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Martin Heidegger, Charles Taylor, and the Caring Person

Our retrieval of an anthropology of love continues by tracing Heidegger's early turn to Augustine and subsequent hermeneutics of facticity. Charles Taylor is also helpful, providing an account of engaged subjectivity and the moral space making up personal identity. For both, there is no person without a horizon, and there is no horizon without love, so love determines the person, and authenticity moves into central focus.

In the previous chapter we indicated that the turn to subjectivity is somewhat out of favor, especially in its linking to Trinitarian thought in the psychological analogy; with the concept of authenticity we encounter another notion viewed with some suspicion. Deeply entrenched in contemporary consciousness, authenticity's genealogy is complicated and disputed, although certainly Heidegger contributed to authenticity's currency in the last century, mediating the notion to existentialism and general culture.¹ Authenticity has its opponents, however. Not only post-modernists suspicious of any presentation of harmonious, unitary subjectivity, but also those with ethical systems rooted in static accounts of human nature or metaphysical biology, as well as a great many thinkers, more than a few influenced by Tocqueville, identifying in authenticity a pathway to personal and political trivialization, self-indulgence, and endless narcissism.² On the Continent, perhaps the strongest criticism came from Theodor Adorno, who identified in the cult of authenticity

1. Braman, *Meaning and Authenticity*, 3–7.

2. For example, Robert Bellah, Phillippe Beneton, Allan Bloom, Mary Ann Glendon, Christopher Lasch, Peter Augustine Lawler, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Jonathan Sacks.

a secularized and corrupted religion, shorn of transcendence, in which it mattered not what was professed so long as it was professed, a great trivialization as well as a moral calamity, particularly with memory of the *Shoah* and Heidegger's "authentic" involvement with the Nazis in the immediate background.³

While we go beyond Heidegger and Taylor to the thought of Bernard Lonergan in subsequent chapters, the two are important for any retrieval of intentionality for anthropology. While Heidegger's account of authenticity has serious lacunae, his pivoting to care as a primary category of human existence provides a helpful correction to the disengaged rationalism of so much modern philosophy, and, moreover, places intentionality firmly *alongside* relation to others, sociality, language, embodiment, heritage, place, and temporality rather than remaining trapped within an account of subjectivity privileging a merely mental and punctual self. Taylor, too, articulates an account of the person always already beyond themselves, with others, and for whom genuine authenticity requires a form of self-transcendence escaping those degraded forms of authenticity haunting contemporary thought and life.

HEIDEGGER AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY

In his 1921 lectures on Augustine's *Confessions*, Heidegger ruminates on the Augustinian insight that humans are a question to themselves.⁴ Standing before a God who knows all things, Augustine wonders what it might mean to confess to one from whom nothing is concealed, and he "wants to dare confess himself . . . only what he knows about himself," and yet he does not know everything about himself but "wants to confess that too."⁵ He has become a question to himself.

Knowing that he loves God, he does not know what he loves in loving God, for God is not known: "Augustine attempts to find an answer . . . by investigating what there is which is worthy of love, and by asking whether there is something among them which God himself is . . . what suffices . . . or saturates, that which, in the love of God, he intends."⁶ Already distancing himself from the modern problematic and its de-

3. Braman, *Meaning and Authenticity*, 5–7.

4. Heidegger, "Augustine and Neo-Platonism." See also Lawrence, "Hermeneutic Revolution and the Future of Theology," and "Lonergan's Hermeneutics of Facticity."

5. Heidegger, "Augustine and Neo-Platonism," 129–30.

6. *Ibid.*

mand for objective distance, Heidegger claims that Augustine cannot confess himself with an “attitude . . . of natural-scientific research,” but must turn inward to his own soul and to the *memoria* in which he meets and recalls himself.⁷ To put it another way, to find the answer of himself, he turns to love, for “what determines the answers we discover to the question that we are for ourselves is . . . only disclosed by our loving. What we love massively conditions our concrete solution to the problem of living together.”⁸ Consequently, Heidegger finds in his retrieval of Augustine an ally in overcoming the “ahistorical, atemporal, decontextualizing of the self” endemic to modern philosophy, and a path forward to the breakthroughs of *Being and Time*.⁹ Heidegger stresses that search for the truth was “contorted through Greek philosophy” with its concerns for correspondence and the metaphysics of substances, but that Augustine allows for the search to “be taken back into the existential-historical unity” of historical-factual lived existence.¹⁰ Everyone prefers truth to falsehood as naturally as they want the happy life, Heidegger says, linking the two, for “a happy life is the joy of truth, and truth is experienced as joy when encountered in one’s lived experience. So all are “somehow rejoicing in, and making an effort towards, the truth” of existence, for in “factual life, human beings somehow intimate something right, love in it and for it as something significant,” and yet “why are they nonetheless not in the *beata vita* . . . why does the joy which corresponds to such *veritas* not live in them?”¹¹ Humans, it would seem, “do wish that the ‘truth’ reveals itself to them . . . but they themselves close themselves off against it. . . .”¹²

The care of Augustine is transposed into the *curare*, or “being concerned” of phenomenology, and *curare*, for Heidegger, is the basic constitutive character of factual life, concrete selfhood, including our troubles and temptations.¹³ If one was concerned for God alone, if one was continent, one would not be scattered in many directions, and yet

7. *Ibid.*, 130, 131, 137.

8. Lawrence, “Lonergan’s Hermeneutics of Facticity,” 427.

9. Heidegger, *Being and Time*.

10. Heidegger, “Augustine and Neo-Platonism,” 146.

11. *Ibid.*, 146–47.

12. *Ibid.*, 148.

13. *Ibid.*, 151.

one is scattered “into the manifold and . . . absorbed in the dispersion.”¹⁴ Life is full of troubles (*molestia*) to occupy concern, and moves within a temporal oscillation between grief and joy, prosperity and adversity.¹⁵ Human life is “nothing but constant temptation,” and “Augustine experiences factual life” in the “fundamental character” of *tentatio*, and so is “necessarily a burden to himself.”¹⁶ In *tentatio* humans finds themselves and cannot know themselves other than through the *tentatio* of concrete and performative human living, and in a lifetime of burdens, judged over and against the relation to God, both human existence and God come to be known.

Heidegger did not work out clearly the relationship of sin and *molestia*, despite his dependence on Augustine. He would appear to identify factual, historical existence (*Faktizität*) with *molestia*, which would render sinfulness part of human nature, or reduce sinfulness to mere finitude. Another way of posing this would be to ask whether fallenness meant a fall from grace or simply human finitude, and Heidegger seems to reduce it to finitude, to temporality and its oscillations, at least in part influenced by his secularizing of Augustine with his use of Aristotle in developing the hermeneutics of facticity of *Being and Time*.¹⁷ Leaving sin and grace aside, Heidegger interprets the troubles and temptations of Augustine as “simply challenges to human seriousness and authenticity,” as the idle-chatter and trivial lack of self-appropriation of the inauthentic self.¹⁸

Dasein Is Care

The pattern of care and fallenness is repeated in *Being and Time*, where Heidegger wishes to overcome the easy forgetfulness of the question of Being and its meaning. Inquiry into Being is made difficult in that every inquiry “gets guided beforehand by what is sought,” and so we must be vaguely familiar enough with Being to know what we are looking for; we have already an average everyday understanding of being.¹⁹ Our inter-

14. Ibid., 152.

15. Lawrence, “Hermeneutic Revolution,” 333–34.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 335.

18. Ibid.

19. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 25.

rogation could be about entities or substances in the world, but which ones would be the best place to start when Being is universal, related to all that is? Heidegger suggests that the interrogation should be of those entities who interrogate, of those entities for whom the question of the meaning of being matters:

Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own Being. This very asking of the question is an entity's mode of *Being*; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about—namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term *Dasein*.²⁰

Dasein, the interrogator, also serves as that which is interrogated, with inquiry itself a hint to the mode of Being of Dasein. Knowing is “fueled by desire, it is not neutral” and so there is a fundamental reflexivity (even circularity) to the inquiry, for the study of being will be the study of the one caring about the question.²¹

Methodologically, *Being and Time* is placed firmly in the turn to the subject, a move which Heidegger later rejected, bemoaning its continued linkage to “phenomenology as propped on egology,” and still dependent on consciousness, *Bewusstsein*, in a Kantian or Cartesian sense.²² His purpose in the text, however, is not a departure from the general question of Being, but a judgment that the question is best understood by a grasp of our own concern for the question. First grasping the Being of Dasein, he intends to circle back in moves of retrieval and reinterpretation to the broad question, but the “ontological analytic of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology, so that Dasein functions as that entity which in principle is to be *interrogated* beforehand as to its Being . . . that entity which already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about. . . .”²³

Access to Dasein begins not from some abstract (thus alienated) theoretical conception of the human essence, but in the concrete situatedness of everyday living, the way Dasein (being-there) exists always

20. Ibid., 27.

21. Marsh, “Self-Appropriation,” 57; cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 27.

22. Lawrence, “Hermeneutic Revolution,” 338; cf. Lawrence, “Fragility of Consciousness,” 55–94; Lawrence, “Lonergan, the Integral Postmodern?,” 95–122.

23. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 35.

already in the world—Dasein does not exist in the “in here” of mental space, but *there*, in the projects and tools and relations of the world, and certainly the Cartesian problem of getting back out-there is for Heidegger the sort of issue emerging long after ordinary Dasein has abstracted themselves from their concrete existence. Consequently, in interrogating Dasein’s mode of Being, Heidegger dwells on an exploration of average everydayness in which Dasein’s fundamental mode of being-there is to be-with others (*Mitsein*). Consequently, the study of Being begins with catching “ourselves in the act of everyday existence” in which we are not distinterested observers of human nature, “but *engaged actors*,” relating to our Being not “primarily through knowledge of self-consciousness, but through acting, through capably dealing with the beings around us.”²⁴

Dasein is engaged with the world because the world matters to Dasein, as does the question of Being. In fact, the very Being of Dasein is that things *matter*, or as Heidegger puts it, “Dasein’s Being is care (*Sorge*).”²⁵ It has concern for Being, its own as well as the world’s, and for Dasein the world is articulated and ordered around what matters, what is pressing, what concerns Dasein. Care is the transcendental condition of possibility of being-there for Dasein, for the world is disclosed and opened because of Dasein’s standing towards it in engagement, the responsibilities and projects and possibilities envisioned and enacted by Dasein.

Care has a fundamental structure and is comprised of “facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), and falling.”²⁶ As thrown, Dasein “has been brought into its ‘there,’ but *not* of its own accord . . . it never comes back behind its thrownness in such a way that it might first release this ‘that-it-is-and-has-to-be from *its Being-its-Self*.”²⁷ We find ourselves already existing in a world, as factual, and Heidegger emphasizes the role of mood, or attunement, in disclosing the fact of our being in the world; attunement also reveals our past history, for we find ourselves already thrown, having already been here, “always disclosed as that entity . . . delivered over in its Being.”²⁸ Moods are fundamental and

24. Polt, *Heidegger*, 45.

25. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 329.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*, 329–30.

28. *Ibid.*, 173.

cannot be excised, and we are always attuned to the world in a certain way, with the mood disclosing the world in some particular, thus partial, form. Consequently, any goal of a perfectly objective, perfectly universal vantage point is naive, for as thrown we always, and can only, have a world disclosed in a certain way, under a certain guise, from a particular stance, from a certain engagement.²⁹

Not only the world, but Dasein is revealed by mood, for “whether explicitly or not, it finds itself in its thrownness. In a state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has.”³⁰ This self-disclosure occurs “*prior to all cognition and volition*,” and so is a more primordial form of self-disclosure than the *cogito* ever could be, for only once disclosed to itself as existing could the Cartesian *cogito* have the capacity to interrogate itself, or care to.

If thrownness, or facticity, is the first structure of care revealing the already-ness of being-there, a past, *existence* as a second structure of care discloses Dasein’s future projects. Finding ourselves in a world, in a certain mood, entities are disclosed to us in a variety of different modes, and we understand and interpret these entities and our relation to them. Understanding (*Verstehen*) is a stand, or way of letting things be involved with our care in this or that way, in this or that stance, so as to disclose things in relation to various possibilities of our projects. For the sake of being an athlete we disclose the being of a ball; for the sake of being a good parent to a toddler we disclose a different being for the same ball.³¹ Having taken a stance towards the ball, I can form an assertion about the ball in a propositional form, although usually there is no reason to do so, and my interpretation comes not necessarily in my words or concepts but in the projects and uses with which I approach the ball. Understanding, therefore, is a way of projecting possibilities, of possible interpretations.

Every interpretation occurs within the past which is already given, including Dasein’s own thrownness, but Dasein is not static and their Being is not merely what they have been or now are, for Dasein is also what they can be; Dasein, thus, can interpret themselves in light of their

29. Polt, *Heidegger*, 67.

30. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 174.

31. Polt, *Heidegger*, 68.

future projects, and the entities and the world are interpreted in light of these forward projections. Of course, possibilities are conditioned by the significance Dasein already has for itself and its world; having already interpreted entities *as* this or *as* that, possibilities bring along previous interpretations, for Dasein approaches possibilities from what has already been: “Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us.”³²

Under the guise of some interpretation, entities are revealed *as* a this or that, and as disclosed the entity has meaning, although meaning arises from our ability to project possibility—things mean because they matter to some way in which I engage them, otherwise they would not mean. As such, entities mean because they refer to Dasein’s projects, inhabiting a location within the totality of the projects, for Dasein’s world is a totality of references, which is to say a totality of projects or engagements. No entity stands alone in some isolated atomic understanding of perception or significance, but all are linked together in a series of articulations, with this connected to that and that to this other in the web of purposes, uses, interpretations. The articulation of the world into intelligibility is what Heidegger calls discourse, the condition of possibility of language.³³

The third structure of care, fallenness, borrowed but secularized from Augustine, deserves longer treatment.

Fallenness: The Cares of das Man

We are not engaged actors in isolation, and in our average everydayness we exist with others in a common world of meanings and interpretations. Unlike the Cartesian *cogito* struggling to convince itself that others exist, we are not normally reflexive and self-consciously aware of ourselves as distinct, solitary individuals; we tend to exist alongside others in pretty much the same way that everyone else exists: “I do *not* normally exist as myself—I exist as just anyone, as no one in particular.”³⁴ So while Dasein “is in each case one’s *own* . . . for the most part, one does

32. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 190–91.

33. *Ibid.*, 203.

34. Polt, *Heidegger*, 60.

not distinguish oneself.”³⁵ Consequently, we simply do not gain access to ourselves through the form of introspection which thinks of itself as a solitary inner-gazing of the mind but rather are inescapably social and enculturated beings.

Usually, one does not own one’s own existence as one’s own, but lives as “the they” do, as *das Man* does. When one is inauthentic, one is the they-self, for then “they” determine one’s own possibilities and projects “within the limits which have been established with the ‘they’s’ averageness.”³⁶ Authenticity, however, living as one’s own self, is not a fundamental departure from the “they” but rather a mode of being alongside and with others: “Authenticity does not involve jettisoning one’s own tradition—which is impossible—but *clear-sightedly* and *resolutely* pursuing a possibility that is opened up by this tradition.”³⁷ Consequently, it is not as if living along with the “they” is a moral failing, it is not, because the “they” is an inescapable element of our ontology, “it belongs to *Dasein’s* positive constitution.”³⁸

Still, our status as embroiled with the “they” makes self-interpretation difficult, not only because the relations of average everydayness are usually not thematized, but also because “covered over and distorted” by the patterns of *das Man*, particularly the “they’s” penchant for idle-chatter, gossip, curiosity, and various forms of dissipation into the “mundane aspects of human living with little or no reflection.”³⁹ In giving our own selves over to the inauthentic they-self, we are distracted from our ownmost selves by the cares and concerns borrowed from the “they”—*molestia* and *tentatio* secularized.

The need to resolutely determine one’s own possibilities becomes hidden, and everything becomes “concernful absorption in the world we encounter as closest to us . . . and the ‘they’ articulates the referential context of significance.”⁴⁰ Meaning is held in common, automatic, unchosen, and the “they” maintains, even enforces, the averageness “which it regards as valid . . . which it grants success . . . it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore” in a leveling down

35. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 154.

36. *Ibid.*, 164, 167.

37. Polt, *Heidegger*, 63.

38. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 167.

39. Braman, *Meaning and Authenticity*, 10.

40. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 165.

into “publicness . . . control[ling] every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted.”⁴¹ In publicness every possibility “gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone” and Dasein is relieved of the burden of its own existence and the determination of its ownmost possibilities.⁴²

Of course, it is only in this space that Dasein encounters anything in the world, including its own self, and so the “they” and they-self make possible the disclosure of the world of significance, of meaningful referentiality and value, and without *das Man* there would be no Dasein—Dasein exists as being-with. The very possibility of things disclosing themselves to us, revealing their truth, depends on the disclosure of sociality, and we live in truth as a result. But we live simultaneously in untruth, because fallenness results in superficial interpretations of everything, a closing off of possibilities and a hiding of what could be grasped. Things are revealed, but in a closed off manner. Only the temporal closing of one’s own death allows authenticity, for only in the recognition of Being-towards-death (*Sein zum Tode*) does one’s ownmost possibility emerge, and with it the possibility of resoluteness in other projects and concerns which all end in death. Being-towards-death reveals the truth of things, their “ripeness” and “end,” a revelation linked closely to mood.⁴³

Mood, especially that of anxiety, is a somewhat rare rupture of the familiar and usual chains of significance; the distractions of everydayness are thrown back to disclose Dasein’s ownmost possibility, which is nothingness. Fallenness generally covers over this possibility in the routine of borrowed meanings and projects, but this tranquility is inauthentic, it is “a constant temptation . . . Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting,”⁴⁴ in a mode similar to the *tentatio* of Augustine.⁴⁵ *Tentatio* “drives one into uninhibited hustle,” into the various inauthentic concerns (*molestia*) of the fallen, an “alienation [which] closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility.” In anxiety, however, Dasein is revealed as one for whom Being matters, and in this care can choose identity, although not in a completely undefined way, for the past has

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 274–90.

44. Ibid., 221.

45. Ibid., 222.

shaped what is, and Dasein cannot leap out of the past. Since Dasein is care, Dasein is *never* separated from the world, from others, from projects or purposes; since Being matters to Dasein, it is always already, and always ahead-of-time engaged with meaning. We are worlded, there is for us reality, only because our very being is care. Our loves run ahead of us to what we *could be*, and what the world could be, because our loves have already made us what we *have been* and what we *now are*. Love makes the world what it is.

CHARLES TAYLOR AND ENGAGED AGENCY

Heidegger's notion of authenticity is grounded in the notion of appropriating embeddedness or involvement; humans simply do not exist as disengaged or uninvolved with their world, they do not stand outside a world distinctly "out there" as opposed to the "in here" of our subjective inner life. Instead, we are always already involved and engaged with the world in our projects and concerns and cares, something that Heidegger, Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas all articulate in their own way, and with varying levels of sophistication.

Charles Taylor carries forward the project of "engaged human agency," in some opposition to reductive naturalism.⁴⁶ Influenced by the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Taylor thinks we are "condemned to meaning," with lives "structured by inescapable layers of meaning or significance."⁴⁷ This is primarily true because things are not-indifferent to us, they matter, and we are always engaged with the world because we are in it; there is no dispassionate or disengaged rationality viewing the world as a camera might.⁴⁸ In the brief sections to follow, we articulate the core of Taylor's anthropology of engaged agency, as well as something of his account of authenticity which follows from the anthropology.

Condemned to Involvement

Taylor claims that authenticity is a contemporary moral ideal often "degraded but . . . worthwhile in itself," although retrieval is needed to

46. Taylor, "Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger."

47. Smith, *Charles Taylor*, 1.

48. *Ibid.*, 7.

recover its normative and valuable contribution.⁴⁹ Whereas the ideal of authenticity is “being true to oneself,” it easily becomes, in reality as well as caricature, an ethic of trivial self-indulgence, relativism, and even absurdity as those striving to be themselves become conformists in their dependence on ready-made and fashionable identities.⁵⁰ Many opponents of authenticity view it as an abandonment of standards and criteria, either those rooted in human nature or philosophical methodology, and suspect that a soft relativism of individualism inevitably follows, with each person claiming a right to determine their own sense of what really matters in a “centring on the self and a concomitant sitting out, or even unawareness, of the greater issues or concerns that transcend the self, be they religious, political, historical.”⁵¹

Taylor counters such objections with both a sophisticated history of selfhood and a moral ontology, with a unifying theme the role of meaning for selfhood. For Taylor, we are condemned to meaning. Even perception is laden with meaning, for like animals we tend to note what interests us while disregarding what does not, like how a predator perceives the mouse somewhat differently than it does a rock—those things which have significance tend to stand out in perception.⁵² Further, consciousness would always seem to be intentional, “of” or “about” something, but Taylor learns from Merleau-Ponty that the directedness of consciousness is compounded by “intentionality-as-significance,” for intentionality is not just “about” but always directed-for or towards something.⁵³ On a naïve model of perception, our experience of the world would be relatively undifferentiated, just one sensation after another pulsing into consciousness as discrete atomic experiences. But experience is not really like this, for the perception is already significant, not only because of what we are interested in noting but also because phenomenal objects bear witness to structures of significance, revealing or covering over other objects and purposes in a nexus of significance. Imagine the difficulty of perceiving a tool, a hammer, without situating it within a context of its purposes, of nails and picture frames, of use and behavior.

49. Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, 23.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*, 14.

52. *Ibid.*, 2.

53. *Ibid.*, 27.

We tend to relate desire to purpose and action, but we interpret rather than perceive the meaning of an action, often when the significance of the action is unclear or complicated, and interpretations are not always without ambiguity or conflict. At times interpreting an action reveals to us a saturation of significance, a weight to the action somewhat more than was expected, and even some desires themselves are interpreted by us as more significant than other desires, more worthwhile to have and pursue. A momentary interest in a dessert seems to us less worthwhile than health, even though both are positioned within the space of how we conceive and value our own worth. We can be disappointed that we chose dessert over health, especially if we promised ourselves to moderate our desires because a loved one asked us to do so; consequently, the interpretations and significance of desires includes an interpretation of our own identity and value, the way of life around which our identity revolves, and in that light some desires and projects seem starkly more worthwhile than others.⁵⁴

Desires operate within a structure of significance and evaluation, with some interpretations serving as terminal, from which we situate ourselves, our desires, and our self-interpretations in relief to those terminal ideals; for us, they are normative and constitutive of how we understand our identity. Despite the importance these highest values play in our lives, identifying and understanding them is frustratingly hard. Our identities develop and change over time, we exist within a variety of communities and their competing identity claims, and we are aware that other identities and values exist, sometimes at odds with our own, and yet seem highly successful and desirable. Our identity-shaping values themselves can lose their obviousness, can become less desirable than we once imagined, and as a result the narrative of our life can alter.

Given the link between intentionality and identity, Taylor rejects the subject-object split of the Cartesian imagination, with subjectivity disengaged from the world behind the veil of ideas and wondering if it will ever be in contact with the world again. Any adequate description of a human being as intentional must include the directedness or purposive nature of intentionality and how the person's consciousness always exhibits a stance, a comportment by which the agent interprets and "copes" with the world, thus revealing their deep engagement with the world and the impossibility of having any identity without engaged

54. Ibid.

subjectivity.⁵⁵ To perceive is already to be caught up into “an overall sense of ourselves and our world. . . .”⁵⁶ Consequently, since even to perceive is to be caught up into the drama of our own identity and the interpretation of our own self, Taylor claims that human selfhood has an intrinsic and inescapable moral dimension—morality is a necessary dimension of subjectivity.⁵⁷

In an early work, Taylor distinguished strong and weak evaluations, or between two stances that persons take when they evaluate.⁵⁸ Borrowing from Harry Frankfurt’s distinction of first- and second-order desires, Taylor agrees that humans share with animals behaviors which satisfy first-order desires for food, safety, or reproduction, but unlike animals humans have desires about their own desires, evaluating their own desires and ascribing praise and blame. Taylor asks another question, however, about the ways we go about evaluating our desires, and argues we can do so either according to a strong or weak evaluation. Strong evaluations judge the worth of desires whereas weak evaluations “weigh alternatives” to judge the degree and amount of satisfaction made possible.⁵⁹ In other words, weak evaluations deliberate on the instrumentality of actions, and are based in satisfaction, whereas strong evaluations judge the worth of the desires themselves based on relatively stable and important interpretations of one’s identity—strong evaluations place preferences in relief against what is most valued to a person, thus revealing how they interpret their own selves.⁶⁰

Since strong evaluations involve claims about the self, Taylor concludes that human subjectivity is irreducibly linked to morality, with morality part of the ontology of human subjectivity—we are *valuing and evaluating beings*.⁶¹ Strong evaluators have a sense of self and its depth quite distinct from weak evaluators, and the ability to understand one’s own self as a strong evaluator reveals that selfhood is not a property one possesses the way a substance “has” properties but is understood insofar as one grasps one’s own ability to distinguish worth.

55. Baker, *Tayloring Reformed Epistemology*, 107.

56. *Ibid.*

57. Smith, *Taylor*, 87.

58. Taylor, *Human Agency and Language*, 15–19.

59. *Ibid.*, 23.

60. Smith, *Taylor*, 90.

61. Baker, *Tayloring Reformed Epistemology*, 109.

If there were only weak evaluations, an agent faced with some choice would perhaps understand that a plurality of preferences were at play, possibly pulling in different directions, and yet the agent would have not much more than a sense of feeling some desires more strongly than others. An agent capable of strong evaluation, on the other hand, judges some desires as worth more, as superior in quality. Importantly, the qualitative framework works its way into the desires themselves, as wanting to live a good and worthwhile life is itself desired.⁶²

Taylor frames worth in the language of value—*strong values* are those goods serving as standards against which we judge the worth of desires as well as the worth of our choices and identity. In *Sources of the Self* he identifies three categories of strong values, (1) those goods “which cluster around the sense that human life is to be respected . . .,” (2) our sense of “what constitutes a rich, meaningful life,” and (3) those notions “concerned with dignity . . . the characteristics by which we think of ourselves as commanding (or failing to command) the respect of those around us.”⁶³ Distinct times and cultures understand and weigh the goods differently, but the distinguishing mark of modernity is its problematic stance towards the second category of goods, namely the sense of a good life. All cultures have questions related to this category, but tend to view the framework which answers these questions as being unproblematic or unquestioned, simply *the* measure against which one judges the worth of a life. Modernity, on the other hand, has questioned these traditional frameworks—consider the status of religion or family honor or patriotism as self-evident goods—rendering some obsolete, others highly contested, resulting in the sense that no framework could ever be considered *the* framework of morality.⁶⁴

The fragility of the frameworks results in the sense that respect for other persons involves respecting their capacity to “express and develop their own opinions, to define their own life conceptions, to draw up their own life-plans.”⁶⁵ So reoriented is the conception of self that at least part of the modern understanding of respect for others includes the capacity of each person to recognize the fragility of frameworks and to develop “an *individualized* identity, one that is particular to me, and that I dis-

62. Smith, *Taylor*, 93.

63. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 14–15.

64. *Ibid.*, 16–17; cf. Taylor, *Secular Age*, 146–58.

65. *Ibid.*, 25.

cover in myself. This notion arises along with an ideal, that of being true to myself and my own particular way of being,” which is authenticity.⁶⁶

While particular frameworks are contingent and historical, frameworks are necessary, for human agents are inextricably linked to strong values and have no identity without an interpreted relation to the good. For Taylor, this is an ontological thesis—without a moral dimension, human agency would be impossible, so humans cannot but be oriented to the good, or at least a stance towards the good:

... the claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood . . . To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.⁶⁷

The notion of a horizon in which to take a stand is interesting. There might be a tendency to read the language of “taking a stand” as if it means “standing up for something,” which it may on occasion mean, but it generally means something more basic. Much like perception occurs within a clearing of significance, so too do human agents occupy “moral space,” in which they navigate their decisions, evaluate the worth of their desires and actions, form an identity, and even, perhaps, stand up for something.⁶⁸ Moral space is a basic ontological reality for humans, and to be without space, or to lose it, would be to “not know who one is,” or even to not be anyone, to lack selfhood.⁶⁹ Borrowing from Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception, Taylor articulates the absolute necessity of horizons from which to orient one’s being:

Our perceptual field has an orientational structure, a foreground and a background, an up and down. And it must have; that is, it can’t lose this structure without ceasing to be a perceptual field in the full sense, our opening onto a world. In those rare moments

66. Taylor, *Multiculturalism*, 28.

67. *Ibid.*, 27; cf. Smith, *Taylor*, 88.

68. *Ibid.*, 29.

69. *Ibid.*

where we lose orientation, we don't know where we are; and we don't know where or what things are either; we lose the thread of the world . . . the confused debris into which our normal grasp on things crumbles.⁷⁰

Assuming that a person was free of moral horizons, or frameworks of strong values, as if they took a view from nowhere with a head empty of pre-judgments, would not result in a perfectly rational and enlightened person, but rather “an appalling identity crisis,” a person with “no orientation,” even “pathological.”⁷¹

We cannot be intelligible without horizons of meaning, although we do experience moments where meaning threatens to crumble into nothingness along with our identities. Moral space is neither fixed nor static, and just as selfhood was not understood by Taylor as a metaphysical property, neither is the unity of selfhood; still, while our identities change there is a unity to the narrative of ourselves.⁷² Unlike the disengaged subject of Descartes or the punctual self of Locke, we are not able to view ourselves from above, so to speak, or from the vantage point of eternity, and see with clarity and certainty the self and identity we are.⁷³ Instead, we grasp ourselves as having a direction, aware that a meaningful life is a good to be pursued, aware that there is a narrative unity to our various projects and purposes, even when they change over time. But we do all this from *within* our narrations and self-interpretations, from within our coming to terms with the world. Taylor insists that our viewpoint is “essentially that of an embodied agent, engaged with or at grips with the world” whereby we make sense of ourselves.⁷⁴

Determining which good to seek, and how to interpret our own selves in light of the changing goods to which we are devoted, is a matter of practical reasoning and not the rule-following of universal criteria; there is no better “measure of reality . . . in human affairs than those terms which on critical reflection and after correction of errors we detect make the best sense of our lives . . . not only offering the best, most realistic orientation about the good but also allowing us best to understand and make sense of the actions and feeling of ourselves and

70. Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, 23.

71. *Ibid.*, 31.

72. Smith, *Taylor*, 97–98.

73. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 143–76.

74. Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, 23.

others.”⁷⁵ The best account standard is less about what is necessary and more about how to become what we wish to be.

Key to this internal development are what Taylor refers to as hypergoods, “incomparably more important than others . . . the standpoint from which these must be weighted, judged, and decided about.”⁷⁶ Given the potential conflicts of our desires, as well as the development of ourselves and our projects, frameworks tend to a terminus in a higher order good against which all other goods are judged or ranked—there is something, or perhaps several—of “overriding importance.”⁷⁷ Generally, this good provides the direction of a life, and while there are many values and strong evaluations, many judgments of better or worse to be made between competing goods, “the one highest good has a special place. It is orientation to this which comes closest to defining my identity, and therefore my direction to this good is of unique importance to me. Whereas I naturally want to be well placed in relation to all and any of the goods I recognize and to be moving towards rather than away from them, my direction in relation to this good has a crucial importance.”⁷⁸ Movement towards this good brings with it a sense of a good life, fullness; failure to attain, or to live up to this good calls for judgment and a sense of meaninglessness, however many of the other, lesser goods are attained.

Naturalism clouds understanding of hypergoods, says Taylor, both in assuming that our grasp should “neutralize our own anthropocentric reactions” so that our moral intuitions, purposes, and meanings are ignored or exorcized in keeping with some objective moral criteria, and by assuming that conflicting accounts of hypergoods could be made commensurable by the appropriate methodological procedures.⁷⁹ Instead, argues Taylor, hypergoods are identified precisely by what *means* to us, what *moves* us in our biographical narrative towards a sense of wholeness, significance, or authenticity. Nor is it beneficial to conceive of hypergoods as transcending human experience—the way that some might think of the moral significance of God or the Good—for hypergoods are elements of *our* horizons, our life projects and hermeneutics. This is not

75. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 56.

76. *Ibid.*, 62–75.

77. *Ibid.*, 62.

78. *Ibid.*, 63.

79. *Ibid.*, 73.

to say that there is not a God or a Good or an Ultimate Value, but it is to say that (1) one does not start with that value as an external criterion and deduce to conclusions of what is to be done, or (2) that higher goods are independent of our horizons. If they were utterly independent, they would be for us nothing, just as we would be utterly perplexed and disoriented without them, for engaged agency operates from within our stance to the world of value and from within our attempts to evaluate who we are, and how to come to grips with it all.⁸⁰

Hypergoods do not compel because of their deductive force but because we experience “being *moved*.”⁸¹ Even when we glide along in obedience to authority or tradition without ourselves understanding or feeling the moral sources of the authority, we grasp that the founders were moved, and we trust their own compulsion, but in any event, hypergoods, the focal point of moral horizons and personal identities, are grounded in our strongest cares and concerns, our loves:

We sense in every experience of being moved by some higher good that we are moved by what is good in it rather than that it is valuable because of our reaction. We are moved by it seeing its point as something infinitely valuable. We experience our love for it as a well-founded love. Nothing that couldn't move me in *this* way would count as a hypergood.⁸²

To those bewitched by naturalism, Taylor claims, this cannot sound like anything other than subjectivism. He disagrees, claiming instead that his hermeneutics of engagement reveals an inescapable moral ontology, just as it reveals a normative element to authenticity, namely that the authentic subject loves what is deemed valuable. The rabid individualism feared by the moralists is in essence self-defeating because it knowingly makes insignificant (and thus incapable of the power to move) the terminus of the frameworks of identity, rendering the entire framework insignificant, and utterly perplexing. Just as a perceiver without a perceptual field was completely disoriented, and the self without a framework incoherent and pathological, so too would narcissism with respect to hypergoods erase the source of personal identity and worth, rendering the self utterly insignificant: “Which issues are significant,

80. Braman, *Meaning and Authenticity*, 36–37.

81. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 73.

82. *Ibid.*

I do not determine. If I did, no issue would be significant. But then the very ideal of self-choosing *as a moral ideal* would be impossible.”⁸³ Authenticity cannot be defended, he claims, by collapsing horizons of significance, and even the sense that our own self-determination is utterly important, “depends on the understanding that *independent of my will* there is something noble, courageous, and hence significant in giving shape to my own life.”⁸⁴ Certainly it is the case that degraded forms of self-fulfillment may be trivial and narcissistic, but authenticity depends upon a turn to the subject which “decenters inwardness” in self-transcendence:⁸⁵

... I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find in myself, would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters. Only if I exist in a world in which history, or the demands or nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order *matters* crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial. Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands.⁸⁶

Authenticity demands values transcending the subject, which move the subject by being worthwhile, but not as some distant object proffering rules or demanding servile acquiescence. Instead, authenticity involves “being true to ourselves, but defining who we are as selves first involves being engaged by transcendent realities so that our self-interpretations might be informed by these sources.”⁸⁷

Of course, given his phenomenology, Taylor considers humans always already involved with the world of value, it is not as if the turn to the subject traps us behind a veil of ideas in some atomistic monad—there is no agent not already operating within a background and foreground of their cares and concerns, no self not already formed by a biography and a narrative of their own projects alongside others, history, and tradition. A thorough-going turn to the subject is a turn to the other, it is a

83. Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, 39.

84. Ibid.

85. Plants, “Decentering Inwardness,” 13–32.

86. Taylor, *Ethics of Authenticity*, 40–41.

87. Plants, “Decentering Inwardness,” 16.

decentered self. The bogeyman of the modern subject, like most bogeymen, does not exist, nor could it ever exist, except in imagination. The problem with the subjective turn of modernity was that it turned only to mental space rather than to authentic subjectivity. In a thorough-going turn one discovers intentionality, and thus love, which carries the subject into the world, with and for others, and into that which has value. The opponents of authenticity fear that authenticity requires “repudiation of qualitative distinctions, a rejection of constitutive goods as such” but fail to recognize that freedom and authenticity are themselves “reflections of qualitative distinctions and presuppose some conception of qualitative goods.”⁸⁸ For Taylor, subjectivity is not enlarged “at the expense of otherness . . . responsibility for the Other is integrated into the structure of selfhood. . . .”⁸⁹

CONCLUSION

In the Introduction we cited with approval J. Donald Monan’s claim that liberal education properly understood would be oriented towards the formation of the care for value. He says as well, “the critical test of human fulfillment and of liberal education is of the same order: It is no mere question of speculative knowing or not knowing, but it is a question either of richness or of emptiness of life.”⁹⁰ In the chapters since, we have developed the outlines of a creative retrieval of a philosophical anthropology rooted in love, claiming that this anthropology is evident, admittedly with various levels of sophistication and methodical clarity, by Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Heidegger, and Taylor. To be sure, despite their political and civil concerns, the anthropology in Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas is perhaps more about mind than sociality, and we read Heidegger and Taylor as providing needed developments for the tradition of inwardness. The inner turn bereft of the hermeneutics of facticity and engagement can indeed sink into the veil of ideas entrapping the disengaged, disembodied, punctual self, even into the excesses of self-indulgent narcissism feared by the opponents of authenticity. So the tradition of inwardness develops its account of love to grasp its engagement with the world of value, meaning, and self-transcendence.

88. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 98.

89. Smith, *Taylor*, 113.

90. Monan, “Value Proposition.”

Still, it seems to us that the figures examined thus far have not yet adequately articulated the structures of intentionality.⁹¹ The tradition first performed intentionality analysis (Plato, Augustine, Aquinas) before reflecting on it explicitly (Heidegger and Taylor), but the structure of intentionality is not fully articulated, neither are the concrete effects of sin and grace. Given the background of the previous chapters, we turn for the remainder of the book to the thought of Bernard Lonergan, albeit in conversation with others, to provide the detailed structure of intentionality needed for the normative fullness of authenticity, to understand the role of conversion, to grasp the effects of sin and grace on the performance of love, and to grasp the full directedness of value and love. Only with a threefold conversion—intellectual, moral, and religious—is authenticity fully redeemed and subjectivity fully engaged.

91. See Plants, “Decentering Inwardness,” 14. See also his “Lonergan and Taylor,” 143–72.