that it is only the sin offering that is a type of Christ and not the Azazel-goat. In homily 10:2:2 of his *Homilies on Leviticus* he interprets the Barabbas episode in Matt 27:15–23 against the background of the scapegoat-rite. Origen writes:

> Let us also now attempt to add something to what was said long
> ago to the best of our ability, that we may show how 'as a type

146. Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 37.

147. Hagner, *Matthew 1–13*, 210.

148. See Gundry, *Matthew*, 150.

149. The *LXX* in Lev 16:22 also uses λαμβάνω to describe that the goat carried away the iniquities of the people.

150. Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 37.

151. See Turner, *Matthew*, 236. Turner points out that "Matthew 8:17 connects Isa. 53:4 to Jesus' earthly ministry, not to his atoning death." Whilst there is some truth to this, I would emphasise that Jesus' entire life amounts to the act of atonement, and his life and death cannot be separated when it comes to his salvific work. Nevertheless, Turner's view provides something of a useful counterbalance to other commentators who see Matthew's use of Isa 53 as 1) failing to capture the "true sense of the Old Testament text" (Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 38); or else 2) "'ignoring' the element in the Isaiah text" (Nolland, *The Gospel of Matthew*, 361), and linking the bearing only as a proleptic act to his death on the cross.

of things to come' (1 Cor 10:11; Heb 10:1) this one he-goat was sacrificed to the Lord as an offering and the other one was sent away 'living.' Hear in the Gospel what Pilate said to the priests and the Jewish people: 'Which of these two do you want me to send out to you, Jesus, who is called the Christ, or Barabbas?' (Matt 27:17) Then all the people cried out to release Barabbas but to hand Jesus over to be killed (v.21f.). Behold, you have a he-goat who was sent 'living into the wilderness,' bearing with him the sins of the people who cried out and said. 'Crucify, crucify.' (Luke 23:21) Therefore, the former is a he-goat sent 'living into the wilderness' and the latter is the he-goat which was offered to God as an offering to atone for sins.[152]

He sees Barabbas as fulfilling the type of the scapegoat in Lev 16. The episode of Barabbas in the Matthean version gains depth when read in the light of the lottery of the two goats in the *Yom Kippur* ritual. In Matt 27:11ff. we see Jesus before Pilate. It was customary at the Passover Feast to release a prisoner. At that time there was a notorious prisoner called Jesus Barabbas ('son of the father'!), whom Luke tells us in chapter 23 had been thrown into prison for insurrection in the city and for murder.[153] Pilate asks the crowd which of the two Jesuses he should release and the chief priests and elders stir up the crowd to demand that Barabbas should live, and Jesus should be crucified. In verse 26 Barabbas is released and Jesus is flogged and handed over to be crucified. Luke tells us that Pilate finds no charges against Jesus and has him punished—Luke 23:16, but the crowd cries 'Give us Barabbas!' Pilate argues with them, saying that he found no grounds for the death penalty, but eventually he grants their demand to have Jesus crucified.

The following four significant characteristics are similar in both events: (1) the 'victims' are presented; (2) they both have the first name Jesus;[154] (3) they symbolize opposed powers (peaceful Messiah *versus* murderer); (4) there is a lottery/election happening as to which of the two is to be released or killed.

So, at first glance the similarities between the ritual of *Yom Kippur* and the Barabbas narrative are obvious. Furthermore, Stökl Ben Ezra shows that the description of the selection of Jesus and Barabbas, who are very similar in name but not in character, agrees with the halakhic ruling regarding the

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152. Origen, *Homilies on Leviticus: 1–16*, Homily 10:2:2, 204f.

153. From now on I shall use the names Barabbas and Jesus.

154. See the textual apparatus in Aland and Aland, *Novum Testamentum Graece*, on Matt 27:16.

two goats in *Yom Kippur*.[155] The significance of these connections would be more obvious were it not for the assumption, in accordance with long-standing Christian tradition, that Jesus was the scapegoat.

However, the release and person of Barabbas has troubled many ex-egetes and historians, and some have labelled Jesus Christ and Jesus Barabbas as two aspects of the one historical Jesus. Maccoby writes that "Jesus of Nazareth and Jesus Barabbas were the same man."[156] Some scholars contend that the scarcity of information about Barabbas makes it unlikely that he was a historical figure. Nevertheless, Maclean also reads Matt 27 as the back-drop of Lev 16 and points out that "the story of Barabbas's release by Pilate appears in all four canonical Gospels (Mark 15:6–15; Matt 27:15–26; Luke 23:18–25; John 18:39–40)" in a fairly consistent plot.[157]

It might therefore be suggested that the only thing that these texts have in common is that Jesus is more strongly identified with the sin offering than the Azazel-goat due to his death on the cross and Barabbas' release. To focus on just one of the accounts, John's Gospel connects several events in Jesus' ministry and passion with the Passover Feast in Jerusalem. Pilate's release of Barabbas to the crowd (John 18:39–40) again echoes the scapegoat ritual of Lev 16:6–10, which involved the sacrifice of one goat to YHWH and the release of another into the wilderness. Also, when Pilate hands Jesus over to be crucified, the narrative informs us that "it was the day of Prepa-ration of the Passover" (John 19:14), the day on which the paschal lambs would have been sacrificed. From these examples and others, it is clear that John's Gospel interprets Jesus' death on the cross at least partly in terms of a sacrifice offered to atone for sins.

What can we conclude from all this? *Prime facie* it appears simply as though Barabbas is fortunate and Jesus is unlucky. Jesus seems to be treated like the Azazel-goat. Jewish tradition tells us that the goat was driven out of the city, spat upon, and beaten. Furthermore, the fact that Jesus is given a scarlet coat, which resembles the scarlet wool placed on the head of the Azazel-goat in order to identify it from the other goat, prompted early Christians to believe that Jesus is a clear 'type' of the Azazel-goat from Lev 16. However, even though Jesus appears to be treated as such, he is *not* a type of the Azazel-goat; rather it seems clear that Barabbas' release is the release of the 'living goat into the wilderness.' What it significant is the fact

155. See Stökl Ben Ezra, *The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity*, 169.

156. Maccoby, *Revolution in Judea*, 164. In an earlier article, Maccoby suggests that Barabbas was a title by which Jesus was known to his followers, see Maccoby, "Jesus and Barabbas."

157. Maclean, "Barabbas, the Scapegoat Ritual, and the Development of the Passion Narrative," 309.

that Barabbas—the murderer—was released as a sinner, and Jesus—the sinless one—was crucified, becoming a *ḥaṭṭā't*. So again we have the mirror-inverted act of one released and one sacrificed as seen in Lev 16—but this time the procedure is reversed. Whereas normally the Azazel-goat was driven out into the wilderness into order to take the contamination away as far as possible, now it is released in the midst of the people. Conversely, the spotless sin offering whose blood would normally be taken into the Holy of Holies is driven out like the Azazel-goat, outside the city gates, spat upon, severely beaten and finally crucified, becoming a *ḥaṭṭā't* for the sins of the world, as well as the new *kappōret*, the place where we can again be at one with God. The *kappōret* was the place where God himself dwelled (1 Sam 4:2), the place of meeting with YHWH's presence (Exod 25:22) of his self-disclosure, where God spoke to Moses and the place where on *Yom Kippur* atonement was made (Lev 16)[158] and "the people were reconciled to God by the sprinkling of blood."[159] In the performed *Existenzstellvertretung* of his Son, the saving presence of God is present and thus atonement occurs.[160] Stuhlmacher thus sees Jesus in the context of the Day of Atonement, being installed by God as a reconciler:

> God publicly made Jesus the place of meeting with God, of his revelation of reconciliation that has been brought about by virtue of the atonement effected in Jesus' sacrifice of his life, in his blood. So God himself has in the death and resurrection of Jesus made himself known as the one who meets humanity and makes atonement.[161]

The *kappōret*, the place of atonement in the Holy of Holies, is no longer locked away but now openly displayed at Golgotha in the form of Christ on the cross. Jesus becomes the כַּפֹּרֶת of the new covenant,[162] and the main implication of this is that the kingdom of God is sufficiently close that his coming and redeeming power are recognized.[163] God speaks to his people in the way he previously spoke with Moses from the *kappōret* (see Exod 25:22) and thus there is now "no longer any need for a priestly mediation between the God who is encountered in secret and the people of God who

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158. See Stuhlmacher, "Recent Exegesis on Romans 3:24–26," 100.

159. Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, 105.

160. See Knöppler, *Sühne im Neuen Testament*, 117.

161. Stuhlmacher, "Recent Exegesis on Romans 3:24–26," 100.

162. See Knöppler, *Sühne im Neuen Testament*, 116.

163. See Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, 105.

exist outside in front of the temple."[164] Thus the cross where Jesus died becomes the new meeting place of God; the cross becomes the *kappōret*.[165] The temple is no longer the place to meet God and to make atonement—Jesus himself becomes the place where the presence of God dwells, and chose the cross as the throne where humanity can meet him. This is how God chooses to reveal himself, in Jesus Christ on the cross, God's self-unveiling, symbolized by the temple curtain being torn in two.

Conclusion

In the light of our own exegesis of Lev 14 and in particular Lev 16, it is difficult to agree with Barth's exegetical conclusion, that Jesus is both the elect and the rejected. Our exegesis shows that applying Barth's typological approach in the way that he does to support his doctrine of election, Jesus Christ should only be seen as the sacrificial animal, giving his life for the sinner in an act of *Existenzstellvertretung*. This would result in the conclusion that Jesus Christ, with *both* his divine *and* his human nature, is only the elect of God. This result is in accord with Luther and the Formula of Concord where the parallel structuring of election and reprobation is given up and election is based "solely of God's gracious will to save as it is revealed in Jesus Christ."[166]

Barth's typological exegesis is, as he says, in line with that of the Church Fathers. Linking the typological exegesis to the doctrine of election is new, though somewhat problematic, since it does not harmonize entirely with his systematic-theological reflection. The two elements (the systematic part and the exegetical part) sometimes do not seem to match entirely. The 'God-human' pair in his systematic part is arranged differently to the 'God-human' pair in his exegetical part and thus the two do not tessellate. Whereas in the large text section, when talking about God and humanity, Barth can sum up his ideas in the phrase "God wills to lose in order that man may gain,"[167] seeing God as the one taking reprobation in order that humanity is elected; when talking about the God-man Jesus, Barth's argumentation is somewhat unsatisfactory. At times Barth says that the "Son of Man was from all eternity the object of the election of the Father"[168] and thus sees the

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164. Stuhlmacher, *Paul's Letter to the Romans*, 60.

165. See Bailey, "Jesus as the Mercy Seat."

166. Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology Vol. 3*, 446.

167. *CD* II/2, 162.

168. *CD* II/2, 158.

"Son of God in His whole giving of Himself to the Son of Man,"[169] committing himself from all eternity to "unite Himself with the lost Son of Man."[170] He also sees the dialectic that is between God and humanity reflected in a dialectic between the 'Son of God' (taking rejection) and the 'Son of Man' (being elected): "The exchange which took place on Golgotha, when God chose as His throne the malefactor's cross, when the Son of God bore what the son of man ought to have borne."[171]

However, in his exegetical section it is the human nature of Jesus (Son of Man) who bears the punishment as pictured by the Azazel-goat and it is the divine nature (eternal Son) who is brought into contact with God through the sin offering. This seems to contradict Barth's explanation in his systematic section. Furthermore, we will see in chapter 4 that the dialectic in his exegesis in *CD* II/2 also does not fit with Barth's doctrine of reconciliation in *CD* IV, where the Son of God is the one who humbles himself in order that the Son of Man is lifted up into the divine Triune fellowship (a notion that we also see in the large text section in *CD* II/2 where Barth writes about "the humiliation which the Son of God accepted on behalf of the lost son of man").[172] Therefore we have to reiterate our question from chapter 1 and ask 'How does Barth see Jesus' humanity in relation to the humanity of all others in reference to rejection and reprobation?'[173] Can Jesus Christ really be divided up into his divine and human nature in the act of election and atonement, fulfilling two completely different functions? And if Jesus is, according to the doctrines of the *enhypostatic* and *anhypostatic* union, fully man but also simultaneously incorporates all of humanity, would it not be fatal for humanity that the human nature of Christ be cast out?

We must now return to the nature of Barth's dialectic. One useful approach is that of Welker, who shows that there is an affinity in method between Barth and Hegel.[174] In 1953, Barth said to a group of pastors "*Ich*

169. *CD* II/2, 157.

170. *CD* II/2, 158.

171. *CD* II/2, 167.

172. *CD* II/2, 173.

173. The English translation seems to have identified this problem of how to allocate rejection and election to the different natures of the God-man Jesus, as well as the fact that Barth is inconsistent in this. The translation appears to solve this by capitalizing 'Son of Man' when talking about the object of election and using lower case for 'son of man' when talking about the cross. However, in the German version of the *KD* no distinction is made when talking about the 'Menschensohn.'

174. On Barth's affinity to Hegel's method see Welker, "Barth und Hegel." Welker highlights that after 1929, when Barth read several hundred pages of Hegel, he never engaged intensively with Hegel (309). I am grateful to Robert Leigh for directing me

selbst habe eine gewisse Schwäche für Hegel und tue gern immer wieder ein-mal etwas 'hegeln.'"[175] This method is for Barth the 'dialectical method' of "*Thesis, Antithesis und Synthesis.*"[176] In the Tambach lecture of 1919 we see that, like Hegel, Barth sees the divine as something that humanity perceives as "wholly other,"[177] "complete in itself [*in sich Geschlossenes*], something new and different in contrast to the world [*Verschiedenes gegenüber der Welt*]."[178] Barth explains that the "synthesis we seek is in *God* alone, and in God alone can we find it. [. . .] The synthesis which is *meant* in the thesis and *sought* in the antithesis."[179] It is the binary structure of thesis and antithesis, of a "critical No and a creative Yes"[180] that is brought into a synthesis in Jesus Christ, God incarnate.

Welker explains that Barth uses this Hegelian method primarily, but not exclusively, to bridge the gap and make a smooth transition between his systematic-theological reflection and his exegesis.[181] We have seen that this dialectical method permeates Barth's doctrine of election, and is in fact the backbone to his entire theological structure. It is seen in the thesis of God's *No* in rejection (the cross) and the antithesis of God's *Yes* in election (the resurrection), which were brought into synthesis in Jesus Christ. Barth is correct in saying that it is not simply that the "antithesis is more than mere reaction to the thesis; it issues from the synthesis in its own original strength, it apprehends theirs and puts an end to it."[182] However, in light of our exegesis, we realize that election and rejection cannot be synthesized in the way Barth attempts.

Barth accuses Hegel of having identified "God with the dialectical method" and of "making the dialectical method of logic the essential nature of God."[183] Barth says that in this way Hegel was a prisoner of his own method and also blocked access to the free and concrete God for humanity. With regard to his own dogmatic (dialectical) method, Barth emphasizes, in opposition to Hegel, that the only justification for using his method (which

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towards this article.

175. Busch, *Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts*, 402.

176. Welker, "Barth und Hegel," 315. See also Ward, "Barth, Hegel, and the Possibility for Christian Apologetics," 63.

177. Barth, "The Christian's Place in Society," 288.

178. Ibid., 277.

179. Ibid., 322.

180. Ibid., 274.

181. See Welker, "Barth und Hegel," 321.

182. Barth, "The Christian's Place in Society," 311.

183. Barth, "Hegel," 304.

is Hegel's as well) is by being constantly in the process of listening *to* and waiting *for* answers from the living Word of God. As soon as the concentration shifts to the method instead of the focus being on the Word of God, the method loses its function (which is to support theological enquiry) and it hinders the theological work. It moves from supporting to hindering. Thus it is only a renewed centring on the Word of God that justifies for Barth in using the dialectical method in theology.[184]

Although Barth's method is in itself coherent,[185] following our exegesis and a fresh engagement with Scripture, we have to challenge Barth and ask whether he has fallen victim to his own method and "misuses the method in the service of a system."[186] The exegetical conclusion of Barth's method becomes even more apparent in the light of our exegesis. Highlighting the axiomatic relationship between Old Testament and New Testament, Barth highlights the problematic tension of his doctrine of election by comparing David and Saul: "David is no more unambiguously a figure of light than Saul is unambiguously the offspring of darkness. There is something of Saul in David, just as there is something of David in Saul. We must undoubtedly see both in each."[187] Just as in the cultic text of Leviticus where Barth sees all four animals as types of Christ, so too does he see the two sides of the two persons David and Saul representing one "total picture."[188] His conclusion is that the elected as well as the rejected have traces of characteristics of the other and *vice versa*. Saul belongs to David, "as does the shadow to light."[189]

The climax of his typological exegesis is finally reached in the story of Judas' rejection,[190] where Barth fades Jesus and Judas into one, Jesus himself becoming Judas, the *Urbild* of rejection.[191] The pattern of exchange is seen by Jesus the sinless one dying for Judas, full of guilt for betraying Jesus [παραδίδωμι]. The rejection of Christ at Golgotha becomes the election of

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184. See Welker, "Barth und Hegel," 327. On 'Hearing and Obeying the Word of God' see Wood, *Barth's Theology of Interpretation*, 136–74. See also Bächli, *Das Alte Testament in der Kirchlichen Dogmatik*, 96–113 and 134–41, who considers what it means to let Scripture talk to oneself, Barth's understanding of exegesis and the relationship between dogmatics and exegesis.

185. See Stoevesandt, "Karl Barths Erwählungslehre," 114.

186. Ford, *Barth and God's Story*, 93.

187. *CD* II/2, 372. See also Bächli, *Das Alte Testament in der Kirchlichen Dogmatik*, 174–180.

188. *CD* II/2, 372.

189. See Kreck, *Grundentscheidungen in Karl Barths Dogmatik*, 266.

190. See Ford, "Barth's Interpretation of the Bible," 66.

191. See Ford, *Barth and God's Story*, 85.

Judas, making his "ultimate rejection inconceivable."[192] For Barth, this exegesis is an "answer to the problem of divine providence and evil"[193] (namely how evil and God's will can be reconciled—"sin is made righteousness, and evil good").[194] We will address this in detail in chapter 3. For now, we have to interrogate Barth's provocative typology. Scripture emphasizes that "God is light; in him there is no darkness at all" (1 John 1:5). We must ask whether Barth in his provocative typology has genuinely seen "an aspect of 'what is there' in the New Testament texts no one had noticed before him? [. . .]. Is Barth's reading original in the sense of genuinely shedding light on a mainly neglected aspect of the texts, or is he imposing a predetermined theological schema?"[195]

The conclusion in Barth's typology suggests that all—Cain, the goat sent to Azazel, and Judas—are finally elected and the sting of finality is removed. Yet for Ford, there seems to be a "misuse of typology which spoils the realism of the literal story for the sake of trying to know more of God's purpose than can properly be elicited. [. . .] [Barth is pressing] his method to the point of producing contradictions."[196] The New Testament gives "little indication that Judas was anything other than lost, even if it is not entirely conclusive in this issue."[197] What we see in Barth is that he has a tendency to synthesize contradictions or antitheses in Scripture that the texts themselves either do not try to resolve, or which they purposefully leave ambiguous. Either way, Barth seems to "peep over God's shoulder,"[198] giving us an answer that the Bible might not want to give. What these apparent contradictions of the text might intend is to provoke in the reader a "humble *Nachdenken* of the story,"[199] and reflect on the question of personal salvation (maybe in the way that the words of the prophets in the Old Testament sought to stir the reader to repentance). And so, in Barth's synthesizing the tensions of the text he in fact is in danger of undermining their own intention.

By using Barth's own typological method we have stayed faithful to his undertaking, while identifying several contradictions in his exegesis. We then offered an alternative exegesis and gave an alternative interpretation that concluded that, according to our understanding of Scripture, Jesus

192. Ford, "Barth's Interpretation of the Bible," 66.

193. Ford, *Barth and God's Story*, 86.

194. *CD* II/2, 503.

195. Cane, *The Place of Judas Iscariot in Christology*, 65f.

196. Ford, *Barth and God's Story*, 91.

197. Cane, *The Place of Judas Iscariot in Christology*, 64.

198. Ford, "Barth's Interpretation of the Bible," 86.

199. Ibid., 86.

Christ is only the elect and not the rejected. In this way we have attempted to correct Barth with Barth, "from within by using his own method."[200] Instead, Barth has produced a construct of "*Inklusivverhältnissen*" that is justified from neither the Old nor the New Testament.[201] Through Barth's typological exegesis and employment of *Aufhebung*, the symmetrical contradictions in election and rejection are resolved universally in their synthesis, Jesus Christ. Yet shifting rejection onto Christ still does not solve the dogmatic problem of whether or not the rejected are included in the elect; instead, Barth has only shifted it with the help of newly created symmetries and analogies.[202]

In conclusion, Cain (*et al.*) who bears his own sin (*nāśāʿ ʾāwôn*) becomes a picture of the rejected and unredeemed.[203] He is a type of the Azazel-goat and, like the goat, is trapped in sin and sent away from the presence of God, becoming a restless wanderer. This notion is undergirded by the New Testament references to Cain as an example of how not to be (1 John 3:12) and whose footsteps one should avoid at all costs (Jude 11). Furthermore, in the New Testament, texts like Matt 25 that talk about the division between the sheep and the goats, again present us with a binary of elected and rejected as that seen in the Old Testament, and this seems to indicate that the writers of the Gospels had no intention, even in the light of the death of Christ, of smoothing out the tensions.

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200. Ford, *Barth and God's Story*, 93.

201. Gloege, "Zur Prädestinationslehre Karl Barths," 126.

202. See ibid., 127.

203. On the topic of Cain and sin bearing see Scarlata, *Outside of Eden*, 157–59.