CHAPTER ONE

Theological Ethics in Transition

This chapter looks at the conversation between theology and ethics in its historical transition from modernity to postmodernity. The first part of the chapter discusses how the relationship of theology and ethics leads to an inherent tension within the strategies of theological and Christian ethics. The second part provides a general summary of the characteristics of modernity and its affect on modern theological ethics, with particular references to Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. Two of the most important characteristics of modern theology and ethics are the emphasis on *poesis* and *praxis*, which leads to two important ramifications, the displacement of the doctrine of the Trinity and the reduction of dogmatics to ethics. These trends carry over into postmodernity, where a problematic relationship between theology and ethics remains. The third section looks at how the "postmodern turn" in theological ethics leads to a search for the Divine *Other*. Postmodern thought, in many different forms, has sought to hear the voice of the *other*, usually the oppressed voice that has been drowned out by the hegemonic powers of modern life. Yet, in theology, this could also be applied to the otherness of God's Word. Has the voice of God been drowned out by these oppressive human powers? Has the voice of God been overshadowed by the power of the human subject itself in modern thought? If so, then a postmodern challenge is to hear God's voice afresh, thereby opening up or providing space for God's speech. Christian ethics is

more than talking about moral principles and virtues and right courses of action. Rather, it must seek to be theological, for in doing so, it opens up space for God's Word to meet us in our particular circumstances.

THEOLOGICAL AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

How should the relationship between Christian theology and Christian ethics be understood? Is Christian ethics a discipline that begins with dogmatic theology, including discussions about God, Christ, salvation, the church, and so on, or does it begin with general philosophical or scientific worldview about reality? Does it begin with Athens or Jerusalem? No doubt these two disciplines in the history of Christian thought, have remained strange bedfellows. On one side, there are those who see Christian ethics as entirely a separate discipline from doctrinal theology, and with the help of philosophy or the sciences, seek to establish a purely natural or *general* ethics based on human reason alone. On the other side, there are others who see Christian ethics as a related discipline of dogmatic (or systematic) theology, and seek to establish ethics through the *particular* interpretation of the moral life based on Christian convictions and practices. Whereas the former approach seeks to place the moral import of particular Christian beliefs, such as the covenant or incarnation, within a more general category of natural law or human experience, the latter approach interprets the generality of human morality through the lens of the particular Christian or biblical framework of established convictions or practices.

Recognizing the fact that Christian ethics should be both general and particular, how do these two frameworks relate to each other? Does one provide the foundation for the other, and if so, which one comes first? Let us begin with the generalist interdisciplinary perspective. As stated, there are many Christian ethicists who choose to begin their work with an interpretive foundation established by the general interplay of theology, philosophy, and the social sciences. Their strategy in doing so rests on the presumption that their work will appear to others in the academy as more objective, rational, and public. Although there is no agreement as to which sources establish such a generalist foundation, we may assume the balance of power, especially in *social* ethics, has shifted toward the social sciences. By relying on the apparent objectivity of sociological, anthropological, political, or economic descriptions and evaluations, Christian ethics becomes an entirely practical science related to the burgeoning field of professional

ethics. What replaces the qualifier *Christian*, then, is the one's expertise in a particular field of study, whether it is social, medical, or business ethics. This implies that the relevance of Christian ethics occurs within the secular frameworks established by professional expertise, and theological discourse is used only, if at all, as a secondary resource of moral knowledge. Theology becomes pushed further into the margins and away from the central space within Christian ethics.[1]

Yet, for all of its apparent hegemony, this generalist interdisciplinary approach remains challenged by another group of Christian ethicists and theologians who seek to recover the use of theology in their work. This group seeks to frame the Christian moral life from within the particularity of ecclesial and doctrinal convictions and practices. The assumption here is that when Christian ethics relies too extensively on other secular perspectives it ends up reducing theological convictions to some other foundational moral language, whether philosophical, scientific, ideological, or experiential. In its worst form, it risks replacing the Christian gospel with some other gospel. Theologians John Milbank and Stanley Hauerwas, for example, have argued for some time that the errors of modern theology and ethics are rooted in its surrender to the logic and grammar of modern historical scholarship, philosophy, and the social sciences. Regarding this, Milbank writes:

> The pathos of modern theology is its false humility. For theology, this must be a fatal disease, because once theology surrenders its claim to be a metadiscourse, it cannot any longer articulate the word of the creator God, but is bound to turn into the oracular voice of some finite idol, such as historical scholarship, humanist psychology; or transcendental philosophy. If theology no longer seeks to position, qualify or criticize other discourses, then it is inevitable that these discourses will position theology: for the necessity of an ultimate organizing logic . . . cannot be wished away. A theology "positioned" by secular reason suffers two characteristic forms of confinement. Either it idolatrously connects knowledge of God with some particular immanent field of knowledge—"ultimate" cosmological causes, or

1. Stanley Hauerwas, for example, argues that "Christian ethics" is a modern invention that presumes a separation of ethics from theology. In order for Christian ethicists to make their thinking more applicable to a pluralistic and secular culture, they often marginalize theological commitments from their ethical analysis. This false dichotomy destroys the theological integrity of Christian ethics. See Hauerwas, "On Doctrine and Ethics," 21–40.

> "ultimate" psychological and subjective needs. Or else it is confined to intimations of sublimity beyond representation, so functioning to confirm negatively the questionable idea of an autonomous secular realm, completely transparent to rational understanding.[2]

Milbank reminds us that when theology becomes reduced to other voices, it invariably changes theology into some form of secular thought. This either reduces Christian convictions to some immanentist perspective, or removes them entirely from the discussion into some transcendental realm; either way these convictions become irrelevant. Instead, Milbank argues that convictions about God, and God's relation to the world, should be the basis for Christian thinking about particular issues of the moral life, which invariably means challenging or deconstructing modern secular thought. This implies that if Christian ethics seeks to move beyond secularism by embracing elements of the past that modernity has forgotten, then it moves in a postmodern, postliberal, or post-secular trajectory.[3] This shift in thought gives Christian ethics a fresh start by moving beyond the failures of modern liberal theology.

The key point here is that for Christian ethics to remain *Christian* it must first be theological, which challenges some secularizing trends in modern theology. This does not imply that such a theological starting point cannot engage in social or cultural analysis. Indeed, if Christian ethics is to be relevant for our contemporary context, it must explain the significant developments and shifts in thought that has taken place in society, culture, and in particular, theology and theological ethics. For this to occur, however, theology should remain part of the process of judgment from beginning to end, otherwise theology cannot be seen as a serious conversation partner. Regarding this point, Jeffrey Stout says: "Serious conversation with theology will be greatly limited if the voice of theology is not recognizably theological. Conversation partners must remain distinct enough to be identified, to be needed."[4] This conversation involves both critical and descriptive analysis. First, Christian ethics must use theology as *critical* discourse in challenging the idea that nontheological frameworks, like the

2. Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 1.

3. For an introduction to these movements, see Vanhoozer, *Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology*; and Ward, *Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology*. The term "post-secular" is often equated with John Milbank and the Radical Orthodox movement. See Milbank, et al., *Radical Orthodoxy*; and Hemming, *Radical Orthodoxy?*

4. Stout, *Ethics after Babel*, 184.

social sciences, provide a foundation for Christian ethics. This challenges modernity's quest for a unitary method of ethical inquiry. Not only is the possibility of this unitary method difficult to support epistemologically, it also silences theology as conversation partner in Christian ethics. Second, Christian ethics uses theology as a *descriptive* discourse in determining what it believes about the objective world. When Christians say, for instance, that persons are created in the *imago Dei*, they are making a statement about the objective moral world. The particularities of Christian beliefs are not subjective but objective accounts of the moral structure of reality. Theological accounts of the world provide the basic framework for Christian ethics.

This book takes the position that Christian ethics begins with a prior understanding of theological ethics. This thesis has been defended by numerous theologians, including Karl Barth. Agreeing with Barth, this book presumes that theological ethics is not just a useful tool for Christian ethics, but remains the basic framework from which Christian ethics ought to be understood and articulated. Although this approach is essential for all historical periods, it is especially important for a postmodern context. Hence, basic to this chapter—and the entire book—is the distinction between theological and Christian ethics, and that the latter depends on the former for its own method, analysis, evaluation, and decision-making. In this book, the term *theological ethics* is used when discussing the theoretical and metaethical questions of ethical inquiry from the perspective of Christian convictions and doctrines about God and God's relationship to the world. According to Barth, for example, theological ethics, or "general ethics," emerges from "the claim, decision and judgment of God which in his Word become evident as the command confronting human action."[5] Theological ethics begins with God's covenantal relationship to humanity, as unveiled in Jesus Christ, which then opens up space for personal moral responsibility in response to God's gracious action. Barth writes: "Man does good in so far as he acts as one who is called by God to responsibility" (*CD* II/2: 546). Emerging from this theological framework, *Christian ethics* concentrates on the actual personal circumstances and actions, in which persons seek to act in responsible ways corresponding to overarching reality understood by theological ethics. In Barth's words, Christian ethics, or "special ethics," determines how the "specific, concrete, special, and even very special action of man can or cannot be called a good action, that is, an action that corresponds to the divine

5. Barth, *Christian Life*, 4. Henceforth, all references to this book will be cited in the text in parenthesis, and abbreviated as *CL*.

claim, agrees with the divine decision, and conforms to the divine judgment" (*CL*: 4). Just has human action corresponds to God's prior action, the task of Christian ethics corresponds to the task of theological ethics. "[M]an does good in so far as his action is Christian" (*CD* II/2: 547).

In this way, theological ethics provides the framework for Christian ethics. To understand how this distinction between Christian and theological ethics develops over time, we must turn to a brief description of modernity and its effect on theology and ethics. Entering into this field of historical study brings with it an obvious risk of oversimplification. Yet, some generalization is inevitable for us to point to the significant developments in ethics during the past several centuries. In the following section, we concentrate on the intellectual background behind the demise and recovery of theological ethics in the modern period. As modernity continued we see a general separating of theology (and theological ethics) from the strategy of Christian ethics, which pushes the ethical importance of Christian beliefs and practices further toward the margins. At the same time, in their desire to remain relevant to an increasingly secular world, Christian ethicists look to other nontheological frameworks, whether scientific or philosophical, for their own moral methodology, epistemology, and linguistic expression. Once theological ethics becomes separated from the task of Christian ethics, however, it becomes more difficult to explain *how* human and divine agency remains linked together in some meaningful way. God's agency remains separated from human agency which further isolates God from humanity and humanity from God. Christian ethics becomes entirely anthropocentric, thereby no different from any other secular version of ethics, except for occasional and obscure references to God or the Spirit's providential role in history. Christian ethics becomes just another version of secular ethics, one that is thoroughly immanent, naturalistic, and de-eschatologized. Without a theological account of divine agency as benevolently acting in the past, present, and future, the course of history and ethics becomes teleologically purposeless and directionless.

BEING MODERN

We begin with a general account of some of the basic characteristics of modern thought, and its effect on ethics. Scholars debate the European foundations of modernity, but most agree that modern life began during the seventeenth century. Although precursory movements, like the Renaissance

and Reformation, radically altered late-Medieval society, it was the intellectual movement, in the next two centuries, known as the Enlightenment, which had significant impact on all areas of modern culture and society. The effects of modernity are still with us, as most persons assume that we remain *modern* people. What are the basic characteristics of modernity? At its most basic, modernity presumes an insatiable quest for "absolute certitude" in interpreting and understanding reality. Although important Enlightenment writings include Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1627), John Locke's *Treatise on Two Governments*, and Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), perhaps the most important text is Rene Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637). Even though Descartes' book is not the most original or innovative of modern classics, it's influence rests more on its *method* for determining the certitude of absolute knowledge and truth. Behind modernity is a particular methodological way reality itself is understood.

Methodological Universalism

Albert Borgmann provides a useful scheme for understanding the *weltanschauung* of modernity, when he looks to Descartes' method the methodological pattern of modern thinking. This "methodological universalism" has four distinct characteristics, namely abstraction, dissection, reconstruction, and control.[6] These four factors provide a general summary of the "spirit" of modernity as well as the specific cognitive structure for all academic disciplines in the modern age, whether in the humanities, sciences, or in theology and ethics. Beginning in the seventeenth century there is a shift in thought which can be called modern, which continues until the present time. There is much debate regarding whether we live in a modern, late-modern, or postmodern world. Suffice it to say, modernity is both a comprehensive and dynamic reality. At its core, it represents one concrete or comprehensive worldview, but as we shall see, it also reveals a dynamic reality that further unveils two distinct worldviews. Modernity, in other words, is double-edged, so that on the surface it presents a worldview that is hopeful, optimistic, and utopian, but underneath it reveals a more nihilistic and pessimistic viewpoint. The character of modernity, says Anthony Giddens, consists of the tension of "*security versus danger and trust versus risk.* Modernity, as everyone living in the closing years of the twentieth

6. For his discussion of these four characteristics, see Borgmann, *Crossing the Postmodern Divide*, 34–37.

century can see, is a double-edged phenomenon."[7] This ambiguity, as mentioned earlier, remains the core experience of the "immanent frame" of our secular age. When the latter underside of modernity dominates, we may say we have entered into a critical period of late-modernity or postmodernity.

With this being said, the first characteristic of modern thought is *abstraction*. Descartes presumes that to discover the truth about something, we must first critically disconnect ourselves as a "subject" from the "object" of our analysis. "Faced with a problem," says Borgmann, "one must first abstract from it—step back from stand regard it from a skeptical distance. One also needs to abstract the problem itself—sever it from the context and our tacit understandings."[8] The process of abstraction occurs at two levels. At one level, when persons attempt to understand something, they begin by separating themselves from their object of study, which leads to a kind of ontological separateness. This disconnection results in the dichotomy between subject and object, self and the world, and the self and God. Modern thought presumes that human beings are ontologically independent from other persons, the community, nature, and God. At another level, to gain absolute certitude, one must isolate their object of study, thus removing it from other constitutive factors. This sets the agenda for the fragmentation in knowledge so typical of the modern period, where every subject matter, articulated by its specialists or experts, becomes reduced to its distinctive claims about knowledge and truth. The abstraction of theology, for example, led to its fragmentation into various unrelated disciplines such as biblical studies, and systemic, historical, moral (or ethical), and practical theology. This further means that Christian ethics, if it is to be consistent with the canons of modern ethical methodology, must separate itself from biblical studies or dogmatic and systematic discussions of God, salvation, and the church. As modernity continued, Christian ethics became more abstracted and separated from its theological grounding, which made the human subject, not God, the standard for human knowledge of the good. In modernity, says James Gustafson, "culturally, religiously, theologically, and ethically, man the human species, has become the measure of all things; all things have seen in the service of man."[9]

7. Giddens, *Consequence of Modernity*, 7.
8. Borgmann, *Crossing the Postmodern Divide*, 35.
9. Gustafson, *Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective*, 82.

The second task of methodological universalism involves the *dissection* of knowledge into its constitutive and simplest parts. Like the strategy of abstraction, dissection takes interrelated parts and isolates and reduces them to an independent status. In this way, human reason becomes reductionistic and mechanistic. This general pattern of reductionistic thinking not only comprises the natural and social sciences, but also the humanities, the arts, philosophy, and even theology. This way of thinking presumes that the individual parts comprising a whole are more determinative for the knowledge of the whole, than the whole itself. Modern medicine, for instance, fights disease not by assisting the body—as a healing organism—to heal itself, but by searching out and isolating the abnormal cells and destroying them; it begins not with the whole but with the various parts that comprise the whole. Likewise, the human person, scientifically understood, becomes reduced to her psychological, sociological, anthropological, physiological, or biological components. Another aspect of *dissection*, furthermore, is its mechanistic dimension. Relying on the Cartesian method, we perceive the world as a complex machine, operated by universal objective laws, which more often than not, are translated into mathematical or scientific formulas or facts. This contributes to our infatuation with scientific (as opposed to humanistic or religious) modes of reasoning and its application into new forms of technology. Although, for example, we still need architects to design a new building—if it is to be built—it must pass through the office of the engineer. Technology has replaced art as the most visible form of modern achievement.

These two factors of reductionism and functionalism, also apply to theology. Once theological knowledge is dissected into smaller and smaller pieces, it becomes reduced to other nontheological methods and analysis, particularly those disciplines that are most functional or practical. This means, in theory, that the core qualifier for theological ethics is no longer theology, as it was in premodern times, but ethics as seen through the interpretive lens of modern moral philosophy or the social sciences. It follows that the first-order languages of confession, worship, and preaching, and even the second-order language of doctrine, become increasingly unimportant in Christian moral reflection. In its final form, the abstraction and dissection of theology leads to the separation of Christian ethics from theology, and its reduction to a philosophically grounded universalist and functionalist discourse, such as a Kantianism or Utilitarianism. These two methods are simply one example of modernity's quest for "moral Esperanto,"

"an artificial moral language invented in the (unrealistic) hope that everyone will speak it."[10] Esperanto has forced Christian ethicists to assume that the "particular" study of theology is irrelevant to the more "general" study of ethics. By attempting to universalize Christian ethics, theologians have overlooked those particular claims unique to Christianity, thus making ethics inherently nontheological or even anti-theological.

The third characteristic of the Cartesian universal method reconstructs the epistemic foundations of human knowledge. Epistemological *foundationalism* assumes there are certain "clear and distinct" ideas that provide the foundation for other dependent ideas, concepts, and thought. In this way, modern thought tears downs buildings and intellectual edifices only to rebuild them in its own image. The modern search for truth, including moral truth, vigorously deconstructs cultural tradition, universal truth claims, and moral certainty only to recreate new structures of knowledge. Just as a building can be built or rebuilt only with a strong foundation, so too the critical, evaluative, and constructive nature of modern thought attempts to build on the "clear and distinct" ideas of universal reason. This new grounding of foundationalism corresponds to the fourth characteristic of the Cartesian method that points toward the power of *control*. In modernity, persons are in firm control of their own perception, evaluation, and implementation of their own knowledge. They not only have the God-given right to extend their power and domination over their own society and culture, but also over the external environment through applied science and technology. It was the economic, industrial, and technological revolutions, more than political revolutions that made industrial Western society a "world civilization." Regarding this point, Krishan Kumar writes: "For the world as a whole it became increasing obvious that to be a modern society was to be an industrial society. To modernize was to industrialize—that is, to become like the West."[11] This transformation is called *modernization*. Indeed, it is modernization that gives the Enlightenment project of methodological universalism its optimistic and utopian character, and its teleological paradigm of historical progress.

Not unlike other disciplines, theology is deeply shaped by the modern conceptions of these third and fourth aspects, namely epistemic foundationalism and progress. Regarding this Barth says, "it was possible to show that

10. Stout, *Ethics After Babel*, 294.

11. Kumar, *Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, 83.

the old conceptions of Bible and dogma were contradictory and impossible in themselves, and by referring to them men could believe that they were entitled, indeed called, to go forward to the construction of a better edifice."[12] What this means for theology is the general departure from the "edifice" of God's special revelation as witnessed in Scripture or the creeds, and toward the new *foundation* based in human reason and experience and confidence in the historical-critical method. To be sure, this meant, at the very least, being critical of the tradition of pre-modern theology and the creeds.

> People now began to think that it was extremely significant that Athanasius and Augustine, Luther and Calvin, despite all their other admirable characteristics, were children of earlier, less enlightened times, still standing on the ground of the Ptolemaic system of the world and ignorant of the concept of natural law as now administered at the University of Göttingen and in other places of the true light. The whole of the Christian past was now fondly imagined as that of a rather credulous, naïve mythology which had fallen victim to a quite brutal authoritarian way of thinking, a blind literalism which ignored all intellectual difficulties. And as modern men, people felt themselves justified in making the necessary (necessary, of course, from other grounds) criticism of his legacy from the past—and armed to do so. And it was so easy to seize the requisite authority and weapons.[13]

Unsure of foundational doctrinal truths, modern theologians reconstructed Christian theology on the new foundations of human reason, experience, or ethics. With the use of natural and critical reason, it became "easy" to criticize the classical doctrines of the Trinity or Christology, or the biblical history and miracle stories. Yet, what replaced these traditions was the new "requisite authority" of human reason and "weapons" of human power and technological control. "The geocentric picture of the universe was replaced as a matter of course by the anthropocentric."[14] Consequently, modern theology and ethics becomes obsessively anthropocentric, and reflects, like moral philosophy, the turn to the autonomous and self-determinative moral subject as the standard for ethics. It is at this point, moreover, where this modern conception of *progress* becomes itself a new foundation. So, for example, Jesus' significance in modern theology became less the risen

12. Barth, *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century,* 95
13. Ibid., 94.
14. Ibid., 24.

Christ, the second person of the Trinity, but the teacher of ethical maxims and principles, often summarized by his teaching about the kingdom of God. The liberal slogan the "Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of man" summarized the liberal attempt to capture Jesus' eschatological message within the confines of various social progressive movements. Guarded with principles like love, freedom, and equality, Social Gospel liberals, for example, viewed the kingdom of God as the outworking of human history in economic, political, and social spheres.

Modernity's Ambiguity: Modernization or Modernism?

Obviously this modern utopian worldview became more difficult to defend with the emerging atrocities of the twentieth century. It is at this point, where modernity becomes double-edged, thereby the underside of modern progress begins to be reflexively understood and known. On the surface, modernity presents a solid, brilliant, and lucid picture of progress, but underneath it discloses a fragile, self-critical, and self-destructive side. The same can be said for modern theology, which for all of its glorious attempts to make the gospel credible to the modern world, it easily succumbs to the hegemony of nontheological and secular frameworks, which trivialize, even eviscerate, the Word from its privileged position in theological ethics. Nevertheless, once the "underside" of modernity is exposed we enter into postmodernity. The hidden self-destructiveness of modernity is evident in the fact that it has been at war with itself from its very beginning. Perhaps the best visual example of the ambiguous nature of modernity is found in modern art. Reflecting on the ambiguous nature of modernity, the nineteenth century French critic and poet Charles Baudelaire prophetically wrote: "Modernity is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immovable."[15] Unlike the art of earlier societies, Baudelaire maintains that modern art must continuously recreate itself, yet it does so by discarding the foundational realism of the eternal and the immovable. The modern quest for "absolute certainty" in art is undermined by its own deconstructive tendencies. This means that what modern art attempts to accomplish, in principle, is undercut by its own self-contradictory creative process. This example of modern art is simply one example of modernity's tendency to be inherently self-destructive.

15. Baudelaire, *Selected Writings on Art*, 403.

The two clashing ideological forces in modernity are: *modernization* and its application to society, and *modernism* and its application to culture. In short, these two ideologies represent the two poles of Baudelaire's description of modernity. As previously noted, modernization, as expressed in political, economic, and technological institutions, affirms the eternal *weltanshaung* of progress, which is grounded in the universal optimism of Enlightenment reason (i.e., the "eternal and immovable"). In contrast, modernism, as expressed in culture and the arts, expresses the transient flux of historical contingency, the preoccupation with the *avant garde*, and the *poiesis* of the creative artist (i.e., the "transient, fleeting, and contingent"). These two ideas stand in tension. On one side, modernization is the practical embodiment of the grand ideas of modernity including industrialization, capitalism, communism, liberal democracy, and technological innovation. It is thoroughly modern, in that, it affirms the confidence of human reason, the practical use of the scientific method, and social and cultural progress. On the other side, modernism—as a cultural movement—is subversive of the idea of modernization from the early nineteenth century period of Romanticism to the present time. It assumes that human autonomy is often held hostage by the apparent hegemonic social structures of modernization embodied in *lassiez-faire* capitalism, political totalitarianism, and techno-scientific rationality. Indeed, since modernism is inherently anti-traditional, it becomes equated with a particular tradition of the *avant garde*, antinomianism, and expressive individualism—as a kind of "new" tradition. By creating *avant garde* movements in the visual arts, music, architecture, and literature, cultural modernism challenges the canons of universal reason and tradition in the arts, while at the same time, preaches "modern" individual self-expression and self-realization.[16] Ironically, it is this combination of factors that lead to a "new" tradition, which strongly links it with other utopian ideologies of modernity, so with the ideology of modernization itself. Although committed to different tasks, these two movements, in the end, remain committed to the modern foundationalist ideas of creativity and progress.

16. This tradition includes the "romantic sensibility" of the poets Shelley, Keats, and Byron as well as the later poets and novelists Flaubert, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Kafka, Joyce, Woolf, and Lawrence. Similar movements occur in the historical development of modernism in the visual arts (Romanticism to Dadaism, Surrealism, and Cubism) and music (Beethoven to Schoenberg and Cage).