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The Image of God

Introduction

Stating the Problem: The Body and the Image of God

THE IMAGE OF GOD IS THE FUNDAMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPT IN Calvin's thought by means of which he comprehensively describes the nature and destiny of man. To have the image of God is to be human. The distortion of the image of God is the distortion of human nature. To have insight into Calvin's doctrine of the image of God is to have insight into his understanding of man.¹

This doctrine may be approached in different ways. Engel lists six ambiguities in Calvin's thought:

- (1) whether the *imago dei* is found in all creation or uniquely in human beings; (2) whether the *imago dei* in human beings refers to the body as well as the soul; (3) whether the *imago dei* refers to natural as well as supernatural gifts; (4) whether the *imago dei* is a substantial endowment or a dynamic relation; (5) whether the *imago dei* is only deformed as a result of the fall, or totally lost; and (6) whether the restored *imago dei* in Jesus

1. The doctrine of the image of God in Calvin's theology has attracted significant scholarly attention. See Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*; Cairns, *Image of God in Man*, 134–51; Prins, "The Image of God in Adam"; Engel, *John Calvin's Perspectival Anthropology*; Anderson, "The *Imago Dei* Theme"; Gerrish, "The Mirror of God's Goodness"; Canlis *Calvin's Ladder*, 74–83. What is common to all these studies is the emphasis on the relational understanding of the image of God in Calvin. However, none of them pays special attention to the problem of axiological dualism in Calvin's doctrine of the image of God although they do discuss the relation of the body to the image.

Christ takes precedence over the created *imago dei* in Adam and Eve.²

My task in the present chapter is to deal with the second problem but it will involve a discussion of some other points as well. The main question, then, is whether or not, for Calvin, the body is included in the image of God? If it is not included, then we have a strong piece of evidence for axiological dualism in Calvin's anthropology because in this case the soul is a much more valuable part of man than his body. Before we turn to the study of Calvin, we should note that there is no prejudice in this approach to the problem of axiological dualism. First, it is a legitimate question to ask whether Calvin included the body in the image. Second, if we find indications that he did not, then we have only one piece of evidence in favor of axiological dualism. This evidence is weighty and important but it is not final. We will have to look at Calvin's epistemology and personal eschatology (which includes the doctrine of the intermediate state and the resurrection) in order to understand whether the distinction between the body and the soul is irreconcilable or gives room for a more holistic view of human beings.

Calvin's exposition of the image of God in Adam gives the impression that only the soul is the image of God in man:

... the proper seat of his image is in the soul.
 ... although the soul is not man, yet it is not absurd for man, in respect of his soul, to be called God's image . . .
 . . . the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers . . .³
 . . . the image itself is separate from the flesh.⁴

These statements would be sufficient to answer the question of the relation of the body to the image of God in Calvin's thought if Calvin at the same time (actually in the same sentences!) did not ascribe the image of God to the body as well:

For although God's glory shines forth in the outer man, yet there is no doubt that the proper seat of his image is in the soul.

Therefore, although the soul is not man, yet it is not absurd for man, in respect of his soul, to be called God's image; even though I retain the principle I just now set forward, the likeness

2. Engel, *John Calvin's Perspectival Anthropology*, 38.

3. I.15.3. Throughout the text these figures refer to Battles's translation of Calvin's *Institutes*: the first number is book, the second is chapter, the third is section in chapter.

4. "Psychopannychia," 387.

of God extends to the whole excellence by which man's nature towers over all the kinds of living creatures.

And although the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers, yet there was no part of man, not even the body itself, in which some sparks did not glow.⁵

These assertions naturally raise the question I have stated above: Is the body included in the image of God?⁶ There are other issues that I must deal with in order to give a full answer to this primary question.

Relational View of the Image of God?

As the above quotations apparently indicate, Calvin held to a substantive view of the *imago Dei*, that is, he believed that it consists in certain capacities in man. But, as I have already noted above, many expositors of Calvin's teaching on the image of God interpret it in relational rather than ontological terms. If this is a legitimate possibility then the division between the body and the soul is perhaps relativized and Calvin's anthropology may be understood in more holistic terms.⁷ In other words, if to be human is to be in relation with God rather than to possess certain spiritual qualities (e.g., reason or will), then the whole man is embraced in this relation. The distinction between body and soul, in this case does not lead to an obvious axiological dualism between them because they equally and inseparably participate in this relation. God does not relate differently to the body and the soul but rather relates to the human being as a whole person.⁸ A secondary and related question, then, is whether the image of God in Calvin is ontological or relational.

However, it is not enough to find grounds for describing the image of God in Calvin as relational. A further problem arises: Does "relational," as it is legitimately applied to Calvin's teaching, mean the same as "relational" when it is understood in post-Barthian anthropology that Torrance represents?

5. I.15.3.

6. Goodloe, "The Body in Calvin's Theology," 109, oversimplifies the problem when he says that "the presence of the image of God in both body and soul, for Calvin, provides a safeguard against overstating their distinction . . ."

7. Cf. Gunton, "Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology," 59.

8. Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, 86.

For post-Barthian anthropology, to be human is to be in relation.⁹ This statement is opposed to the ontological/substantive interpretation of human nature. It is neither body nor soul, nor reason, nor morality, nor linguisticity, nor immortality that make man man but relation to other human creatures and ultimately to God. What is to be understood by “relation”? Martin Buber speaks of two types of relation: “I-Thou” and “I-It.” Three spheres of relation—nature, human community, God—may be described by either type. When the other is considered as an object that is to be known, possessed, and used, and to which we are closed, then the “I-It” relation is operative. When we are open to the other and let the other respond to us and we respond to him or her, then we enter the “I-Thou” relation. The “I-Thou” relation is not describable in words. Attempts to put it in precise terms objectify it and turn “Thou” into “It.” Buber’s analysis lacks specific Christian understanding of the relation, especially of the relation to God, although his relational terminology was adopted by such Christian theologians as Karl Barth and Emil Brunner.

The Christian (including Barthian) understanding of relation as constitutive of human personhood is rooted in the doctrine of the Trinity and relational conception of God. Relationality is not only an attribute of God; it is the primary concept to describe the nature of divinity.¹⁰ To be a human person is to be, first of all, in relation to God. The relation between God and man is asymmetrical; it is based on God’s election of man rather than on man’s election of God, on God speaking to man rather than man speaking to God. The special relation of God to man that may be described as “the covenantal commission” constitutes human nature and human personhood.¹¹ The relation of man to God means that man lives responsibly before God,¹² reflects back God’s image,¹³ is grateful and obedient to God.¹⁴

The asymmetrical nature of the divine-human relation implies that the relation from God to man is primary and is sufficient for constituting a creature as a human person. The secondary relation of man to God is important but is not necessary for making man man.¹⁵ The lack of response from the side of man because of moral or physiological reasons does not undo man as

9. See Schwobel, Gunton, *Persons, Divine and Human*, 47–61, 141–65.

10. Jansen, *Relationality and the Concept of God*, 15.

11. Horton, “Image and Office,” 198.

12. Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, 11.

13. Torrance, *Calvin’s Doctrine of Man*, 56.

14. Barth, *CD*, III/2, 166, 174.

15. Kelsey, “Personal Bodies,” 156–57.

a human person. In other words, the lack of rationality (damaged brain) or faith (moral-spiritual failure) does not make man inhuman or impersonal.¹⁶

Let us consider a specific instance of Barthian reading of Calvin's doctrine of the image of God. Torrance interprets the image of God in Calvin in the following—"relational"—way:

If in Calvin's thought the *imago dei* has thus to do first of all with God's gracious beholding of man as His child, which is the objective basis of the *imago*, and then with man's response to that decision of God's grace in coming to Him as a Father and yielding to Him the gratitude and honour which are due in such filial relationship, which is subjective basis of the *imago*, it is implied throughout that God has created man just for this relationship with God and in that relationship has already given the *imago dei* its being in the sphere of man's understanding.¹⁷

A shorter version of this interpretation is this: "Within the single thought of *imago dei* there is included a two-sided relation, but it is a relation that has only one essential motion and rhythm. There is the grace of God, and man's answer to that grace."¹⁸ Cairns and Engel in their discussion of the relational aspect of the image of God in Calvin both refer to Torrance and accept his understanding of relation.¹⁹ Prins succinctly defines "relational" in the sense of being "with God."²⁰

As we will see, Calvin's doctrine of the image of God does contain a relational element but it is not primary in and exhaustive of the image of God. Relation is rather the natural outcome of the primary element of the image of God (reason and will). For Calvin, man is man even without this relation with God because his humanity is constituted by the faculties of the human soul. In anticipating the analysis of Calvin, we should note that the relationality of the image of God in Calvin should be distinguished from the relational interpretation of human person in post-Barthian anthropologies in four ways. For Calvin the following statements are true:

1. The primary element of the image is reason and will.
2. Relation to God is the result of the primary element.

16. O'Donovan, "Man in the Image of God," 452, 456-57.

17. Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, 77.

18. *Ibid.*, 80.

19. Cairns, *The Image of God in Man*, 135; Engel, *John Calvin's Perspectival Anthropology*, 51.

20. Prins, "The Image of God in Adam," 37.

3. Reason and will are not mere capacities for being human; they make us human.
4. A one-sided relation of God to man is not a relation at all. A relation can only be mutual: God elects—man believes, God speaks—man obeys.

The final difficulty, which we will address later, is the relation of the image of God in Adam to the image of God in Christ: are these two different images in Calvin?²¹ If so, how are they related and do they both give evidence of axiological dualism?

Now let us consider Calvin's doctrine of the *imago Dei*. I will follow Calvin's presentation of this doctrine in the *Institutes*, adding to my discussion relevant passages from his other works. In the *Institutes*, Calvin divides his exposition of the image of God into two parts. In the first book, he speaks of the ideal image of God; in the second, he deals with the loss of the image. In my presentation I will do the same. Therefore discussion of the loss of the image will appear nearer to the end of this chapter.

Exposition of Calvin's Doctrine of the Image of God

Three Criteria

To establish Calvin's method of determining the content of the image of God is to have a sure key for interpreting his diverse anthropological statements.

Concerning the method, I suggest that Calvin used three criteria to define the image of God, namely, (1) spirituality of God, (2) distinction of man from other living beings, and (3) restoration of the image by Christ. These criteria were first formulated in one of the early theological works of Calvin, namely *Psychopannychia*,²² and later were consistently used in the *Institutes*, his commentaries and sermons.

21. The question is raised in Prins, *Ibid.*, 35. Cairns, *The Image of God in Man*, 127, also notes the problem of continuity between the image in the OT and NT. He believes that the image of God in the OT is different from that in the NT. (*ibid.*, 37) Apparently, the distinction between the OT and the NT is maintained by Cairns for the sake of a primarily relational model of the image. Since the OT image is substantive (*ibid.*, 38), by this distinction, he provides a biblical justification for a mainly relational interpretation of the image. By his own admission Cairns follows Emil Brunner in this.

22. "[Criterion I] The Sacred History tells us of the purpose of God, before man was created, to make him "after his own image and likeness." These expressions cannot possibly be understood of his body, in which, though the wonderful work of God appears more than in all other creatures, his image nowhere shines forth. For who is it that speaks thus, "Let us make man in our own image and likeness?" God himself, who is a Spirit, and cannot be represented by any bodily shape . . .

Behind these three criteria lies an assumption that we cannot clearly see the image of God in man as he is after the Fall. The image is not totally lost but its remnants are meager.²³ (I will discuss the remnants of the image in more detail later in this chapter.) There is a need to look at an ideal man in whom the image of God is intact. This ideal man is, first of all, Adam before the Fall²⁴ but also, and more importantly,²⁵ the believer redeemed by Christ: “Nevertheless, it seems that we do not have a full definition of “image” if we do not see more plainly those faculties in which man excels, and in which he ought to be thought the reflection of God’s glory. That, indeed, can be nowhere better recognized than from the restoration of his corrupted nature . . . through Christ . . .”²⁶

SPIRITUAL IMAGE

According to the first criterion, the image of God in man must be spiritual. It cannot include the body because God is spirit: “the image itself is separate from the flesh . . . we hold that nothing can bear the image of God but

“[Criterion II] For what if I should maintain that the distinction was constituted by the word of God, by which that breath of life is distinguished from the souls of brutes? For whence do the souls of other animals arise? God says, “*Let the earth bring forth the living soul,*” etc. Let that which has sprung of earth be resolved into earth. But the soul of man is not of the earth. It was made by the mouth of the Lord . . .

“[Criterion III] When he [Paul] enjoins us to “*put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him who created him,*” he clearly shows what this image is, or wherein it consists . . .” (“Psychopannychia,” 386–87)

23. I.15.4; II.2.12–26; Comm. Gen 1:26; 9:6; Ps 8:5; Jas 3:9. References to Calvin’s biblical commentaries start with “Comm.” and are followed by indication of a biblical passage.

24. I.15.1.

25. Torrance, *Calvin’s Doctrine of Man*, 36, suggests that the main metaphor that nearly becomes a technical term for the *imago Dei* in Calvin is that of a mirror. Mirror, according to Torrance, *ibid.*, 51, implies mutual relationship between God and man. Focusing on the mirror metaphor Torrance attempts to substantiate purely relational interpretation of the image of God in Calvin. Torrance’s exclusive focus on the mirror metaphor is equivalent, in my terms, to recognizing only the third criterion of the image of God and refusing to admit the presence of the other two. Cairns, *The Image of God in Man*, 137, agrees with Torrance that “the picture of a mirror is the governing one in Calvin’s mind.” But Engel, *John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology*, 52–53, rightly criticizes Torrance for singling out this particular metaphor in Calvin. She demonstrates that mirror is only one of a number of “common Renaissance images drawn from the arts of coin-making, engraving, and printing.” Grenz, *Social God and Relational Self*, 166, regards Torrance’s conclusion as “overdrawn.”

26. I.15.4

spirit, since God is a Spirit.²⁷ Only the soul can bear the image of God. Calvin opposes the views of the early centuries Anthropomorphites who identified the image of God with the physical constitution of man and of the Lutheran theologian Osiander who “indiscriminately extending God’s image both to the body and to the soul, mingles heaven and earth.”²⁸ The body is so far from being able to bear a spiritual image that man, because of his physicality, “savoured of the earth” in spite of the fact that his soul was from heaven.²⁹ This straightforward logic of Calvin does not require, for our purposes, any further analysis. The first criterion clearly and unequivocally rules out the body as a bearer of the image.

DIFFERENCE FROM ANIMALS

The second criterion³⁰ locates the image of God in that part of man by which he differs from and excels other creatures. Many times Calvin identifies this part of man with his reason: “reason is proper to our nature, it distinguishes us from brute beasts.”³¹ If the first criterion drew the line between the material (body) and spiritual (soul) parts of man, the second one determines in what sense the soul is the image of God.

This criterion is related to Calvin’s understanding of man as created in stages. He may identify either two or three stages. Two-stage creation means that, first, the body is created, then the soul. Calvin contrasts this with the one-stage creation of animals. Man is different from them because of his soul without which he does not possess the image of God:

Moses, to prevent any one from placing this image in the flesh of man, first narrates that the body was formed out of clay, and makes no mention of the image of God; thereafter, he says, that “the breath of life” was introduced into this clay body, making the image of God not to become effulgent in man till he was complete in all his parts.³²

27. “Psychopannychia,” 387. As Barth, *CD*, III/1, 192, indicates, this logic was known in the early church: “The exegesis of the Early Church (cf. Ambrose, *Hexaem.*, VI, 7) maintained at once that since the divine likeness is not to be found directly in the body of man it is to be identified with the soul.”

28. I.15.3; cf. *Comm. Gen* 1:26.

29. *Comm.* 1 Cor 15:47.

30. This criterion is present in Calvin’s thought when he discusses Adam both before and after the fall, see I.15.3 and II.12.6.

31. II.2.17. Cf. also other examples of ascribing human superiority over animals to reason: I.15.2; II.1.1; II.2.12; *Comm.* Ps 50; Gen 1:20, 24; 1 Cor 15:45.

32. “Psychopannychia,” 386.

Elsewhere Calvin identifies three stages of the creation of man:

Three gradations, indeed, are to be noted in the creation of man; that his dead body was formed out of the dust of the earth; that it was endued with a soul, whence it should receive vital motion; and that on this soul God engraved his own image, to which immortality is annexed.³³

The first stage is similar to the creation of animals: man is given a material body made from the dust of the earth. For Calvin, this is what must humble man, constantly remind him of his low origin.³⁴ The second stage is the creation of the soul. But it cannot be denied that animals have souls too if the soul is understood as life.³⁵ However, the souls of men are different from the souls of animals. What makes the human soul unique among all other embodied living beings is the third stage of creation. This stage involves the impression of the image of God on the soul, thereby endowing it with immortality. What is exactly impressed on the soul is its various faculties³⁶ that may be summed up as reason and will.³⁷ As Calvin gives a detailed explanation of the image of God in I.15.6–7, he leaves out the body and concentrates on the soul and its faculties. “Of the bodily nature of man, Calvin has (here at least) little to say.”³⁸ Thus even the literary structure of the chapter on the image of God indirectly supports the view that Calvin did not include the body in the image. Another secondary evidence to support this thesis is that Calvin approvingly refers to Plato’s identification of the image with the soul.³⁹ Clearly Plato, who regarded the physical body as the prison of the soul, could not include the former in the image. Therefore Calvin would not invoke Plato’s authority if he intended to include the body in the image.

33. Comm. Gen 2:7.

34. I.15.1.

35. “Psychopannychia,” 386.

36. I.15.4; Comm. Gen 2:7.

37. I.15.6–7. Cf. Helm, *John Calvin’s Ideas*, 135: “Endowment with reason and understanding distinguishes us from non-human animals. Calvin affirms the tradition that sees humankind’s being made in the image of God as our being given certain intellectual and moral endowments.”

38. Warfield, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Creation,” 337.

39. I.15.6.

RESTORATION IN CHRIST

However, for Calvin, the description of the image is not complete until he employs the third criterion: restoration of the image by Christ.⁴⁰ The NT describes the restoration of the image using three key terms: knowledge, righteousness, and holiness (Eph 4:23; Col 3:10). How does Calvin understand them?

First, the NT reference to “knowledge” confirms the initial insight gained on the basis of the first two criteria, namely, that image has to do with reason: “But what is meant by—*the spirit of your mind*? I understand it simply to mean,—*Be renewed*, not only with respect to the inferior appetites or desires, which are manifestly sinful, but with respect also to that part of the soul which is reckoned most noble and excellent.”⁴¹ In the sermon on the same verse from Ephesians, Calvin interprets “mind” in a similar way: “St. Paul takes up here what seems most excellent and most valued in man’s nature, namely knowledge, understanding, wit, reason and all manner of mental ability.”⁴² Elsewhere Calvin explains that restoration of the image by the Holy Spirit involves not only gaining a knowledge of the truth but also a transformation of the will: “And this is what he [Paul] immediately adds, that we are *renewed after the image of God*. Now, the *image of God* resides in the whole of the soul, inasmuch as it is not the reason merely that is rectified, but also the will.”⁴³

Second, the NT adds the notions of righteousness and holiness to the definition of the image formulated on the basis of the first two criteria that place the image in the powers of the soul. How are righteousness and holiness to be understood? These are not faculties of the soul but rather they constitute a dynamic element of the image. Are they ethical or relational terms? First of all, Calvin interprets them ethically: “I am rather inclined to consider *holiness* as referring to the first table, and *righteousness* to the second table, of the law.”⁴⁴ The quotation from his commentary on Col 3:10 just cited above indicates that “knowledge” is interpreted by Calvin ethically too (“transforming the whole man,” “it is not the reason merely that is rectified, but also the will”). But he also recognizes that these terms imply vertical and horizontal relations:

40. I.15.4; “Psychopannychia,” 387; Comm. Gen 1:26.

41. Comm. Eph 4:23.

42. *Sermons on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, 433.

43. Comm. Col 3:10.

44. Comm. Eph 4:24.

Now he shows us how that is done, saying “in righteousness and holiness.” By the word “righteousness,” he means soundness and uprightness, so that we live with our neighbor without deceit, and without malice and mischief, giving to every man that which is his due . . . But it is not enough that men have their right, unless God also has his . . . righteousness must be linked with holiness. For the two tables of the law are inseparable. And under the word “holiness,” St. Paul includes all things that belong to the service of God.⁴⁵

In the *Institutes*, Calvin gives a brief summary of the first table of the law that again shows that, for him, ethical is inseparable from relational: “the principle points of the First Table [are] putting our faith in God, giving due praise for his excellence and righteousness, calling upon his name, and truly keeping the Sabbath.”⁴⁶

If we compare this understanding of holiness with Torrance’s relational interpretation of the *imago dei* in Calvin, we will see that Torrance, and those who follow him, are correct in identifying a relational aspect in Calvin’s doctrine of the image of God. For Calvin, holiness is relational in the sense that it involves “service of God,” “faith in God,” “praise” of God, and “calling upon” God’s name. This is comparable to Torrance’s “the grace of God, and man’s answer to that grace.” However there are two differences. First, it is doubtful that Calvin included “the objective basis,” i.e., God’s relation to man, in the image of God. Second, in Calvin, relation functions differently in defining humanity. For Torrance, human nature is constituted by the unique relation of God to man and man’s response to God, but, for Calvin, a relationship with God is a derivative of unique human attributes such as reason and will. What for Torrance is only the capacity to become human is, for Calvin, human nature itself. These are two fundamentally different approaches to defining human beings. Therefore, Calvin’s view of the image of God can be called relational only in the limited sense described above.

Moreover, it is incorrect to say that for Calvin knowledge, righteousness and holiness are purely relational terms.⁴⁷ The ethical interpretation for Calvin is primary and cannot be disregarded. Ethical and relational understandings of these terms are not identical although, as we have seen, they are closely related. The relations are fulfilled in obeying God’s commandments. The importance of recognizing the ethical element in the image

45. *Sermons on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, 437.

46. II.2.24.

47. As suggested in Prins, “The Image of God in Adam,” 36.

will become apparent when we consider Calvin's doctrine of the remnants of the image after the Fall.

At this point we should ask the question: Does the third criterion exclude the body from the image or not? To be specific: Does Calvin think that restoration of the image in Christ includes restoration of the body?

In the following passage, Calvin spiritualizes the sins described by Paul, no doubt following the exegetical pattern of the Sermon on the Mount (as he understood it). Lusts are not so much bodily, as spiritual, they belong to the soul:

Let us beware of considering *the deceitful lusts*, as the Papists do, to mean nothing more than the gross and visible lusts, which are generally acknowledged to be base. The word includes also those dispositions which, instead of being censured, are sometimes applauded, such as ambition, cunning, and everything that proceeds either from self-love or from want of confidence in God.⁴⁸

In general, the exposition of Ephesians, chapters 4–5, and Colossians, chapter 3, (with its references to hands, mouth, fornication, etc.) provided for Calvin an appropriate context to comment on the body as the image of God. However he does not take advantage of this, but rather concentrates on the spiritual. This is not an argument from silence (“Calvin says little about the body therefore he denigrates the body.”) It is only an observation that Calvin does not include the body in the discussion of this *locus classicus* of the restoration of the image of God. We cannot simply conclude, based on these important texts, that Calvin included the body in the process of regeneration. Other evidence is required.

It is interesting to see how Calvin uses the expression “the whole man” in his exposition of this classical passage on the restoration of the image:

He shews in the *first* place, that newness of life consists in *knowledge*—not as though a simple and bare knowledge were sufficient, but he speaks of the illumination of the Holy Spirit, which is lively and effectual, so as not merely to enlighten the mind by kindling it up with the light of truth, but transforming the whole man. And this is what he immediately adds, that we are *renewed after the image of God*. Now, the *image of God* resides in the whole of the soul, inasmuch as it is not the reason merely that is rectified, but also the will.⁴⁹

48. Comm. Eph 4:22.

49. Comm. Col 3:10.

When Calvin says “the whole man,” one would expect him to explicate this as “the soul and the body.” However, it turns out that “the whole man” is “the whole soul” or “the reason and the will.” The body is again left out from consideration.

Of course, in commentaries on such passages as 1 Thess 5:23, 2 Cor 7:1, and Rom 6:13, where the body is explicitly mentioned by Paul, Calvin cannot avoid including the body in the process of sanctification but it must be noted that he does not speak there about the image of God so these passages do little to shed light on our primary question.

This lack of reference to the body, however, may prepare us for an interesting suggestion by Margaret Miles, namely, that “flesh,” for Calvin, is not body but soul:

Calvin makes the surprising statement that the body needs no earthly conversion, and that is why the rebirth of the soul will not affect the body until the resurrection. Calvin clustered all the faculties and energies of human being in the soul; yet his interest—even in terms of which aspect of human being to blame for sin—remains with the soul . . . “A person must be born again because he is flesh. He requires not to be born again with reference to the body.” [Miles’s quotation is slightly inaccurate, cf. II.3.1] Here we face a most important distinction in Calvin’s thought between “flesh” and “body.” Curiously, the soul participates in “flesh” more than the body does. Using Paul’s synecdoche, “flesh,” to designate the whole human being in the fallen condition of sinfulness, Calvin reduces human being to two organized activities, both located in the soul: flesh and spirit.⁵⁰

Thus the third criterion excludes the body from the image of God as do the first two.

The Unity of the Image

As the descriptions of the image of God on the basis of the first two criteria, on the one hand, and on the basis of the third criterion, on the other, seem to be so different, it has been suggested by Prins that Calvin really describes two different images. In this regard, it is important to note that Calvin uses the word “restoration”⁵¹ when he speaks about the image of God

50. “Theology, Anthropology, and the Human Body,” 311.

51. Cf. an editorial comment in a footnote to the *Institutes* I.15.4: “The use of words like *renovation* and *reparatio* in this section . . . has a methodological significance. Much of the picture of man at creation is derived from the account of the image of God

as seen in those who are united to Christ. There is a continuity between the original image possessed by Adam and the image given by Christ: “what was primary in the renewing of God’s image also held the highest place in the creation itself.”⁵² In commenting on Genesis 1:26, Calvin, after a negative description of the image of God (it is neither body nor the dominion over the nature), amazingly refers directly to the third criterion skipping the first two. In order to explain the image of God as mentioned in Gen 1:26, Calvin refers to the idea of spiritual regeneration in Christ that he understands as restoration of the original image, as possessed by Adam. It means that, for Calvin, there is no disjunction between the OT and NT understanding of the image of God; for him, it is the same phenomenon. The same idea may be found again and again in his commentaries.⁵³

At the same time Calvin admits that Christ restores the image of God with a greater measure of grace.⁵⁴ Restoration means not so much a return to Adam but, rather, a regeneration after the image of Christ. However, the renewed image includes the original one. Whatever the greater measure of grace⁵⁵ means, the continuity and non-contradictory nature of the “two” images is there.⁵⁶

Substantive-Dynamic Image

The three criteria describe one image. It means that Calvin speaks not of two different images (one substantive, the other relational) but of two aspects of one image. The endowments of man must be included in Calvin’s definition of the image. The possibility of a purely relational, non-substantive image is excluded by the first two criteria.⁵⁷ Reason and will are part of the image. A purely substantive interpretation is also hardly possible according to the third criterion. Knowledge, righteousness and holiness, as we have seen, are ethical-relational terms. Knowledge is not only correct information about God but faith in Him and it also implies moral transformation of the whole man. Holiness is possible only in relation to God as our response to His holy

as restored in redemption.” (*Institutes*, 1:189)

52. I.15.4.

53. Comm. Eph 4:24; Col 3:10.

54. I.15.4; Comm. Eph 4:24; Col 3:10.

55. For a possible explanation see Comm. 1 Cor 15:44.

56. *Contra Prins*, “The Image of God in Adam,” 42–43.

57. Cairns, *Image of God in Man*, 139, admits that “while it is true to say that man is in God’s image in so far as he reflects back in gratitude God’s glory, this definition is not exhaustive.”

will. Calvin relates righteousness to the second table of the Decalogue. But keeping the last six commandments requires relations with other people, love for them, and love for one's neighbor that can never be separated from love for God. Apparently, there is only one possibility left for interpreting Calvin's thought.⁵⁸ The image of God is, on the one hand, a unique spiritual ability to know (ultimately to know God), to be a moral being (that is, to fulfill God's will), to be in personal relations (with other humans and with God) and, on the other hand, actually knowing about God, knowing Him personally and obeying Him. The image of God is the endowment leading to the relation, or the relation based on the endowment. The relation is impossible without the endowment; the endowment is unfulfilled without the relation. This interpretation will be further nuanced after the discussion of the loss of the image below.

I conclude that the image of God in Calvin is substantive-ethical-relational or substantive-dynamic.⁵⁹ The term "dynamic" is helpful not only in respect of brevity but also because it does not limit the second aspect of the image to ethical and/or relational elements but includes all different ways in which reason and will can be used. As will become clear from the discussion of the lost image in Calvin, intellectual use that does not involve personal relations is also a part of the image.

58. The possibility is hinted at by Helm, *John Calvin's Ideas*, 7, who allows that Calvin might have understood the image of God "in ontological, or ethical, or relational terms, or in some of each."

59. Prins, "The Image of God in Adam," 36–37, draws a similar conclusion. Likewise Berkouwer, *Man: The Image of God*, 139, without specific reference to Calvin, insists that the image of God should be understood as a complex, ontological-relational phenomenon: "It is one thing to say that the relation to God is of the essence of the image, but quite another to make the image itself consist merely of relation . . ." Only Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, 79, seems to believe that, in Calvin, the image is merely relational. However he admits: "A large part of the difficulty in determining Calvin's views on the depravity of man is due to the fact that he lapses back again and again, at least in language, from a dynamic to a more static conception of man." (*ibid.*, 106) Kelsey, *Eccentric Existence*, 34, similarly says that Calvin is inconsistent. But Partee, *Calvin and Classical Philosophy*, 52, comments on Torrance's position: "The exposition of the relational aspect of Calvin's doctrine of the image of God tends to underemphasize the natural, i.e., created character of the image of God that Calvin also affirms." Engel, *John Calvin's Perspectival Anthropology*, 53–54, accepts both parts of the image on different grounds, namely, as divine and human perspectives.

Lost Image

Analysis of Calvin's doctrine of the loss of the image yields similar results, that is, it shows that, for Calvin, image is, first, spiritual, second, substantive-dynamic, and, third, the dynamic dimension of the image is based on the powers of the soul. Yet there is an important qualification to be made with respect to the dynamic part of the image: in a certain sense it is accidental to the image.

Calvin recognizes that the presence of the image of God in man after the Fall is highly problematic: it is nearly lost. The question is in what respect it is totally lost and in what respect it remains at least in some measure. Calvin answers with two related distinctions: natural/supernatural gifts⁶⁰ and lower/higher objects of knowledge: "the natural gifts in man were corrupted, but the supernatural taken away . . . For my part, if I wanted clearly to teach what the corruption of nature is like, I would readily be content with these words . . ." ⁶¹ Later in the same chapter follows a fuller description of the natural/supernatural⁶² distinction:

And, indeed, that common opinion which they have taken from Augustine pleases me: that the natural gifts were corrupted in man through sin, but that the supernatural gifts were stripped from him . . . Among these [supernatural gifts] are faith, love to God, charity toward neighbor, zeal for holiness and for righteousness. All these, since Christ restores them in us, are considered adventitious, and beyond nature: and for this reason we infer that they are taken away. On the other hand, soundness of mind and uprightness of heart were withdrawn at the same time. This is the corruption of the natural gifts . . . Since reason, therefore, by which man distinguishes between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be completely wiped out.⁶³

60. Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, 83, recognizes this distinction.

61. II.2.4.

62. Engel, *John Calvin's Perspectival Anthropology*, 56, thinks that the natural/supernatural distinction is not the real key to the solution of the problem of the loss and presence of the image in fallen man. She believes that Calvin sometimes asserts complete loss of natural gifts as well. However, her argumentation is invalidated (1) by failure to point out clear passages in Calvin where he asserts that the natural gifts are lost, (2) by not explaining why the entire chapter in the *Institutes* on the loss of image (II.2) is structured around the natural-supernatural distinction, and (3) by the drive to squeeze Calvin's thought into her new perspectival approach. She herself admits that her method does not fully synthesize Calvin's thought. (*ibid.*, 61)

63. II.2.12; cf. II.5.19.

Natural/supernatural gifts correspond respectively to inferior and higher spheres of knowledge: “Therefore, to perceive more clearly how far the mind can proceed in any matter according to the degree of its ability, we must here set a distinction. This, then, is the distinction: that there is one kind of understanding of earthly things; another of heavenly . . .”⁶⁴ This distinction was already anticipated by Calvin in his exposition of the image of God in Adam: “And if human happiness, whose perfection is to be united with God, were hidden from man, he would in fact be bereft of the principal use of his understanding. Thus, also, the chief activity of the soul is to aspire thither.”⁶⁵ In discussion of the image in fallen man, “the principle use of his understanding” and “chief activity of the soul” correspond to the knowledge of heavenly things.

For Calvin, the ability to know the inferior things (natural gifts) remains with man even after the Fall but the ability to know the higher things (supernatural gifts) is lost. What are these inferior and higher things? “The first class includes government, household management, all mechanical skills, and the liberal arts. In the second are the knowledge of God and of his will, and the rule by which we conform our lives to it.”⁶⁶ To “the first class” may be also added jurisprudence, observation of nature, medicine, mathematical sciences.⁶⁷

The objects of the second category are classified by Calvin in the following important passage: “We must now analyze what human reason can discern with regard to God’s kingdom and to spiritual insight. This spiritual insight consists chiefly in three things: (1) knowing God; (2) knowing his fatherly favor in our behalf in which our salvation consists; (3) knowing how to frame our life according to the rule of his law.”⁶⁸ Man lost the ability to use his mind to pursue the objects of the second class: “In the first two points—and especially in the second—the greatest geniuses are blinder than moles!”⁶⁹ What is lost was present in the beginning. Thus we have a full picture of the image of God.

First, the image is based on man’s reason. Reason is the fundamental element of the image. It cannot be excluded from Calvin’s definition of the image by any stretch of the imagination.

64. II.2.13.

65. I.15.6.

66. II.2.13.

67. II.2.15.

68. II.2.18.

69. *Ibid.*

Second, the image is dynamic in the sense that it consists in using reason. That is why Calvin is able to maintain that the image is lost yet remains. After the Fall, man can use his reason in certain ways but he cannot use it in other ways. He can know natural things but he cannot know God and be in relationship with Him. If the image is exclusively relation to God then, for Calvin, there is no sense in which the image remains in sinful man. If the image is not extended to different uses of reason and is confined to relation to God then the image is wholly lost in sinful man. Cairns who wants to understand the image of God in narrowly relational terms states: "It is clear from a consideration of many passages that when Calvin talks of man's corruption, he does not mean that sin has severed the connection with God altogether."⁷⁰ If "connection with God" is understood as a corrupted seed of religion in man, on the one hand, and preserving of creation by God, on the other hand, then this statement by Cairns is true. However, if the "connection with God" is understood in terms of saving faith (as in Calvin, e.g., II.2.18) or responsible existence before God (as in Cairns himself, e.g., *The Image of God in Man*, 106), then it must be admitted that on exclusively or primarily relational view of the image of God it is impossible to speak about the image, or even its remnants, in sinful man.

Moreover, relation being far from exhaustive of the image is actually not even a necessary part of the image. Calvin goes as far as to describe the supernatural gifts (the relational part of the image in Prins' terms) as adventitious,⁷¹ accidental.⁷² For Calvin, a human being remains a human being even without relation to God although in such a state he or she is far from perfection and the purpose of his or her creation. Thus we have to add a further nuance to our statement that the image of God in Calvin should be understood as a substantive-relational phenomenon. The nuance is this: the center of gravity in Calvin's understanding of the image is in the substantive rather than in the relational. The former is essential; the latter is accidental. It is true that Calvin rarely⁷³ applies the adjectives "adventitious" or "ac-

70. Cairns, *The Image of God in Man*, 144.

71. Anderson, "The *Imago Dei* Theme," 186, takes Calvin's adjective *adventitia* at its face value: "Faith, love of God and love of neighbor, zeal for righteousness, and aspirations for holiness are *adventitia* and *praeter naturam*. If these *dona* are adventitious, they are neither inherent in nature nor due to nature. By consequence they are totally gratuitous, transcendent, and separable."

72. II.2.12.

73. One certain instance is in II.2.12 quoted above. The other place where Calvin uses the word "adventitious" in connection with the discussion of the image of God is Comm. Gen 2:7. Here he states that the entire image was "adventitious." This time the word has the connotation of "gracious" rather than "accidental" or "unnecessary" as

cidental” to the second aspect of the image but this fact does not cancel the undeniable presence of the idea expressed by these words. If knowledge of God, holiness and righteousness could be lost and man could remain man and continue to bear the image of God, then they are accidental. The substantive element is primary and necessary, it is constitutive of the image.⁷⁴ The relational element is secondary, derivative and teleological.

Third, the use of reason may be intellectual, relational or ethical. That Calvin includes purely intellectual use of reason in the image of God can be seen from its use in respect both of inferior and higher things. After the Fall man can use his reason, for example, in mathematics. In this particular situation, no personal relation is possible because the object of knowledge is not a person. The same applies to medicine, observation of nature, and the arts. Regenerated believers can additionally use their reason in “knowing God”—this expression should probably be interpreted as an intellectual exercise in distinction from relational and ethical uses that Calvin lists as the second and third points in the description of “spiritual insight.” Thus “knowing God” here is perhaps making true theological statements as may be seen in the following comment by Calvin: “Certainly I do not deny that one can read competent and apt statements about God here and there in the philosophers, but these always show a certain giddy imagination.”⁷⁵ It does not matter that philosophers are unable to conceive of God correctly. What is important to note is that Calvin is speaking about “statements about God” when he explains the first part of “spiritual insight.”

After the Fall, human reason is able to maintain government of countries and on, a more intimate level, men are still able to live in households as families. These imply horizontal relations as a part of the image. The expression “knowing his fatherly favor in our behalf” anticipates Calvin’s definition of faith as “a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence toward us . . . ,” which he gives in the third book of the *Institutes*, namely,

otherwise it is unclear how Calvin could believe that man would be man without the image of God. It is not improbable that the sense “gracious” is also present in II.2.12. Knowledge, holiness and righteousness are restored to us by Christ—this is certainly a gracious act of God towards fallen men. However, the context of II.2.12 demands that—whether the additional meaning “gracious” is present or not—“adventitious” is to be understood as “accidental, unnecessary.”

74. In a passage where he speaks about restoration of the freedom of the will by Christ, Calvin describes will as “essential” to human nature and as existing even in fallen man. (II.3.6) Torrance, *Calvin’s Doctrine of Man*, 91, refers to this passage in Calvin to explain in what sense the image is present in fallen man.

75. II.2.18.

III.2.7. Thus it must be interpreted in terms of vertical relation to God. The relational element clearly belongs to the image.

Finally, ethical use of reason is present too. “Knowing how to frame our life according to the rule of his law” undoubtedly refers to ethics. Ethics stands on the border of natural/supernatural and earthly/heavenly distinctions: “There remains the third aspect of spiritual insight, that of knowing the rule for the right conduct of life . . . The human mind sometimes seems more acute in this than in higher things.”⁷⁶ Calvin believes in natural law: “If Gentiles by nature have law righteousness engraved upon their minds, we surely cannot say they are utterly blind as to the conduct of life. There is nothing more common than for a man to be sufficiently instructed in a right standard of conduct by natural law . . .”⁷⁷ The remnant of the ethical part of the image of God is natural law.

Thus we see that:

1. The doctrine of the lost image of God in Calvin can be understood only in terms of the ontological-dynamic model.
2. The dynamic part of the image cannot be confined exclusively to relation with God: intellectual exercise of the mind, relations with other people, moral life—all must be included.
3. The dynamic part is tied to the spiritual endowments of man, it is derivative from them.
4. The ontological element is primary and necessary, the dynamic one (in its different aspects) is secondary and accidental.

General and Specific Senses of the Image

Finally, we come back to the problem of ascribing the image of God by Calvin to the body. He does speak about sparks of God’s glory in the human body and of reflecting God’s image by the bodily frame of man. (I.15.3) However, these statements should be interpreted, on the one hand, as affirmation of the goodness of creation, and, on the other hand, as inclusion of the whole man, body and soul, in general revelation. In this sense any part of creation is the image of God:

There is certainly nothing so obscure or contemptible, even in the smallest corners of the earth, in which some marks of the power and wisdom of God may not be seen; but as a more distinct image of him is engraven on the heavens, David has

76. II.2.22.

77. Ibid.

particularly selected them for contemplation, that their splendor might lead us to contemplate all parts of the world . . . It is indeed a great thing, that in the splendor of the heavens there is presented to our view a lively image of God . . .⁷⁸

Thus two senses of the expression “image of God” should be recognized in Calvin. In the general (revelatory) sense, the image of God is the entire creation (including the human body) because all creation in one way or another reflects God’s glory. However, the image of God in a specific (anthropological) sense resides only in the human soul. Calvin himself explicitly makes the distinction.⁷⁹ Note the words “proper” and “primary” in the following statements: “For although God’s glory shines forth in the outer man, yet there is no doubt that the proper seat of his image is in the soul . . . And although the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers, yet there was no part of man, not even the body itself, in which some sparks did not glow” (I.15.3).

The distinction between general and specific senses of the image is not a matter of brighter and dimmer lights of revelation, as if Calvin were only saying that man reflects God much better than the heavens or any other part of creation. The distinction is more fundamental: man as the image of God differs from the rest of creation as the image of God not in a quantitative but in a qualitative way. Man bears the image of God in both senses: he is a part—a bright part—of the general revelation of God in creation, but he is also an absolutely unique bearer of the image of God because he is endowed with God-like capacities that the rest of creation does not and cannot possess. The ascription of the image to the body should be understood in the former sense only.⁸⁰

In the history of Reformed anthropology, the terms “wide” and “narrow” were used to describe a different distinction, namely, the distinction between, in our terms, ontological and dynamic parts of the image. In the

78. Comm. Ps 19:1; cf. Comm. Ps 19:4. There are also references to the gospel as the image of God, see Comm. Isa 2:2; Ps 20:9. Calvin sometimes used the expression “image of God” in the sense of a picture of God in special revelation. But this sense is not relevant to our present discussion.

79. So is Cairns, *The Image of God in Man*, 135, and Torrance, *Calvin’s Doctrine of Man*, 35. Contra Engel, *John Calvin’s Perspectival Anthropology*, 47, who explains ascribing the image to man’s body by means of her perspectival approach and does not recognize general and narrower senses.

80. Berkouwer, *Man: The Image of God*, 76, discusses the ascribing of the image to the body by Calvin and similarly concludes: “But Calvin is really concerned here more with a general reflection of God’s majesty in all the works of His hand than with the image of God as including man’s body specifically.”

narrow sense, the image included knowledge of God, holiness and righteousness and these were lost after the Fall. However, man, even in his fallen state remained, man and the image of God in a wide sense was introduced by Reformed theologians in order to express this truth. Thus the image in the wider sense included reason, will, freedom and other unique human capacities that were not obliterated by the Fall.⁸¹

However, I use the terms “specific” and “general” to distinguish between anthropological and revelatory uses of the word in Calvin. On the one hand, Calvin uses the concept of the image of God to answer the question, “What is man?” This is the anthropological, specific use of the expression. On the other hand, Calvin makes man a part of the theatre of creation that displays God’s glory and reveals to us God the Creator. Putting aside the question of whether or not natural knowledge of God is at all possible, we can say that, in Calvin, the intention of the “theatre of creation” is to give general revelation. That is why I call the wide sense of the image of God revelatory.⁸² Granted that this anthropological/revelatory distinction is valid the problem of inclusion of the body in the image of God in Calvin is solved: when he includes the body in the image, he uses the word ‘image’ in the revelatory sense, but he excludes the body from the image of God in the anthropological use of the term.

In order to support this conclusion, I will look more closely at the statements in which Calvin ascribes the image of God to the body.

And although the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers, yet there was no part of man, not even the body itself, in which some sparks did not glow. It is sure that even in the several parts of the world some traces of God’s glory shine. From this we may gather that when his image is placed in man a tacit antithesis is introduced which raises man above all other creatures and, as it were, separates him from the common mass.⁸³

This passage in Calvin gives good grounds for thinking that he used the expression “image of God” in respect of man both in general and specific, or in revelatory and anthropological senses. However, we should note the following things here:

81. See Berkouwer, *Man: The Image of God*, 37–66.

82. Cf. Kooi, *As in a Mirror*, 62, who draws attention to the fact that man, for Calvin, is one of the mirrors by means of which God gives knowledge of himself. The language of mirror thus used corresponds to my “revelatory” sense of the image of God as applied to the human body.

83. I.15.3.

1. The soul is “the primary seat” of the image of God.
2. In the body of man only “sparks” of the image glow.
3. Calvin immediately adds a statement about “traces” of the glory of God (which he also calls image of God elsewhere, cf. Comm. Ps. 19:1, 4) in the world thus intimating that the body is one such “trace” or “spark” where divine glory can be seen.
4. This interpretation is indirectly supported by his earlier remarks in the *Institutes* about the “sparks” of divine glory that are very similar to the present statement about the body: “Yet, in the first place, wherever you cast your eyes, there is no spot in the universe wherein you cannot discern at least some sparks of his glory.”⁸⁴
5. Although Calvin has just admitted that the body can be called an image of God in the sense in which all creation can be called divine image, he underscores that the image of God in the specific, anthropological sense is in the soul alone because this is what makes man different “from the common mass.”

If we look at the other passages where the image of God is attributed to the body, we can, I think, detect a similar terminological pattern: “For although God’s glory shines forth in the outer man, yet there is no doubt that the proper seat of his image is in the soul.”⁸⁵ Again, we see that “the proper seat” of the *imago* is attributed to the soul, and that the shining of “God’s glory” is attributed to the body. But Calvin continues:

I do not deny, indeed, that our outward form, in so far as it distinguishes and separates us from brute animals, at the same time more closely joins us to God. And if anyone wishes to include under “image of God” the fact that, “while all other living things being bent over look earthward, man has been given a face uplifted, bidden to gaze heavenward and to raise his countenance to the stars.” I shall not contend too strongly—provided it be regarded as a settled principle that the image of God, which is seen or glows in these outward marks, is spiritual.⁸⁶

In this passage, it must be admitted, Calvin does speak about the body as the image of God in the specific/anthropological sense—as is clearly seen from his reference to what I called “the second criterion” of the image of God. In other words, if the human body, Calvin says, distinguishes us from the brutes in some ways, then in these respects it is the anthropological image

84. I.5.1.

85. I.15.3.

86. *Ibid.*

of God. However, what should not escape our attention is this: the ways in which the body distinguishes man from the animals are spiritual, that is, only as far as the body reflects, reveals and conducts through the life of the soul, it is the image of God. “The soul does everything. But the condition of the body accurately and intimately reflects the state of the soul.”⁸⁷ The body is not the image in any physical sense (as is clear from Calvin’s argument against Osiander). This, clearly, negates Calvin’s efforts to elevate the body because the presence of the image of God in human physicality is denied.

SUMMARY

The fact that the image of God in Calvin includes a relational element might have solved the problem of axiological dualism. However, this is not what actually happens in Calvin’s anthropology. All three criteria clearly rule out the body as the image of God.⁸⁸ Relation with God (and other men) is based on the intellectual and moral abilities of man that are tied to two primary faculties of the soul: reason and will. Since it is the soul and emphatically not the body that possesses these faculties, the body does not play as important a role in the relationship with God as the soul does. Therefore, the soul is superior to the body.⁸⁹ Ultimately, it is irrelevant if the image of God is present in the body in some measure or not. If Calvin allowed for such statements, it is only to ascribe to the body the goodness of God’s creation and to reject Manichaeism of matter and spirit. The disjunction between the body and the soul in respect to image bearing is present in his thought whether we understand this disjunction as total exclusion of the body from the image or as attributing to the soul the primary content of the image. For Calvin, purely spiritual beings (angels) are superior to men exactly because they do not have bodies: “That the comparison might appear more clearly, he now mentions what the condition of angels is. For calling them spirits, he denotes their eminence; for in this respect they are superior to corporal creatures.”⁹⁰ Thus Calvin’s doctrine of the image of God gives evidence of

87. Miles, “Theology, Anthropology, and the Human Body,” 310.

88. Berkouwer, *Man: The Image of God*, 63, believes that this is the necessary result of any doctrine of the image of God that sees the ontological structure of man as the primary element of the image. He, *ibid.*, 76, thinks that Calvin excluded the body from the image and describes Calvin’s view as “dualism between body and soul.” Warfield, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Creation,” 338, too, recognizes the disparity between body and soul in respect of image bearing: “The only proper seat of the image of God was to him indeed precisely the soul itself . . .”

89. Cf. Comm. 1 Cor 9:11.

90. Com. Heb 1:14.

axiological dualism in his anthropology.⁹¹ However it is important to state again that this is only one line of evidence. We need to move on to the study of other relevant doctrines in Calvin in order to put this evidence in its proper perspective.

SAMPLE

91. Partee, *Calvin and Classical Philosophy*, 65, concludes that “Calvin’s anthropology could, and does, contain a distinction between soul and body without the Platonic division.” This conclusion is justified in respect of Calvin’s doctrine of the resurrection of the body but is inadequate in respect of Calvin’s doctrine of the image of God.